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Abstract 
 
 
Since the transformation from Political Economy to Economics and from Classical to 
Neoclassical theory in the late nineteenth century, a theory of human behavior has 
constituted the initial foundation upon which all economic theory is based and developed.  
Two main theories of human behavior developed by William Stanley Jevons and Carl 
Menger have been generally accepted to have ushered in this Marginalist Revolution.  
Jevons’ marginal utility theory popularized by Alfred Marshall is still extensively used 
today, while the Austrian approach of Menger was effectively removed from academic 
discussion in the nineteen thirties; mainly as a result of the annexation of Austria and the 
dissolution of the Austrian School of Economics.  Given the inability of economists to 
fully operationalize the marginal utility theory and realistically explain and resolve a 
broad range of behavioral anomalies using Neoclassical and Post-Neoclassical 
Economics, this thesis attempts to examine and address the most fundamental issues of 
human behavior in economics to explain how utility theory and modern Neoclassical and 
Post-Neoclassical Economics are flawed and how a realistic theory of human behavior, 
developed from the scholarly work of the early Austrian Economists, can be used to 
develop the basis of a scientific economics, derived from observation, that holds the 
potential to both expand the scope of economic understanding, redirect the focus of the 
discipline, and possibly unify the many disparate theories in the field.   
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Common sense is the best distributed thing in the whole world.  Everyone thinks 
that they are well endowed with it, so that even those who are most difficult to 
please in every other respect do not usually wish to have more than they already 
possess.  It is unlikely that everyone is wrong about this.  It shows, rather, that the 
ability to judge well and to distinguish what is true from what is false – which, 
strictly speaking, is what is meant by ‘common sense’ or ‘reason’ – is naturally 
equal in all human beings.  Thus the diversity of our views does not result from 
the fact that some people are more reasonable than others, but simply from the 
fact that we guide our thoughts along different paths and do not think about the 
same things.  For it is not enough to have a good mind; it is more important to use 
it well.  The greatest souls are just as capable of the greatest vices as of the 
greatest virtues, and those who move only very slowly may make much greater 
progress if they always follow the right path than those who run but stray from it. 
 
 
René Descartes – Discourse on Method 
 
1637 
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It’s a true miracle, that modern education hasn’t yet completely smothered the 
curiosity necessary for scientific study.  For without the required encouragement, 
and especially freedom, this fragile plant will wither.  It is a grave mistake to 
believe that the pleasures of observation and inquiry can be induced by constraint 
and a sense of duty. 
 
Albert Einstein 
 
1879 - 1955 
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Chapter 1.  Human Behavior in Economics 
 
In science, too, it is impossible to open up new territory unless one is prepared to 
leave the safe anchorage of established doctrine and run the risk of a hazardous 
leap forward....In general, scientific progress calls for no more than the absorption 
and elaboration of new ideas--and this is a call most scientists are happy to heed. 
However, when it comes to entering new territory, the very structure of scientific 
thought may have to be changed, and that is far more than most men are prepared 
to do. 
 
Isidor Isaac Rabi 
 
 
I.  Hamartia? 
More than just looking at particular behaviors, or how certain actions are motivated, 
this discourse attempts to inquire into the mechanical nature of how human beings 
conduct themselves.  What are the abilities of man?  What are the limitations of man?  
What are the processes of man?  These are the questions that need to be resolved to 
develop a comprehensive theory, not only of human understanding, but of choice, action 
and human decision making in economics.  Great effort was expended over the last 
century to develop a predictive model of consumer behavior that essentially treats as 
exogenous those core human characteristics that motivate, discriminate and explain why 
and how people choose between goods.  These tools of logic, however, have led to the 
segregation of economic theory into numerous specialized sub-disciplines, and have not 
led to the unification or expansion of insight necessary to expand the scope of economic 
science. 
 
Because all actions and behaviors seem to originate from the consciousness, the focus 
of this discourse is directed towards determining the nature of human decision making; 
especially as it relates to the theory of rational consumer choice.  It is hoped that by 
identifying the source of certain structural errors and irrelevancies in the current 
microeconomic view, and through providing a more accurate taxonomy of the 
foundations of human behavior, that it will be possible to treat the human aspect of 
economic man endogenously and, ultimately, empirically.  Because the scope of this 
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discussion and the scope of human behavior are expansive, it is not possible in this short 
thesis to articulate fully each point in great depth.  Most discussions, as a consequence, 
will be brief, covering only those concepts that are particularly relevant in clarifying the 
nature of human behavior in economics. 
 
The principal foundation of modern consumer theory stems from the axioms of choice, 
which are intended to give formal mathematical expression to the consistency inherent in 
consumer decisions involving choice.  According to Jehle and Reny in Advanced 
Microeconomic Theory: “These axioms are intended to give formal mathematical 
expression to fundamental aspects of consumer behavior and attitudes towards the objects 
of choice.  Together, they formalize the view that the consumer can choose and that 
choices are consistent in a particular way”. (p. 5)  Based on these axioms, the theory of 
choice suggests that a consumer has stable, well-defined preferences upon which they 
consistently make rational choices within a market that tends to equilibrium.  In this 
method of modeling, as few meaningful and distinct assumptions as possible are set forth 
to characterize the structure and properties of preference.  All that is required of the 
consumer is that they are able to make binary comparisons between two certain 
consumption plans at a time, and that the consistency of their choices obey the 
mathematical properties of Completeness, Continuity, Transitivity, and Local Non-
satiation.  To this extent, these axioms represent a rational framework that characterizes 
those aspects necessary to structure a consistent discriminatory model of choice.  These 
axioms support the development of the indifference curve, the utility function, and 
ultimately allow for the derivation of a demand curve and a demand function. 
 
A persistent criticism of the rational theory of consumer choice is that it is founded on 
severely unrealistic assumptions.  During his Nobel Prize interview, Nobel Laureate, 
Daniel Kahneman, remarked that “the definition of rationality that is used in economic 
theory is a very implausible definition, and it fails descriptively.”  This statement is based 
on his work with Amos Tversky and other economists that have demonstrated empirically 
how the formal model of consumer choice is unable to take account of certain tendencies 
in human behavior.  According to Vernon Smith, in, “Experimental Economics: Reply,” 
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who received his Nobel Prize in conjunction with Daniel Kahneman: “Even if preference 
theory accounts for many agents’ stationary state choices in certain experimental 
situations, it tells us nothing about the processes that yield these “good” predictions or 
why some agents’ behavior is not consistent with the theory.” (p. 266)   
 
The criticism directed against the neoclassical theory can largely be considered to 
derive from the over-simplification of the model and the exclusion of psychological 
explanations of human behavior.  While modern economic theory is loaded with 
terminology that seems to suggest certain psychological propositions, this terminology 
remains in the theory principally as a survival of culture from whence these terms were 
first introduced by the marginalists and early neoclassicists.  The modern economic 
meaning of terms like utility, rationality, preference, value, good, price and choice have 
very specific meanings and often have very little in common with their corresponding 
dictionary definition or the definition of the term when it was first introduced into 
economic discussion.  In regards to utility and a utility function, as Hal Varian writes in, 
Microeconomic Analysis, “a utility function is often a very convenient way to describe 
preferences, but it should not be given any psychological interpretation.  The only 
relevant feature of a utility function is its ordinal character.” (p. 95)   
 
There have always been opponents of neoclassical economics.  The successor of Lord 
Lionel Robbins of the London School of Economics, Friedrich Hayek (perhaps the best-
known member of the Austrian School of Economics), has expressed unease with certain 
aspects of modern economics, but in large part has viewed his work as a complement to, 
rather than a substitute for the neoclassical approach.  Later in his career, Hayek 
expressed his desire to “avoid giving the impression that I generally reject the 
mathematical method in economics.  I regard it as indeed the great advantage of the 
mathematical technique that it allows us to describe, by algebraic equations, the general 
character of a pattern even where we are ignorant of the numerical values determining its 
particular manifestation.” (p. 28).  Other economists such as von Mises and Rothbard 
have been less forgiving and have set out to develop their own foundations of economic 
analysis.  Von Mises and Rothbard fundamentally reject the core of neoclassical 
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economics to include utility functions, indifference analysis, continuous preferences, and 
nearly all of welfare economics.  Bryan Caplan’s, The Austrian Search for Realistic 
Foundations, details much of this discussion.   
 
Nobel Prize winner, Herbert Simon, and similar critics of the neoclassical model argue 
that information is expensive, incomplete, and unreliable, and that human rationality is 
limited.  Thus, optimizing, in the sense of considering all possible alternatives and 
choosing the best option is simply impossible.  Any person or organization who has 
found a rule of conduct whose results they regard as satisfactory, for example ‘always tell 
the truth’, or ‘always price your product at average cost plus n per cent’, will not change 
their strategy so long as nothing goes seriously wrong.  This form of conduct is called 
satisficing.  As Simon suggests, in, “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,” satisficing 
consists of two related concepts, namely: (1) satisfying a minimum requirement, and (2) 
choosing among a subset of behaviors when information-processing or time constraints 
limit the ability of a decision-maker to make an optimal decision.  Satisficers change their 
rules of conduct only if circumstances change or when the current rules no longer 
produce satisfactory results.  Even then, they do not try to optimize, but search for better 
rules by trial and error.  Once they find an acceptable rule, they settle down to satisfice 
again.  This heuristic view of human behavior is significantly at odds with modern 
neoclassical theory, specifically the parameters that define preference and the notion of 
the utility-maximizing consumer.  Theories that incorporate constraints on the 
information-processing capabilities of the actor, or consumer, are known as theories of 
bounded rationality.  The concept of satisficing as applied to the field of economics has 
received a great deal of attention, and as a result, there exists an extensive literature on 
the subject with a well developed mathematical foundation.  For a cogent summary of the 
mathematical application of satisficing in economics, see Roy Radnar’s, “Satisficing.”  
 
One of the great puzzles in economics over the past century revolves around the 
relevance of utility, whether cardinal or ordinal, as the primary instrument to explain 
value, choice and ultimately demand.  While some economists have effectively 
abandoned the notion of cardinal utility because it is not amendable to measurement, a 
 4 
 
transition from a cardinal measure of utility to ordinal utility in the 1930’s significantly 
affected the development of the modern neoclassical theory.  Alternatively, some 
economists now argue that some types of utility are measurable.  As Kahneman, Wakker, 
and Sarin in, “Back to Bentham?  Explorations of Experienced Utility,” explain:  
 
In current economics and in decision theory, the utility of outcomes and attributes 
refers to their weight in decisions: utility is inferred from observed choices and is 
in turn used to explain these choices.  With few exceptions, experienced utility is 
essentially ignored in modern economic discourse.  The rejection of experienced 
utility is justified by two standard arguments: (i) subjective hedonic experience 
cannot be observed or measured; (ii) choices provide all necessary information 
about the utility of outcomes because rational agents who wish to do so will 
optimize their hedonic experience. (p. 376) 
 
Making a distinction between experienced utility and decision utility, Kahneman et al. 
argue that experienced utility is both measurable and empirically distinct from decision 
utility.  Following an example first mentioned by Paul Romer, the distinction between the 
two concepts of utility can be better understood:  
 
A patient suffering from unusually profound amnesia has two toasters in his 
kitchen.  The toaster on the right functions normally.  The toaster on the left 
delivers an electric shock when the toast is removed.  The patient’s gasp and 
quick reaction of his hand indicate that the shock is painful.  Because the patient 
does not remember the experience, however, he does not anticipate the shock the 
next morning, and is consequently indifferent between the toasters.  The patient’s 
decision utility for using the toasters is equal, but his experienced utilities are 
quite different. (p. 376)  
 
The satisfaction that a person experiences from using a useful thing and how they 
understand the usefulness of a thing is clearly separated in this example.  Kahneman et al. 
argue that in general what a person experiences and what a person takes away from their 
experiences to guide future decisions is not necessarily consistent.  In, “Prospect Theory: 
An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” Tversky and Kahneman suggest that “people rely 
on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks … to simpler 
judgmental operations. … These heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to 
severe and systematic errors’ (p. 1124)  Prospect theory, loss aversion, status quo bias, 
the gambler’s fallacy and self-serving bias are all heuristics that have been developed to 
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explain behavior that is inconsistent with the predictions and explanations of behavior 
derived from the modern neoclassical theory of choice.  The technique of framing, 
specifically cognitive framing, mental accounting, reference utility, and anchoring were 
developed to explain other inconsistent behaviors.  Framing and heuristic biases are 
discussed in Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler’s, “The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion 
and Status Quo Bias,” Tversky and Kahneman’s, “The Framing of Decisions and the 
Psychology of Choice”, and Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, and Schwartz’s, “The Effect of 
Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking: An Experimental Test.” 
 
Extensive criticism of the modern neoclassical approach seemingly has developed from 
the inclusion of only a few meaningful and distinct assumptions that have led to an over 
simplified model that is unable to explain the broad scope of human action and economic 
pursuits.  As the boundaries of economic science are expanded to tackle new economic 
problems, the syllogistic model of consumer choice is intractable and difficult to expand.  
Critics of the modern neoclassical approach argue that there are unlimited numbers of 
different ways of using given resources, that a consumer chooses between a very limited 
number of possibilities, that people use crude ‘rules of thumb’ to make decisions, that 
peoples’ tastes change or evolve over time and that the set of available goods and 
services is continually changing and that knowledge about what is available is partial, 
expensive and unreliable.  Behavioral models typically address particular observed 
market anomalies and modify standard modern neoclassical models by describing 
decision makers as using heuristics and being affected by framing effects.  
 
A large number of reported anomalies exist that put into question many of the 
assumptions of modern neoclassical economics.  Richard Thaler and many other 
economists have written a large number of papers discussing specific market anomalies 
from a behavioral perspective.  A few of these anomalies include preference reversals in 
Allais’, “Le Comportement de l’Homme Rationnel devant le Risque, Critique des 
Postulats et Axiomes de l’Ecole Americaine,” Lichtenstein and Slovic’s, “Reversals of 
Preferences Between Bids and Choices in Gambling Decisions,” the Ellesberg paradox 
in, “Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms,” the part-whole bias, cash valuations of 
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risk in, Loomes, Dubourg, and Jones-Lee’s, “Imprecise Preferences and the WTP-WTA 
Disparity,” the endowment effect in Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler’s “Experimental 
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem,” money illusion in Shafir, 
Diamond and Tversky’s, “Money Illusion,” and  Patinkin’s, “Money and Wealth: A 
Review Article,” inequity aversion in Fehr and Schmidt’s “A Theory of Fairness, 
Competition, and Cooperation,” reciprocity in Fehr and Gatcher’s, “Fairness and 
Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity,” and present-biased preferences in  
O’Donoghue and Rabin’s, “Choice and Procrastination.”  While some critics desire to 
completely overhaul economic theory, others wish only to introduce or modify particular 
assumptions.  What is certain however is that there is a growing discontent amongst 
economists and a growing collection of evidence to support the conclusion that the 
modern neoclassical rational consumer choice theory is an ineffective method and model 
to account realistically for human behavior in economics.  Even the most basic of 
assumptions, for example, Transitivity, which characterizes the consistency in choices of 
the consumer from one moment to another, may inaccurately depict human behavior.  As 
Jehle and Reny suggest in Advanced Microeconomic Theory, experiments have shown 
that in various situations, the choices of real human beings are not always transitive” (p. 
6). 
 
 
II. Epistemology 
In Paul Krugman’s, How I Work, he poignantly characterizes the sentiment of many 
economists regarding the reliance on inference based models in economics: “What I 
began to realize was that in economics we are always making silly assumptions; it's just 
that some of them have been made so often that they come to seem natural.”  Rather than 
using an empirical approach to gather evidence, economists generally rely upon statistical 
inference.  Economists typically begin by describing the terms that are considered the 
most important in an area under study, and then develop a model that approximates the 
real world where certain variables are included endogenously and the remainders are 
treated exogenously.  Imposing order by logically abstracting, isolating or simplifying 
certain variables, a model is manipulated and particular predictions or implications are 
 7 
 
derived.  At this point, the findings of the model are tested by comparing its predictions to 
the actual phenomena it describes in the real world. 
 
The central problem of statistical inference is that there is always a degree of 
uncertainty involved with determining whether a sample is characteristic of the 
population it is taken from, and if an identified correlation actually depicts a cause and 
effect relationship between tested variables.  This doubt can never be removed, and 
consequently there is always a degree of uncertainty that surrounds the results of this 
approach.  It is for this reason that economists caveat their findings with ‘a degree of 
confidence,” however this degree of confidence only relates to the variance in the data to 
the hypothesized relationship between the variables.  The prolific adoption of statistical 
inference by economists as a tool of discovery largely derives from Milton Friedman’s 
argument for the use of the methodology of Positive Economics.  Friedman has argued 
that, “the entirely valid use of ‘assumptions’ in specifying the circumstances for which a 
theory holds is frequently, and erroneously, interpreted to mean that the assumptions can 
be used to determine the circumstances for which a theory holds, and has, in this way, 
been an important source of the belief that a theory can be tested by its assumptions.” (p. 
19)  Faced with a general inability to test successfully the assumptions of the neoclassical 
model against real world behavior in the middle of the twentieth century, Friedman’s 
Positive Economic approach has bypassed arguments based on assumptions and rather 
concentrated on examining the relationship between particular phenomena.  He has laid 
the theoretical foundation of econometrics which ignores the relevance of neoclassical 
theory and the relevance of the assumptions that the model of choice is based upon.  
Rather, with direct evidence in terms of observable correlations between economic 
phenomena, the relationship between particular phenomena can be observed and 
measured.  In essence, Friedman has argued that regardless of the problems with the 
realism of modern neoclassical theory, there exist observable consistent trends in 
economic variables that economists should not ignore and can use, despite an ignorance 
of their causes, to make reasonably accurate predictions based on the stability of these 
observed correlations. 
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According to Bryan Caplan in, “The Austrian Search for Realistic Foundations,” 
“Friedman's (1953) reply that unrealistic assumptions are acceptable if they yield correct 
predictions leaves many unsatisfied” (p. 823).  The consequent prolific adoption of the 
Positive Economic approach and the explosion of interest in econometrics have led to the 
development of a methodological paradox in economics.  On one hand, the inability to 
test successfully and utilize the neoclassical model has led to the adoption of and reliance 
on statistical inference (econometrics).  On the other hand, economic theory is required to 
understand and organize data.  In Econometric Analysis, William Greene stresses the 
importance of economic theory in guiding econometric analysis: “With no theoretical 
basis, the result of the exercise is most likely to be an ambiguous catalog of possibilities” 
(p. 4).  Because the interpretation of econometric information depends upon theory, and 
because econometrics was developed to replace the reliance on theory, the economist is 
caught in a cycle of analytical stagnation.  Consequently, because pursuing the use the 
neoclassical theory to form predictions was unsuccessful and because the primary method 
of discovering economic information is dependent upon economic theory, a new method 
of inquiry is required to identify truth and determine true explanations from false ones. 
 
The core of logic has always been the study of inference.  For general clarification, 
inference is the process of deriving logical conclusions from premises known or assumed 
true.  The classical theory of statistical inference centers on rules for using sample data 
effectively.  These rules are based on the properties of samples and sampling 
distributions.  Whether the form guiding inference is statistical, mathematical or 
syllogistic, each method of inference is based on the same logical process; however the 
various methods are different in application.  The method of propositional inference is a 
deductive method that deals with the relations between propositions in terms of their 
form instead of their content.  The main import of logical propositions is that the logical 
consistency of an argument can be maintained by adhering to the rules of form.  Thus, the 
rules of logic or form, whether they are based on statistical, mathematical or syllogistic 
theories, serve to provide the consistency framework that allows for logical development 
of an argument.  The primary intent of this logical approach is to provide a mechanism 
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that guarantees the consistency of an argument, and given that no rules are violated, 
discussion can be moved from arguments of form to arguments of result. 
 
Given that the rules of logical succession are not violated, the basic propositions of 
form can be expanded and easily analyzed for accuracy.  This technique has proved very 
effective in developing more advanced mathematical and statistical applications based on 
a few initial propositions.  The usefulness of such methods in deducing the properties of 
reality was less successful.  The imputation behind the use of deductive methods lies in 
the successful inclusion of content that accurately reflect the phenomenon of concern.  
Thus, assuming reality is logically consistent, stated premises of a proposition accurately 
encompass and depict some reality or situation that is in question, and given the correct 
use of form, then it must be concluded that the logical deductions should conform or 
correspond to the cause and effect relationships in reality.  The uncertainty inherent in 
determining whether the included premises fully and accurately encompass some reality 
is the primary limitation of methods of inference.  Thus, as inference depends on the 
accuracy and inclusiveness of its premises, it is in itself a limited and an ineffective tool 
or method of discovery, as its efficacy depends entirely on the efficacy of those methods 
that would allow the development of accurate premises. 
 
Syllogistic inference, often referred to as Aristotelian logic, is used to discover the 
logical consistency that can be drawn from simple true statements concerning nature.  
The formal neoclassical model is both a mathematical and syllogistic model of consumer 
choice.  The failure of inference based methods can be observed through the often 
inaccurate and conflicting arguments made using the method.  During the 17th century, 
opponents of the method, such as Galileo Galilei, Francis Bacon, and Tycho Brahe, who 
while admitting the logical consistency of the method, especially given its success in 
mathematics, advocated the inadequacy of the method in ascertaining the properties of 
nature.  Axiomatic models require not only that its assumptions are accurate, but that they 
fully depict the nature of the phenomenon a paradigm approximates.  If the initial 
premises are not true, or if the full nature of the phenomenon is not accurately depicted, 
the inferences made from the model will not accurately depict reality.  The problem with 
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using methods of inference is that it is enormously difficult to determine the scope and 
nature of even simple phenomenon, and because it is so difficult, the goal of a science 
should be focused on discovering these simple true statements, rather than using them as 
its starting point.  As Francis Bacon discovered over four centuries ago, an empirical 
approach is the most effective in sustaining intellectual development in a field of study: 
 
In forming axioms, we must invent a different form of induction from that hitherto 
in use; not only for the proof and discovery of principles, (as they are called,) but 
also of minor intermediate, and in short every kind of axioms.  The induction 
which proceeds by simple enumeration is puerile, leads to uncertain conclusions, 
and is exposed to danger from one contradictory instance, deciding generally from 
too small a number of facts, and those only the most obvious.  But a really useful 
induction for the discovery and demonstration of the arts and sciences should 
separate nature by proper rejections and exclusions, and then conclude for the 
affirmative, after collection a sufficient number of negatives.  Now, this has not 
been done, or even attempted, except perhaps by Plato, who certainly uses this 
form of induction in some measure, to sift definitions and ideas.  But much of 
what has never yet entered the thoughts of man, must necessarily be employed to 
exhibit a good and legitimate mode of induction, or demonstration; so as even to 
render it essential for us to bestow on syllogisms. (p. 364) 
 
The use and development of econometrics has sustained the growth of economic 
science and has led to a wealth of correlative studies that have been used to better 
forecast and predict economic metrics and their fluctuations.  Without a theoretical 
synthesis of how these empirical relationships interrelate, the ability to organize and 
understand the actual causal relationships between these metrics, the speculative aspects 
of econometric analysis and the development of theory used to guide new hypotheses, is 
put in question.  Because the factors that lead to the change in and movement of 
economic metrics are not understood, there is always the possibility that when a system is 
destabilized that many of the currently accepted relationships between particular metrics 
may uncouple as other previously unknown factors are discovered to influence the 
system. 
 
While cyclical fluctuations in economic metrics afford the opportunity to study a 
greater range of economic phenomena that allows economists the opportunity to measure 
and discover the extent to which different economic phenomena are more or less causally 
 11 
 
related, the economic pain that is likely to ensue from these unpredicted market 
fluctuations is avoided by predicting and testing the effect of these changes through the 
development of an empirical or realistic theory of the economy.  By developing a 
taxonomy of economic metrics beforehand, a clearer understanding of the costs and 
benefits of particular approaches and a greater flexibility will be afforded the leaders of 
an economy.  Jehle and Reny note in, Advanced Microeconomic Theory, that consumer 
theory is the “bedrock foundation on which so many theoretical structures in economics 
are built”, a clearer understanding of human behavior in economics and a unified 
economic science may and should derive from discovering these secret causal 
connections between economic metrics and the human specific causal connections that 
compose the process of choice. 
 
 
III. The Way Forward 
In this discourse, both the historical analysis and treatment of human behavior in 
economics and the empirical synthesis of economic human behavior is discussed.  At the 
conclusion of this discourse, sufficient doubt will be cast on the usefulness of the modern 
neoclassical treatment of human behavior in economics, and the empirical treatment of 
human behavior in economics, which first developed over a century ago, will be 
identified as the primary, if not only, method and model to explain human economic or 
consumer behavior.   
Rather than focusing on an econometric or mathematical approach to analyze this 
subject, which is currently the standard approach used to address human behavior in 
economics, this discourse is focused on the empirical aspects of an economic science, and 
illustrates through observation and demonstrable evidence, how the development of a 
realistic theory of human behavior in economics has become derailed, how the modern 
rational theory of consumer choice does not realistically account for human behavior, and 
how human behavior or consumer choice theory can be realistically be addressed and 
researched in economics.  Throughout this discourse, many inconsistencies in the modern 
neoclassical and post-neoclassical approaches and many arguments detailing 
consistencies in observed behavior are explained.  By utilizing an empirical 
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methodology, the results of this discussion are developed into a realistic theory of human 
behavior in economics that integrates a broader scope of economic research and 
observable behavior than both the neoclassical and post-neoclassical models of choice. 
 
In Chapter Two, after a brief review of the origins of the modern neoclassical model of 
human behavior, this discourse begins by addressing the question of whether or not there 
exist typical human characteristics that can be used in economic modeling.  Until recent 
history, the prevailing view in economics proposed by the eminent Frank Knight and 
Lord Lionel Robbins was that the complexity involved in identifying the root cause of 
behavior effectively precludes the taxonomy and the accurate accounting of general 
human characteristics.  As was demonstrated by recent research in the fields of 
Psychology, Neuroscience, Medicine, and even Economics, there now appear to be many 
typical human characteristics that lend themselves to a systematic study. 
 
The search for consistencies in human behavior begins in Chapter Three with a 
discussion of Ludwig von Mises’ view of rationality.  Von Mises has argued that all 
human behavior is rational in the moment of decision.  Due to a misinterpretation of his 
view by the eminent Lord Robbins and Dr. Knight, rationality was taken only to mean 
logical consistency.  Von Mises’ insightful depiction of rationality as a momentary and 
consistent mental process provides the causal framework upon which an empirical 
investigation is undertaken.  If behavior is not consistent, then there exists no basis upon 
which to compare and organize observed human choice and action.  Von Mises’ 
important contribution of the rationalization of behavior and the momentary process 
whereby choices are made is of paramount importance to the development of a scientific 
inquiry into realistic human behavior.  Because of a miss-translation of this process of 
rationalization to mean and refer only to logical consistency, von Mises contribution to 
economic theory was largely neglected. 
 
Deriving from the marginalist revolution in the late nineteenth century, neoclassical 
theory as it is generally understood today derives primarily from William Stanley Jevons’ 
Theory of Political Economy, and Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Economics, which is 
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based on Jevons’ work.  One of the important contributions of Jevons’ theory is his 
supposed resolution of Adam Smith’s Water and Diamond Paradox.   As Smith argued in 
the Wealth of Nations, some goods may have a high value in use and a low value in 
exchange or a high value in exchange but a low value in use.  Jevons explained these 
divergences by the relative scarcity of goods.  Goods like water, that are highly useful, 
but relatively abundant, have a low exchange value because the demand for water is 
easily satisfied.  Diamonds, conversely, according to Jevons, possess very little use value, 
but a high exchange value because the price of diamonds is bid up by the relatively high 
demand and diamonds and the scarce supply.  Jevons bases his theory of value on the 
relative scarcity of particular goods, however, he never addresses why goods, whether 
scarce or not, are desired or are useful in the first place.  In Chapter Four, Jevons scarcity 
explanation of the water and diamond paradox is examined and is demonstrated to be an 
incomplete explanation of value.  By examining the relationship between the 
characteristics of a good and how these characteristics relate to the resolution of human 
interests, why goods are chosen and valued over other goods can be determined 
irrespective of the relative scarcity.  By utilizing Carl Menger’s empirical approach, a 
greater understanding of the phenomena relevant to the subject can be identified and it is 
shown in this chapter that the neoclassical theory does not accurately explain the water 
and diamond paradox, and is based on a notion of utility that inaccurately depicts the 
underlying phenomena involved in choice.      
 
In Chapter Five, many of the questions that revolve around the empirical treatment of 
human behavior are discussed. Historically, attempts to describe and explain human 
behavior have failed, primarily because their authors did not possess an accurate 
understanding of reality and the physiological processes of the human body.  It was not 
until 1948 that the sex habits of human beings were even taxonomically and scientifically 
studied, as described in Dr. Kinsey’s, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male.  The subject 
of human behavior in economics today is ripe for empirical investigation.  In economics, 
the empirical approach to human behavior began with the publication of Carl Manger’s, 
Grundsätze der Volkswirthschaftslehre.  Menger’s contribution has often been confused 
with William Stanley Jevons' arguments written in Theory of Political Economy.  Owing 
 14 
 
to certain historical geo-political and socio-political disruptions, the Austrian empirical 
approach has practically become extinct.  The importance of much of the excellent early 
empirical analysis is now studied by only a handful of economists and many of the early 
empirical arguments have been distorted and miss-understood.  While the empirical 
analysis of human behavior (specifically the treatment of goods and value), seems to 
possess a realistic and accurate interpretation of the underlying variables in human 
behavior.  The small number of empirical studies in economics were lost in the large 
shadow of numerous neoclassical and modern neoclassical studies.  By expanding the 
early empirical research of Carl Menger, it is possible to show how and why many 
propositions commonly accepted today in neoclassical theory are invalid.  The research 
techniques and evidence gathered by behavioral economists over the last several decades 
help suggest how human behavior can be integrated into economic analysis and 
discussion.  It is now possible to outline the foundation of an empirical approach, which 
if researched further may offer a superior theory of consumer behavior. 
 
In Chapter Six, the question of uncertainty as it relates to decision making is discussed.  
Uncertainty is often modeled using probability theory, which involves a partial 
understanding of the possibilities and the relative probabilities of particular outcomes.  
True uncertainty involves an uncertainty regarding what will be the outcome rather than 
the uncertainty described in probability theory which refers to the hypothetical 
generalization of the regularity of particular known outcomes or which in a set of known 
outcomes will occur.  The argument is made that “expected utility theory” is irrelevant to 
human decision making that involves true uncertainty because people are unable to 
account for what is unknown.  Expectation theory as with probability theory involves an 
illusion, where the causal connections between causes and outcomes are proxied by a 
hypothetical probability that does not exist in reality. 
 
It is only through assuming that unknown cause and effect relationships can be 
approximated by some degree of randomness that expectation theory and probability 
theory are assumed to make sense.  While certain outcomes can be observed to recur 
consistently from one similar period to another, this illusion of consistent randomness 
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exists merely because of the regularity in the manifestation of the causes that effect these 
particular outcomes.  Probability theory depicts the regularity in the confluence of 
unknown disparate events and identifiable outcomes and ignores the minutia of what is 
not generally understood.  In the toss of a coin and in the machinations that lead to a 
consistent number of consumers entering a store at a particular time on particular days, 
the initial moment of the force and the external forces the coin comes in contact with and 
the sociological and physiological needs and habits of the customer are ignored and 
generalized in terms of the relationship between particular preset conditions.  While this 
approach is amenable to the discovery of general patterns and correlations between 
particular preset conditions, these approaches are incapable of explaining truly uncertain 
phenomena because truly uncertain phenomena involve an ignorance not of what 
outcome is likely to occur but an ignorance of the existence of the situation upon which 
to conceive of possible outcomes.  True uncertainty involves ignorance, and it is 
meaningless to propose that a person weighs what is not known with what is known when 
making purposeful decisions.  The infinity of reality’s possible outcomes preclude the 
notion of even considering what is unknown and if all behavior other than vegetative 
behavior is purposeful as described in the previous sections, then what cannot be 
conceived cannot be incorporated in rationales that guide conduct.  What is unknown is 
purposely explored, however, as even with exploration, there must be an element of the 
thing to be explored that is known for purposeful exploration to occur or else discovery 
arises blindly through the circumstance and situational relation between the observer and 
the previously unknown phenomena. 
 
Repeatedly throughout recent history the limitations of probability theory as a method 
only to describe temporal generalities and consistencies has repeatedly been reinforced.  
While probabilities can be easily assigned in simple games and theoretical arguments, 
just how these likelihoods are simulated in reality establishes the limitation of the 
approach.  Even in simple card games, randomness is approximated by hiding the 
location of a large number of similar cards, or by utilizing the physical properties of a 
large number of circular balls bounced forcefully in a small container.  While the concept 
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of probability serves as a useful tool to characterize particular regularities it distracts the 
focus of discussion away from the true causal nature of reality. 
 
Many great thinkers have argued against the relevance of using probability theory to 
model uncertainty in human decision making.  John Maynard Keynes has refuted this 
proposition in his Treatise on Probability, René Descartes has refuted it in his Discourse 
on Method, Henri Poincaré has refuted it in his Foundations of Science, and more 
recently the Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon has rejected the idea.  The argument is an old 
one, dating back to Bernoulli and Condorcet, and each time it was advocated (with the 
hope that something can be said about that which is uncertain) the inability to derive 
practical knowledge from its implementation has ultimately led to its irrelevance.  The 
refutation is almost always in the same form.  It is simply not possible to know that which 
is not known.  As is discussed in this thesis, it is not possible to model uncertainty with a 
frequency distribution in the face of real uncertainty because there is no basis on which 
one can construct such a distribution.  The use of a frequency distribution to model 
uncertainty in simple games is only possible because there is in practice no uncertainty in 
simple games. 
 
Because people face true uncertainty simple probability games and the predictions of 
expectation theory do not accurately reflect the process and outcomes of choice.  Because 
purposeful decisions and choice are based on rationales that incorporate known 
information, simple games are interpreted in terms of the subjective understanding of 
each respondent.  More or less information concerning the benefit of particular courses of 
action and an understanding of the relevance of the potential outcomes and the nature of 
the probabilities inherent in the game are involved in the manifestation of a final choice.  
True uncertainty is not involved in the decision because the decider is unable to take into 
consideration that which is unknown to them.  The divergence in choice of seemingly 
simple choices derives from this interpretation of the relevance of the simple game to the 
respondent.  Identifying a simple problem and expecting peoples’ behavior to follow 
these simple probabilities requires control of those variables that may affect the 
respondent’s choice.  As a result, how a person will react to a simple probability 
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experiment is not based just on the probabilities inherent in the simple game, but in how 
they interpret the probabilities and factors they perceive are involved.  Deviations in 
peoples’ responses from predicted theory recorded by Kahneman and Tversky in, 
“Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” can consequently be explained 
by the inclusion of additional information that is relevant to the question.  By including 
the interpretation of a simple game’s outcomes, for example including the interpretation 
of the opportunity cost of particular outcomes, the predicted choice that a respondent can 
be shown to deviate from expectation theory, however, the usefulness of the analysis of 
simple games with hypothetical probabilities may practically be of little importance to an 
understanding of the process of choice and a rational consumer theory. 
 
In the final chapter, Chapter Seven, this discourse concludes with a discussion of what 
characteristic human behaviors can be empirically supported and what neoclassical 
assumptions are required to be re-evaluated. A brief history of the geo-political effects on 
the development of the empirical approach is discussed as well as how economic growth 
can be identified to derive from the development of understanding and the more efficient 
command of nature.  It is apparent that an empirical model of human behavior will 
require continued research to verify and expand upon the phenomenological processes 
only generally discussed in this discourse.  Many of the currently accepted modern 
neoclassical assumptions and theories contested in this discourse and the nature of the 
process of choice and human behavior hypothesized in this discourse are briefly 
summarized in this chapter.  The final section discusses a broadly how additional 
research and experiment can be used to develop and expand conducted to develop the 
empirical approach.  There appears to be a fairly straightforward path towards developing 
a general model of human behavior that seems to possess the potential to unify and 
advance economic theory.  It seems evident that through experimentation and the testing 
of a realistic theory that many of these new explanations will better guide econometric 
analysis and support future theoretical studies and enable the development of realistic 
experimental controls in economic science. 
 
 18 
 
This thesis offers a theoretical discussion of human behavior based on an appeal to 
facts and demonstrable theory.  Rigorous empirical verification of the discussion in this 
thesis could easily be the subject of future studies, however, the intent of this thesis is to 
address specifically only how the theory of human decision making in economics can be 
improved by developing and expanding the factual base upon which to establish an 
economic science of consumer behavior.  An appeal to economists is made to move away 
from neoclassical models of human behavior and to explore the factual development of a 
realistic theory of consumer behavior that can be used to develop a unified discipline that 
will form the basis of an economic science that is testable, reproducible and will support 
future research for understanding the complexities of human behavior in economics. 
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Chapter 2.  The Science of Human Behavior 
 
It is no wonder that these sciences are still in the stage of violent disagreement 
among their followers as to what they are and what they are about.  The first step 
toward getting out of this slough, we suggest, is to recognize that man’s relations 
with his fellow man are on a totally different footing from his relations with the 
objects of physical nature and to give up, except within the recognized and rather 
narrow limits, the naïve project of carrying over a technique which has been 
successful in the one set of problems and using it to solve another set of a 
categorically different kind. 
 
Limitations of Scientific Method in Economics, Frank Knight 
 
 
Inquiry into the nature of human behavior is by no means new, and by no means 
complete.  While certain formularized systems exist and while certain limits are 
understood, it is an indictment of the difficulty inherent in the subject that mankind has 
not yet formalized a coherent and comprehensive dissertation on the matter.  In the field 
of economic science, the aspects of human behavior discerned to be amendable to 
codification are incorporated into the theory of rational consumer choice.  The theory of 
rational beliefs and rational preference in recent history was driven by a desire to move 
away from the strong psychological laws of the classical utilitarian theory of Edgeworth, 
and Mill, and to render its foundations as general as possible.  Economists have sought to 
pare away as many of the traditional assumptions as possible so as to retain a streamlined, 
yet coherent, theory with predictive power. 
 
Derived from the marginal utility revolution and from utilitarian ideals, the theory of 
behavior developing out of the marginal revolution has gone through many subsequent 
changes and refinements.  In 1896, Vilfredo Pareto published his, Cours d’Economie 
Politique, where he speculated that the reliance on cardinal or measurable “utility” was 
unnecessary to the theory of demand, as it is sufficient to order preferences ordinally.  
Evgeny Slutsky, in his article, “Sulla Teoria del Bilancie del Consumatore,” which was 
originally published in the, Giornale degli Economisti, expanded on Pareto’s suggestion, 
and derived the first fundamental equation of value that did not rely on an ordinal 
measure of utility.  Sir John Hicks and R. G. D. Allen’s famous paper, “A 
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Reconsideration of the Theory of Value,” published in 1934, introduced the Slutsky 
decomposition of demand into substitution and income effects, and redefined substitution 
and complementarity.  Sir Hicks reacquainted English-speaking economists with the 
derivation of demand curves with the use of indifference curves and budget constraints 
and the equation between marginal rates of substitution and relative prices.  Under the 
encouragement of Lord Lionel Robbins, Sir John Hicks in 1939 published his book, 
Value and Capital, which demonstrated that the principle of marginal utility was neither a 
necessary or sufficient condition for the law of demand to hold.  It was later, in 1959, that 
Gerard Débreu reduced the standard consumer theory to its core essentials in his book, 
Theory of Value.  It is largely this view of the theory of rational consumer choice which 
will be considered in this discourse. 
 
The principal foundation of modern consumer theory stems from the axioms of choice, 
which are intended to give formal mathematical expression to the consistency inherent in 
consumer decisions involving choice.  Based on these axioms, the theory of choice 
suggests that a consumer has stable, well-defined preferences upon which they 
consistently make rational choices within a market that tends to equilibrium.  In this 
method of modeling, as few meaningful and distinct assumptions as possible are set forth 
to characterize the structure and properties of preference.  All that is required of the 
consumer is that they are able to make binary comparisons between two certain 
consumption plans at a time, and that the consistency of their choices obey the 
mathematical properties of Completeness, Transitivity and Local Non-satiation.  These 
axioms represent a rational framework that characterizes those aspects necessary to 
structure a consistent discriminatory model of choice.  These axioms support the 
development of the indifference curve, the utility function, and ultimately allow for the 
derivation of demand curve and function. 
 
The characteristic feature of the standard model of choice assumes that the consumer is 
fully aware of price and the availability of the objects of choice.  To the extent that a 
consumer is uncertain about these characteristics, it was suggested that decisions can be 
modeled using von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility theory.  John von 
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Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s expected utility theory relates the probability of 
expected outcome to the utility one would derive from obtaining a particular bundle at a 
particular price.  This approach was published in their 1944 book, Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior.  Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theory contains essentially the 
same axioms of choice as the certain model, however, rather than relating bundles of 
goods, the expected model relates simple gambles or lotteries.  Whereas in the standard 
model of choice the axioms allow the derivation of a utility function, in the uncertain 
model, the various probabilities associated with different ventures in a lottery 
proportionately dissipate the potential utility of an outcome, more so when a likelihood is 
low, which can be represented by an expected utility function. 
 
It was later in 1954, that Leonard J. Savage synthesized von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s axiomatization of expected utility with Bruno de Finetti’s axiomatization 
of subjective probability in his book, The Foundations of Statistics.  Savage’s theory was 
presented as a rational foundation for statistics and decision analysis, which was 
presented as a normative theory of behavior under uncertainty to which ideally-rational 
decision makers ought to conform, and which social theorists can use as a modeling tool 
to explore the implications of the hypothesis of rationality in settings involving 
uncertainty.  Savage’s theory essentially revolves around six initial axioms, which are 
both motivated and discussed, and from these are deduced the existence of a subjective 
probability and a utility function.  It is readily admitted by Savage that he is building a 
“highly idealized theory of behavior of a ‘rational’ person with respect to decisions” (p. 
7), and that he has certain misgivings in regards to the nature of uncertainty underlying 
his argument, particularly in regards to the nature of human rationality and its 
implications in what constitutes logical behavior: “The assumption that a person’s 
behavior is logical is, of course, far from vacuous.  In particular, such a person cannot be 
uncertain about decidable mathematical propositions” (p. 7). 
 
Savage is not convinced that such a framework can lead to a truly formal model, and 
suggests that George Pólya’s tempting theory of the probability of mathematical 
conjectures, discussed in, “Preliminary Remarks on a Logic of Plausible Inference,” on 
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which he bases his argument, cannot be fully successful as there exists an inconsistency 
in what can be assumed as uncertain and what must be assumed to be known.  Savage, 
however, cites Bruno de Finetti’s optimism towards Pólya’s suggestion in, La ‘logica del 
plausibile’ secondo la concezione di Polya, but clearly reiterates his concern regarding 
the seemingly arbitrary separation between what can be determined uncertain or certain.  
He suggests to his readers that “when certain maxims are presented for your 
consideration, you must ask yourself whether you try to behave in accordance with them, 
or, to put it differently, how you would react if you noticed yourself violating them” (p. 
7).  This consideration should be applicable to all aforementioned mathematical or 
statistical deductive schemas. 
 
While the derivation of the rational model establishes a mathematical framework for 
the exercise of choice under certainty and uncertainty, the essential feature of 
discrimination between choices, that being why one thing is preferred over another or 
how the possibilities of a lottery are identified, is in both models treated exogenously.  As 
a result, the current economic theory of choice abstains from speculating on the root of 
the derivation of human preference, and thus, is not so much a theory of choice, but a 
framework of consistency.  Given the vast body of literature on the subject and given the 
current scientific research into the physiology and psychology of human behavior, it is 
puzzling why the human aspect of human decision making is not more thoroughly 
incorporated into the micro foundations of economic theory.  Given that the core variable 
which determines the outcome of human decisions is not formularized, there exists a 
great deal of uncertainty and confusion regarding the application of these models, and 
their significance.  It is perhaps not surprising that certain paradoxes within the axioms of 
choice have been discerned, as demonstrated by Allais and by Ellesberg, and that the 
predictive capabilities should be demonstrated to be inconsistent predictors of human 
behavior.  As Tversky and Kahneman demonstrated in their famous article, “Prospect 
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,” it is readily apparent that the theory of 
consumer choice, in its current form, is unable to account for certain scientifically 
demonstrated tendencies in human behavior. 
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Whereas the contribution of the theory of consumer choice is of immeasurable 
importance, it must be admitted that both its greatest strength and greatest weakness 
stems from its limited inclusion of typical human behavior, particularly in regard to the 
limited rationality invoked in the axioms of choice, and more significantly in regards to 
the assumed indefinable nature of the determinants of human preference.  The question 
that needs to be addressed is why such an important aspect is excluded from economic 
theory, and why such pains should be taken to avoid a subject that has endured significant 
historical inquiry and which has in the last half of the twentieth century endured 
significant scientific treatment in the fields of neuroscience, physiology and psychology.  
For microeconomic theory to progress, it is apparent that the nature of human behavior 
will have to be resolved, and that the current theory of consumer choice will have to be 
amended. 
 
The two most often cited reasons for not dealing with the subject of human behavior in 
economic science are, firstly, that human behavior is not an economic concern, as these 
problems are under the prevue of sociology and psychology; and, secondly, that the 
inherent nature of human behavior virtually precludes the possibility of formularization.  
The first reason refers to the proper classification, or definition, of what constitutes 
economic science.  Taxonomically, it is apparent that a classification encompasses what 
should and should not be studied within a subject and that, if a subject of concern is 
outside of these parameters, it is readily apparent that the subject should be naturally 
excluded.  In the case of human conduct, since economics deals specifically with the 
subject of human decisions in a human economy, it is apparent that it would be useful to 
understand the nature of choice and preference, and that a classification or definition that 
excludes the study of this pursuit should necessarily be redefined or amended.  As for the 
second objection, for the claim to be valid, it is apparent that one must possess a clear 
understanding of human behavior or at least a clear enough understanding so that one can 
assert with sufficient certainty the apparent futility of the endeavour.  Thus, it seems 
sufficiently important to clarify the historic reasoning behind this objection so that it can 
be discerned why human behavior is no longer included or speculated upon in the 
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economic sciences, and to determine both the validity of such an argument and the limits 
of its censure 
 
Perhaps the most notorious advocate of this position was Frank Knight.1  In his essay, 
“The Limitation of Scientific Method in Economics,” he is very clear when he makes the 
claim that “human phenomena are not amenable to treatment in accordance with the strict 
canons of science” (p. 129).  Knight makes two important distinctions in coming to this 
conclusion.  The first distinction involves his classification of knowledge, and the second 
distinction involves his view of science.  In regards to Knight’s first point, he 
distinguishes three distinct categories of knowledge.  The first field of knowledge is of 
“the external world,” which encompasses the knowledge of everyday reality; second, the 
knowledge of the truths of logic and mathematics, and while his view of logic and 
mathematics is a priori, he does note that it is possible that this type of knowledge may 
actually be of the same objective reality as the first category; third, is knowledge of 
human behavior.  It is clear from such a distinction that Knight discriminates between 
knowledge that can be obtained concerning human behavior and knowledge that can be 
obtained concerning “the external world.”  Knight establishes the third category to draw 
attention to the unique problems associated with understanding the root of human 
behavior.  It is in this last category where Knight felt that economic problems lay. 
 
Knight suggests “life is a mere matter of mechanics; what human beings think of as 
practical problems of conduct are subjective illusions; thinking and planning and all 
subjectivity are illusions; human actions are a detail in a cosmic panorama of the 
transformation of motion” (p. 105).  In regards to knowledge of human behavior, Knight 
determined it is impossible to discuss these illusions, such as value, in purely objective 
terms, and thus recommended that we should simply assume the reality of the conscious 
                                                 
1 Dr. Knight was one of the twentieth century’s most eclectic economists.  While generally Knight’s views were 
irreducibly neoclassical, his particular brand of economics was largely influenced by his Cornell professor, Herbert J. 
Davenport, who was at the time associated with the American Psychological School, which sought to ground the 
Marginalist high theory of Jevons, Wicksteed and the Austrians in the relativist foundations of Thorstein Veblen’s 
methodology.  Like Davenport, the often notoriously opinionated Knight took great opportunity to criticize other 
schools, while at the same time adopting many of their ideas.  Knight’s more notable debates where with Hayek, Mises, 
and the Austrian School over capital theory, Pigou over welfare theory, with Keynes over his general theory, and with 
Hutchison’s over his positivist methodology. 
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data and leave it to philosophy to reconcile the contradiction or to decide whether it can 
be reconciled.  In this regard, Knight suggested that economists “have to accept the 
common-sense notion of value or worth as our starting-point” (p. 105).  It is thus his view 
that human conduct is a subjective illusion, rather than being objectifiable, which is at the 
core of his objection.  It is, however, as with his view of beauty, which he discerns to be 
an illusion, that his argument is really based on the vast complexity of the determinants of 
human behavior, as he notes that even the simplest behaviors are dependent on a 
multiplicity of previous experiences: 
 
Long before he is adult, a being with man’s sensitiveness to passing experience 
and his capacity for conscious and unconscious memory has become such an 
unique aggregation of attitudes toward meanings that there is no use in talking 
about accurate classification; he has to be treated as an individual.  In addition he 
is highly unstable, and most especially is largely unknowable, since as already 
observed, the associations which condition his responses are quite inaccessible to 
observation.  No life history could conceivably be detailed and accurate enough to 
make them available as scientific data. (p. 130) 
 
According to Knight, the difficulty in discerning the manifestation of behavior and 
determining through observation what experiences contribute to particular behaviors, has 
forced his conclusion that human behavior “will not yield generalizations which can be 
used as the basis of prediction and the guidance of policy, because there are no 
generalizations about them which are true; that is, no generalizations about our 
observations of them” (p. 129).  As far as observations go, “they are simply not uniform; 
human beings do not maintain their identity as behavior traits and do not fall into a 
manageable number of behavior classes with objective and measurable identification 
marks; and this is practically true whether we do or do not attempt to use conscious states 
or attitudes as data in the classification” (p. 130). 
 
It is this later statement that leads to the second point in Knight’s assertion.  The reason 
that leads Knight to his statement that human phenomena are not amenable to scientific 
treatment derives from his unique view of science as “merely the technique of prediction” 
(p. 109).  As Knight stated previously, because there do not exist observations concerning 
human conduct that “yield generalizations which can be used as the basis of prediction,” 
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and because he considers science as “merely the technique of prediction,” Knight arrives 
at the conclusion that “human phenomena are not amenable to treatment in accordance 
with the strict canons of science.”  The problem with this line of reasoning is that he 
assumes away the existence of generalizations as a result of the complexity inherent in 
human conduct, and then goes on to suggest that because science requires generalizations 
as the basis for prediction, that human behavior is not amendable to science. 
 
Science in the common meaning does not just deal with prediction.  Rather, science is 
the intellectual and practical activity encompassing the systematic study of the structure 
of the behavior of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment.  In 
this context, the role of science is to determine the pattern within the complexity of 
human behavior so that typical human generalizations can be determined.  Given that 
there does not exist a formalized theory of human behavior, it is readily apparent that 
Knight’s argument is valid, in that one cannot expect to formulate accurate predictions 
without a formalized base of understanding.  This argument, however, only appeals to a 
static situation where what is known is fixed.  If, by some means, a pattern of human 
behavior is discerned, then it is necessarily the case that within Knight’s view of science, 
human behavior should be amendable to treatment.  Essentially, Knight’s argument is 
based on the premise that human behavior is too complex to yield generalizations.  As 
was demonstrated in the natural sciences, however, what in one generation has appeared 
random or insurmountable is often in the next generation simply understood.  Consistent 
with his tendency to categorize knowledge in terms of what is known, he concludes in his 
essay, “Limitations of Scientific Method In Economics,” not that “prediction and control 
are impossible in the field of human phenomena, but that the formal methods of science 
are of very limited application” (p. 132).  Perhaps, as Professor Lundberg suggests in his 
book, Can Science Save Us?, the reasoning behind Knight’s argument and others like it, 
is that human relations are simply not “believed to be proper subjects for serious 
scientific study” (p. 4). 
 
The effect of Knight’s view has tended to discourage and discredit those who have 
advocated a scientific treatment of the complexity of human behavior.  It is essentially 
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Knight’s particular view of science, and his subsequent views on what can be known 
about human behavior, which precipitated his critique of Terence Hutchison’s book, 
Significance & Basic Postulates of Economic Theory.  The principal contentious issue 
revolves around Hutchison’s inductive rather than deductive view of science.  In the 
preamble of the third edition of Hutchison’s book, he comments on Knight’s erroneous 
critique: 
 
It is held – (perhaps to a decreasing extent) – that empirical testability and 
falsifiability may provide a suitable criterion for the statements and theories of the 
natural sciences, but is quite inapplicable, or distorting, if applied to statements 
and theories characteristic of the social sciences.  These are concerned with 
purposive, ‘rational,’ problem-solving, human actions and their motives, 
statements about which cannot conceivably be tested or falsified empirically, 
since they rest on intuitive ‘understanding,’ and introspection.  This was the main 
basis for the criticisms of Professor F. H. Knight, if I have understood him 
correctly.  Of course I cannot re-argue this whole issue here, but it seems to me as 
definitely as it did twenty years ago that the crucial points in Professor Knight’s 
case should be rejected. (p. xi) 
 
Whereas Knight rejected the efficacy of using empirical techniques to determine certain 
aspects of human behavior, and thus consequently rejected their use in the broader scope 
of the social sciences, Hutchison rather attempted to suggest that because of the 
confusion brought about by the use of a deductive approach, economic propositions 
should and must become empirically accountable.  In Hutchison’s, Significance & Basic 
Postulates of Economic Theory, he notes that to “all other scientists apart from logicians, 
mathematicians, and many economists, scientific laws are regarded as inductive, 
inferences conceivably falsifiable, though not practically falsifiable, empirically.  If they 
are referred to as, ‘hypothetical’, what is implied is rather their provisional falsifiable 
character, and that they may conceivably be abandoned at any moment” (p. 62). 
 
It seems significantly apparent that to understand a subject, a person must know about 
the subject, and to this point, idle, or even reasoned speculation is no substitute for 
observed reality.  Surely to this extent, this discourse only extends the irony of Knight 
and Hutchison’s argument in that this discourse seeks to deductively argue the merits of 
Hutchison’s deductive argument that advocates the use of inductive inquiry over 
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deductive inquiry upon which Knight sought deductively to reject.  The apparent “violent 
disagreement” to which Frank Knight speaks in the initial quotation of this chapter is the 
likely the result of such confusion, which points to Hutchison’s position that the merits of 
inductive reasoning are not readily supported by deductive argument.  Perhaps, the merit 
of any methodology is best demonstrated through its results and not by its advocation. 
 
It retrospect, it appears that Frank Knight was wrong, as demonstrated by the research 
that was carried out in the field of psychology; where many human commonalities have 
been observed.  Within the discipline of neuroscience, and in particular within social, 
behavioral and cognitive psychology, a vast array of consistent human factors have been 
unveiled that illuminate how the complex system of cells, tissues and organs regulate the 
body’s responses to internal and external stimuli.  In these fields of study, there currently 
exists an extensive body of literature concerning: information processing, attention and 
memory, learning, cognitive development, judgment and decision theory.  It is essentially 
the results born out in these fields that Hutchison objected to shielding.  He saw that 
rigorous inquiry into the nature of a concern should whenever possible be carried 
through, as it is useful, and perhaps essential to bring about clarification and agreement.  
Thus, the shortcoming of Knight’s objection to Hutchison’s approach derived from his 
view that human behavior is a distinctly different concern that is so complex and 
unobservable, as to defy study. 
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Chapter 3.  Rationality and the Moment of Choice 
 
This is not to argue with von Mises and some of his followers that we must regard 
human action, if not purely vegetative, as at all times rational in the sense that, 
given belief in the range of technical knowledge available to individuals or 
collections of individuals, action must be consistent.  I confess that I have never 
been able to understand this contention: I should have thought that one of the 
main practical functions of economic science was to enable us to detect 
inconsistencies in plans, such as, for instance, simultaneous demands for low 
interest rates brought about by increases in the size of the credit base and a 
diminution of inflation.  … I would have thought that the contention that 
explanations of economic relationships must involve considerations of purposes, 
implicit or explicit was relatively non-controversial. 
 
On the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, Lord Robbins  
 
 
I. The Post-Neoclassical Rational Theory of Consumer Choice 
In, “A Reformation of the Theory of Choice”, Ian Little has suggested that: “a person 
is, on the whole, likely to be happier the more he is able to have what he would choose”. 
(p. 98)  The underlying mechanism of the choices people make and the desire and 
understanding that motivates action is formulized in the rational theory of consumer 
choice, which is considered by Jehle and Reny in, Advanced Microeconomic Theory, to 
be the “bedrock foundation on which so many theoretical structures in economics are 
built.” (p. 3)  In this chapter, the theoretical architecture of human rationality, how people 
reason and choose, is discussed, particularly in relation to how rationality can be 
explained empirically to improve the foundations and realistic application of the rational 
theory of choice. 
 
Human rationality, or human consistency, is the main assumption under which the 
theory of consumer choice is based.  Since the Great Depression and the movement away 
from psychological explanations and cardinal measures of utility, the rational and 
consistent aspects of the theory have been transformed into an axiomatically based 
syllogistic model that bears little resemblance to the models and arguments of the 
Marginalists who developed neoclassical economics.  This modern neoclassicism, or 
post-neoclassical economics has retained very few of the original ideas that sparked the 
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transition from the classic labor theory of value.  As a result of the rejection of the study 
of human behavior in economics and the exclusion of behavioral findings, many Nobel 
Laureates over the past half century have published articles suggesting that the rational 
theory of consumer choice and expected utility theory are incapable of addressing the 
broad range of human behavior. 
 
Because so many human aspects of behavior have been removed from economic 
theory, it should not come as a surprise that important economists questioning the power 
of the post-neoclassical microeconomic models have been able to discover evidence that 
contradicts the predictions of the theory.  As already discussed, the Allais and Ellesberg 
paradoxes serve as a lasting example of the rational theory’s inability to explain peoples 
preference for certainty over uncertainty, and recently, Kahneman and Tversky’s, 
“Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,” (1979) has experimentally 
demonstrated that peoples’ decisions are inconsistent with the predictions of the rational 
theory of choice.  They have found that people choose to underweight risky outcomes in 
comparison to outcomes that can be obtained with certainty.  In, “A Behavioral Model of 
Rational Choice,” Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon suggests that: “Recent developments in 
economics, and particularly in the theory of the business firm, have raised great doubts as 
to whether this schematized model of economic man provides a suitable foundation on 
which to erect a theory – whether it be a theory of how firms do behave, or of how they 
“should” rationally behave.” (p. 99) 
 
Over the past two decades, many important discoveries have been made in regard to the 
economic-psychology of human behavior.   Mathew Rabin’s “Psychology and 
Economics” offers an illuminating account of several instances where the predictions of 
the post-neoclassical model of consumer choice are inconsistent with the behavior of 
human beings.  It is unfortunate that much of this research is ignored by most mainstream 
economists, as Mathew Rabin suggests: “many of the arguments invoked against the 
reality or relevance of behavioural research derive from unfamiliarity with the details of 
this research.  Hence, my hope and guess is that as economists become more familiar 
with this research, such arguments will dissipate.  And as the aggressive uncuriosity 
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shown in the past toward behavioural research continues to diminish, we can look 
forward to focusing entirely on its substance”. (p. 41) 
 
A point that is often overlooked in the efficacy of the rational theory of consumer 
choice is the medium of the argument itself.  At its very core, the post-neoclassical model 
is an expansive mathematical equation logically derived from the axioms of choice.  It is 
not possible to disprove this model, other than appealing to inconsistencies within the 
logic of the argument, or by demonstrating its irrelevance in describing and predicting 
accurately human behavior and choices.  All mathematical models share this common 
characteristic, requiring no empirical evidence to validate the structure of their arguments 
and the validity of their conclusions.  While a valid solution derived from such an 
argument may be true, there is no means inherent in the model to determine if the 
solution accurately depicts reality other than to compare the result to phenomena that it 
supposedly predicts.  The structure of the argument may lead to logically true 
conclusions; however, there is no guarantee that these conclusions realistically portray 
phenomena in reality.  Because mathematical models are supported only by the rules of 
logic that apply to them these models may appear stable over time, however, this illusion 
of stability should not be mistaken for a tested scientific theory.  Without studying the 
correlation between observations and developing supportable hypothesis with observable 
and reproducible evidence there is no science.  The impracticality of relating pure 
mathematical statements to empirical observation is illustrated in, “On the Nature of 
Mathematical Truth,” authored by Carl Hempel: 
 
The statement that 3 + 2 = 5, then is true for similar reasons as, say, the assertion 
that no sexagenarian is 45 years of age.  Both are true simply by virtue of 
definitions or of similar stipulations which determine the meaning of the key 
terms involved.  Statements of this kind share certain important characteristics: 
Their validation naturally requires no empirical evidence; they can be shown to be 
true by a mere analysis of the meaning attached to the terms which occur in them. 
… However, this characteristic ‘theoretical certainty’ of analytic propositions has 
to be paid for at a high price: An analytic statement conveys no factual 
information.  Our statement about sexagenarians, for example, asserts nothing that 
could possibly conflict with any factual evidence: it has no factual implications, 
no empirical content; and it is precisely for this reason that the statement can be 
validated without recourse to empirical evidence. (p. 544) 
 32 
 
 Despite certain paradoxes and damaging experimental evidence, as Gary Becker 
suggests in his Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, there is simply 
no other widely accepted approach of comparable generality that has yet been developed 
that offers serious competition to the rational choice theory.  Despite the success of the 
rational choice theory, the exogenous treatment of human biological and psychological 
behavior has lead to a great deal of uncertainty and too many questions regarding the 
theory’s experimental application, which in turn has generated confusion regarding its 
propositions and axioms.  For example, in economic theory, if all that is meant by 
rationality is logical consistency, then the question must be asked: what is gained by 
using the broadly defined term rationality?  Additionally, when certain behaviors in an 
experiment contradict the predictions of the ‘rational’ theory, then what is meant by 
declaring the behavior ‘irrational?’  If all that is meant by irrationality is that behavior is 
inconsistent with the predictions of the theory or the experimental hypothesis, then does it 
not seem more plausible to assume that the theory is inaccurate or miss-specified, since 
the hypothesis is intended to model the behavior, rather than the behavior conforming to 
the theory.  People are prudent decision makers, and if people are fallible and capable of 
making mistakes, then the rational theory of choice needs to take this into account, 
otherwise, the economic experiments and the theoretical applications it supports will be 
unrealistic and poor predictors of human choice and action. 
 
  The needs of economists have grown beyond the simple mathematical notion of 
rational consistency.  The current economic theory of choice abstains from speculating on 
the origins of human choice and preference, building only upon the consistency within 
the structure of static decisions.  Namely, that if a choice is made, it is chosen for a 
reason and it is preferred to all possible and comparable choices.  As such, the theory is 
intractable, imparting little guidance on how the model should be applied in experimental 
research.  In developing a realistic model of human decision making, it is necessary to 
broaden the scope of the rational theory of consumer choice and include realistic 
assumptions that model the complexity and dynamic nature of human behavior.  It will be 
necessary to clarify the psychological role and suitable application of the axioms of 
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choice.  Economists are not psychologists, and generally do not possess a tool set that 
allows them to apply mathematical models to the reality of human behavior, nor should 
they expect to since historically, economists have sought to exclude this type of 
understanding from the discipline.  In my view, economists will inevitably have to come 
to terms with the fact that one cannot separate economic behavior from human behavior, 
and this behavior will have to be eventually understood to improve economic theory. 
 
 
II. Human Action and Momentary Choice 
Human rationality, or human consistency, is the main assumption under which the 
theory of consumer choice is based.  As this theory developed out of the marginal utility 
revolution, which was heavily influenced by William Stanley Evans’s, Theory of 
Political Economy, Carl Menger’s, Principles of Economics, and Leon Walras’, Elements 
of Pure Economics, it has many other derivatives, but it essentially revolved around the 
notion of utility maximization.  It is the base assumption that human beings are rational, 
that they conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the tenets of logic, which 
defines the ordered nature of decision making and choice in the post-neoclassical model. 
 
Ludwig von Mises, throughout several essays written in the first half of the twentieth 
century, later consolidated into the book, Epistemological Problems Of Economics, has 
pointed out that it is not that people are rational or irrational, consistent or inconsistent, 
but rather that people are rational in the sense that there is a reason behind all conscious 
human action or lack of action.  He has sought to explain the inherent rational or 
reasoned nature of human action, and has promoted the view that rational behavior is 
purposeful or teleological.  This view implies that irrationality should not refer to 
inconsistent behavior and rather be defined as purposeless behavior, or as von Mises 
classifies it, “purely vegetative” behavior.  The interpretations of von Mises work by 
Lord Robbins and Frank Knight, who were primarily responsible for introducing the 
economic views of the continental Europeans to the West, failed to translate the 
significance of von Mises concept of rationality.  With the subsequent devastation of 
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Europe, as a result of World War II, and with the decrease in popularity of the Germanic 
languages, von Mises work has become effectively relegated to obscurity.2
 
The key reason why Lord Robbins and Professor Knight could not appreciate von 
Mises analysis was a result of their a priori views of human understanding.  While von 
Mises held this view, he was heavily influenced by the prevailing logical positivism of 
his day; and, consequently, much of his work conforms to this type of epistemology.  
Robbins and Knight viewed mathematics and logic in the Aristotelian sense, as essences 
or universal absolutes, and as a result of this view, they failed to take into consideration 
that the logical consistency of mathematical logic derives and evolves from an 
understanding of the nature of the cause and effect relationships that exist in reality.3  
The rules of consistency proposed in the modern theory of consumer choice have the 
same result as being arbitrary distinctions, explaining and integrating only a subset of the 
possible phenomena that play a role in the process of choice and their effect of human 
action.  Failing to take into consideration all aspects in a system of behavior ultimately 
leads to arbitrary hypothetical conclusions.  It is this point that von Mises argued, that 
people are always rational or consistent, but that their rationales are limited to what they 
understand, and to what they understand as their choices.  It is a failure to address and 
recognize the complexity of human behavior, and the need to take into consideration all 
of its phenomenal aspects, that has limited the application and advancement of the 
neoclassical approaches and models. 
                                                 
2 Lord Robbins was largely a follower of Jevons and Wicksteed and was also influenced by the works of 
Böhm-Bawerk, Wieser and Wicksell.  He was particularly known for his work in developing the prestige of 
the London School of Economics and for articulating the role of economic science.  In his, On the Nature 
and Significance of Economic Science, he defined Economics to be, “the science which studies human 
behaviour as a relationship between scarce means which have alternative uses” (p. 16).  Like Mises and 
Menger, Robbins was vigorous in his advocation of a priori theory and with the aid of his counterpart in 
America, Frank Knight, they contributed in dismantling the influence of Marshallian Empire. 
3 In Frank Knight’s later work he begins to alter his a priori view of knowledge.  In, “What is Truth in 
Economics,” in an aside concerning his second category of knowledge, namely, the truths of logic and 
mathematics, Knight speculates that “the problem here is whether knowledge of this sort is knowledge 
about the same objective reality as the first category or whether it is about thinking or mind-or what is the 
relation between the two” (p. 155).  In the same article, he later states that: “In fact, most of the content of 
arithmetic and algebra consists essentially of ‘short cuts’ or procedures for saving time in computation, as 
compared with the prohibitively slow and costly method of getting results by counting.  And the 
propositions of geometry are also empirically verifiable, to any worthwhile degree of accuracy, by drawing 
and measuring figures” (p. 157).  While it appears that Knight did not come out completely and recant his a 
priori view of knowledge, it is apparent that he was tending towards this direction.      
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 One of the principal reasons for developing his view of rationality was to demonstrate 
how human action was always motivated by reason.  One of the principal views which 
von Mises attempted to discredit was the social action hypothesis of Max Weber, as 
Weber suggested that rationality was not the core instrument on which people base their 
decisions.  One of the founding fathers of sociology, Max Weber emphasized the 
importance of cultural and political factors in determining economic development and 
individual behavior.  It was as a result of the rapid modernization of western society that 
Weber became concerned with explaining how development and industrialization was 
affecting human decision making.  He attempted to explain how human behavior was 
becoming increasingly goal-oriented, rather than being motivated by tradition, value, and 
emotion.  In his work, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, published in 1922, he attempted to 
identify the social factors that had brought about the ‘rationalization’ of the West, and 
emphasized that the basic distinguishing feature of modern society was best viewed in 
terms of a shift in motivation that had resulted from structural and historical forces.  
Weber’s pursuit of the determinants of human behavior led him to reject the rational view 
of behavior, and in its place, he hypothesized an “ideal type” of value where he deduced 
that there were four principal categories of “meaningful action,” of which three were 
distinctly non-rational. 
 
According to Weber, all “meaningful action” is encompassed in the following four 
categories: 
 
(1) purposive-rational, i.e., guided by anticipations of the behavior of the objects 
of the external world and of other men, and using these anticipations as 
‘conditions’ or as ‘means’ for the attainment of the ends rationally considered and 
sought by the actor himself; (2) valuational, i.e., guided by conscious belief in the 
unqualified intrinsic value of a definite mode of conduct—ethical, aesthetic, 
religious, or any other—purely for its own sake and independently of its 
consequences; (3) affective, especially emotional, when it is guided by burning 
passions and moods; and (4) traditional, when it is guided by the familiarity of 
custom. (p. 12) 
 
Weber drew another distinction, suggesting that beyond every meaningful action there is 
“a merely reactive mode of behavior which is not attendant on a subjectively intended 
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meaning” (p. 12).  In this way, Weber referred to those actions seemingly taken 
automatically without conscious intent. 
 
In an attempt to illustrate the error in Weber’s position, von Mises set about to 
demonstrate how each of his categories of “meaningful action” was the result of rational 
motivation.  In von Mises, Epistemological Problems of Economics, he begins by 
suggesting that Weber’s “valuational” sub-classification of “meaningful action” differs 
from rational conduct only in that it regards a definite mode of behavior as having a 
value.  Accordingly, a person arranges these and other values in an order of rank.  Von 
Mises gives the example that a person may forgo “the advantages that a Civil Service 
career offers because he does not want to renounce his political convictions,” and he 
suggests that “this is in no way an action that could be termed nonrational” (p. 87).  Von 
Mises notes that Weber makes the classic utilitarian error of mistaking as an “end,” only 
those things that are material that can be expressed in terms of money.  Similarly, he 
points out that “traditional” views are affected by the same misunderstanding.  Being 
similar to political convictions, honor and integrity, time honored traditions can be seen 
as an end in themselves.  Von Mises gives the example of an old farmer who does not 
want to sell his land for a profit or use a new type of fertilizer.  While von Mises suggests 
that the old man will not sell his farm or use a new fertilizer because he values the old 
ways over the new, it is apparent that the cost in terms of finding and moving to a new 
home, or the cost of learning how to use a new fertilizer may outweigh the extra profit in 
doing so, especially for an old man.  It seems apparent that both “valuational” and 
“traditional” behavior can be regarded as distinctly rational if a person sees certain views, 
beliefs or time honored traditions as an end. 
 
In refutation to Weber’s third non-rational category, “affective” action, von Mises 
makes the interesting observation that while one may act foolishly under the influence of 
emotion, it is necessarily the case that even under the influence of passion or stress a 
person still seeks to resolve their desires rationally.  The interesting connection he makes 
is that desires act on, but are not distinctly part of, a person’s rationality; their 
understanding of cause and effect.  Von Mises suggests that when we are under the 
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impulse of passion “the rank order of ends shifts.”  Thus, while the power of the 
conscious mind to make decisions can become limited under the influence of passion, a 
person still seeks to rationally achieve their desire.  Von Mises suggests that a person 
“who endangers his own life rushing to the aid of a drowning man is able to do so 
because he yields to the momentary impulse to help … It is may be  that subsequent 
reconsideration will lead him to a different judgment. But at the moment—and this is the 
only thing that matters—even this action was ‘rational’” (p. 88). 
 
Von Mises’ specific purpose in discussing rationality at length was to demonstrate that 
there was a reason or a rationale behind all meaningful action and thus that all human 
action is rational.  Outside of meaningful action, there was only purely “vegetative 
action.”  In, Epistemological Problems of Economics, von Mises notes that in “the 
behavior of men we can distinguish only two basic forms, between which there is a sharp 
conceptual division: unconscious behavior, or vegetative reaction, and conscious 
behavior, or action. … Action always seeks means to realize ends, and it is in this sense 
always rational and mindful of utility” (p. 68).  He specifically went out of his way to 
illustrate his understanding of the scope of rationality in human decision making, and as a 
result alludes to the root of the common misconception of referring to behavior as 
irrational or inconsistent.  Von Mises suggested that action “is, by definition, always 
rational,” and as such, comments depicting behavior as irrational or inconsistent merely 
reflect an ethical judgment based on the limited perspective of another person’s situation 
and understanding.  Regarding the manifestation of ones rationale in action, von Mises 
suggests: “One is unwarranted in calling goals of action irrational simply because they 
are not worth striving for from the point of view of one’s own valuations. Such a mode of 
expressions leads to gross misunderstandings. Instead of saying that irrationality plays a 
role in action, one should accustom oneself to saying merely: There are people who aim 
at different ends from those that I aim at, and people who employ different means from 
those I would employ in their situation” (p. 36). 
It was largely the result of Lord Robbins and Dr. Knight’s translation, that the work of 
von Mises was introduced into the western-English speaking world.  Both Robbins and 
Knight, however, failed to grasp the scope on which von Mises sought to explain human 
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action.  Knight’s view of knowledge led to his view of what constitutes human 
intelligence, which influenced how he interpreted von Mises work.  Knight viewed 
intelligent behavior as being in accordance with proper logic, and unintelligent behavior 
as being inconsistent with proper logic.  It is readily apparent in the following quotation 
from Knight’s essay, “On the History and Method of Economics,” that he does not see 
people as being consistently rational in their endeavors: 
 
[A] free economic order must assume that men actually tend to be rational in the 
use of means, that they try to be and tend to succeed. … The careful economic 
theorist does not confuse the abstraction of perfectly economic behavior, or the 
economic man, with the actual behavior of real men, any more than the physicist 
or engineer assumes that friction is absent in real machines.  Applied economics 
must try to take account of the role in business life of error and of motives (good 
or bad), such as prejudice, curiosity, and the various forms of the play interest, 
which do not conform to the pattern of economic rationality.  Competition itself, 
in the psychological meaning, is a non-economic interest.  The economic interest 
is merely a striving for efficiency in the use of means, whatever means are 
available and whatever ends are pursued. (p. 25) 
 
Knight interpreted von Mises view of rationality to mean consistency in how people 
‘tend’ to be rational, and how they ‘tend’ to succeed. 
 
Lord Robbins made a similar distinction noting that, if what von Mises referred to as 
“rational is taken to mean merely ‘consistent’, then it is true that an assumption of this 
sort does enter into certain analytical constructions” (p. 91).  It is in this way that Robbins 
saw rationality as a form of mathematical consistency.  In support of his view, he 
hypothesized essentially what amounts to the rational axiom of transitivity.  If a person 
faces a choice between three different sets of goods, A, B and C, and if the person 
chooses A over B, and B over C, then they must logically prefer A over C.  As a result of 
his view that behavior could be modeled by mathematical consistency he was led to 
conclude that “the assumption of perfect rationality in the sense of complete consistency 
is simply one of a number of assumptions of a psychological nature which are introduced 
into economic analysis at various stages of approximation to reality” (p. 95).  
Consequently, Lord Robbins determined it was possible to discuss human behavior in 
terms of consistency and inconsistency.  The structure of his view, however, became 
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confused as he suggests that at times it “may be not consistent to be consistent,” whereby 
he means that it “may be irrational to be completely consistent as between commodities, 
in the sense just described, just because the time and attention which such exact 
comparisons require are (in the opinion of the economic subject concerned) better spent 
in other ways” (p. 92). 
 
The difficulty that Lord Robbins and Professor Knight had in understanding the 
significance of von Mises’ view derives not directly from what von Mises said, but rather 
from what von Mises implied.  For von Mises, it is only in the moment of choice that a 
person sorts through various means to satisfy some end, and as a result, it is only in the 
moment that a person’s choices can be seen as being consistent.  Von Mises assumed, as 
in his refutation of Weber, that there could be limits imposed upon the consciousness of 
man, through stress or passion, and that a person’s ability to formulate decisions can thus 
be limited to a person’s momentary capacity to interpret their situation and to recall a 
broad spectrum of means to an end.  It is in this context, that there is no inconsistent or 
unintelligent behavior, because it is impossible for a person to be aware of that which 
they are not.  Subsequently, it is apparent that a person is only able to realize that they 
have made an error when their understanding has expanded sufficiently so that they can 
discern their mistake.  Thus, the treatment of the consistency of human behavior inter-
temporally led to misinterpretation of von Mises view, and as a result has led to the 
current view that human behavior should be treated as consistent over time. 
 
The suggestion that a person acts irrationally is thus a meaningless statement, as it is 
not compatible with the concept of action.  For von Mises, “‘seeking to attain an end’ and 
the ‘striving after a goal’ cannot be eliminated from the concept of action. Whatever does 
not strive after goals or seek the attainment of ends reacts with absolute passivity to an 
external stimulus and is without a will of its own, like an automaton or a stone” (p. 35).  
Thus, it is in the moment of action that a person is considered rational, because they draw 
upon reasons or rationales for basing their momentary decision.  As a result, von Mises 
suggests:  
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It makes no difference whether action springs from altruistic or from egoistic 
motives, from a noble or from a base disposition; whether it is directed toward the 
attainment of materialistic or idealistic ends; whether it arises from exhaustive 
and painstaking deliberation or follows fleeting impulses and passions. The laws 
of catallactics that economics expounds are valid for every exchange regardless of 
whether those involved in it have acted wisely or unwisely or whether they were 
actuated by economic or non-economic motives (p. 36) 
 
As von Mises argues, the assertion of unintelligence or irrationality is then always rooted 
in a scale of values different from our own, and whoever says that irrationality plays a 
role in human action is merely saying that his fellow men behave in a way that he does 
not consider correct. 
 
Many recent economists, like Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, Richard Thaler, and 
Alan Schwartz have been credited with demonstrating the existence of irrationality or 
irrational behavior, because they have demonstrated experimentally how observed 
behavior deviates from the predictions of post-neoclassical models of human behavior.  
More importantly, these economists have not demonstrated irrationality; they have 
demonstrated the failures of the post-neoclassical models to accurately explain human 
behavior.  Daniel Kahneman makes this very point in his Nobel Prize Interview: 
 
I never think of myself as having demonstrated irrationality.  There is a definition 
of rationality within the context of economic theory or decision theory more 
broadly, which is a completely unrealistic conception of a human agent with a 
complete preference order of all states of the world, with a Bayesian set of beliefs 
about all possible states, and this defines rationality in the context of economic 
theory.  As a descriptive hypothesis this is a totally implausible hypothesis, and it 
is fairly easy to show that the hypothesis is not true.  We have been able to show 
many of the ways people have been able to depart from this ideal of rationality, 
but this is not irrationality.  People are reasonable, they are prudent agents.  It is 
just that I think the definition of rationality used in economic theory is a very 
implausible definition, and it fails descriptively, and we have been able to 
document some of these failures and explained them. 
 
Knez, Smith, and Williams agree with Kahneman in their paper, Individual Rationality, 
Market Rationality, and Value Estimation: “We would emphasize that such behavior is 
“irrational” only in the narrow sense of EUT (expected utility theory) as a behavioral 
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hypothesis which may not only be a poor predictor of individual choice, but may not be a 
satisfactory guide to action.” (p. 397) 
 
The effect of von Mises argument concerning the nature of human rationality is that 
conscious volition controls all spheres of human conduct that is accessible to it by 
tolerating only the reactive, instinctive or cognitive conduct that it sanctions as expedient 
and would itself have carried out.  He suggests that the science of human action aims at 
something quite different than psychology, as the boundary between meaningful and 
merely reactive behavior is not at all indeterminate.  If the will has the power to become 
efficacious, there is only meaningful action.  The question, however, of how one means is 
chosen over another and why certain ends are preferred over others is not addressed in 
von Mises analysis.  While he clarifies the extent to which the current theory of rational 
consumer choice can be considered consistent, he does not explain the nature of human 
behavior, the motivation to act, and the measure of discrimination in the process of 
choice.  To understand the nature of motivation and discrimination a more detailed 
examination of the nature of human behavior is required. 
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Chapter 4.  Value and the Water and Diamond Paradox 
 
The word VALUE, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and 
sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object, and sometimes the 
power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object conveys.  
The one may be called “value in use;” the other, “value in exchange.”  The things 
which have the greatest value in use have frequently little or no value in 
exchange; and on the contrary, those which have the greatest value in exchange 
have frequently little or no value in use.  Nothing is more useful than water: but it 
will purchase scarce any thing; scarce any thing can be had in exchange for it.  A 
diamond on the contrary, may frequently be had in exchange for it. 
 
The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith 
 
Modern neoclassical theory derived from the Marginalist revolution when the classical 
labor theory of value was superseded by William Stanley Jevons’ marginal theory of 
value.  Jevons sought to develop an objective theory of value by integrating an objective 
measure of utility with observable market metrics.  He attempted to demonstrate how the 
usefulness of a good varies as more of a good is consumed, and how a measure of this 
vacillating utility can be shown to affect prices and quantity demanded.  Compared with 
Jevons’ objective theory, Menger’s ‘subjective’ theory of value derives from an 
individual’s understanding of the usefulness of a particular thing in satisfying a, or 
multiple, desires.  Usefulness is a constant, derived from understanding, while the 
impetus or motivation to choose derives from the magnitude of the individual’s many 
desires.  These desires cause demand and limit which goods will be produced based on 
the relative efficiency in the cost of production which is the cause of price. 
 
A clearer understanding of this difference between these two theories of value can be 
identified by noting how each theory relates to Adam Smith’s two types of value; value 
in use and value in exchange.  For Jevons, value depends entirely upon utility, the 
abstract quality whereby an object serves the purposes of its user.  A good that may 
produce pleasure and prevent pain possess utility and consequently possesses value.  
Jevons suggests that the concept of value is often confused and is not correctly used in 
economics.  He concludes that there are three distinct meanings that are habitually 
confused together.  There is value in regards to esteem, or the desire for more (U), which 
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he equates to the final degree of utility or the utility derived from the last unit consumed.  
There is value in use (M·U) which he equates to total utility, or the quantity (M) of a 
good multiplied by the final degree of utility (U).  The third meaning, the exchange value 
or purchasing power of a good, he determines does not refer to value at all: 
 
Value in exchange expresses nothing but a ratio, and the term should not be used 
in any other sense. To speak simply of the value of an ounce of gold is as absurd 
as to speak of the ratio of the number seventeen. What is the ratio of the number 
seventeen? The question admits no answer, for there must be another number 
named to make a ratio; and the ratio will differ according to the number 
suggested. What is the value of iron compared with that of gold?—is an 
intelligible question. The answer consists in stating the ratio of the quantities 
exchanged. (p. 60) 
 
The third meaning of purchasing power refers to a ratio of exchange between two 
goods (M˚= M·M-1).  The scientific expression of Smith’s exchange value is the ratio of 
exchange; the ratio of the quantity of one commodity to the quantity of some other 
commodity exchanged for it.  Jevons ultimately determines that value depends solely on 
the final degree of utility, where the degree of utility depends upon having more or less of 
a commodity to consume.  Because the supply of a good determines how much of a good 
can be consumed, he ultimately concludes the following tabular form: 
 
Cost of production determines supply. 
Supply determines final degree of utility. 
Final degree of utility determines value. (p. 101) 
 
The value of a good is consequently determined only by its subjective scarcity; the degree 
to which peoples’ desire for that good exceeds its availability.  The price of a good and 
the quantity demanded is determined jointly and simultaneously by the demand for and 
supply of the good.  Utility determines what is to be supplied and “the degree of utility 
varies with the quantity of commodity, and ultimately decreases as that quantity 
increases.” (p. 6)  Utility, value and price, supply and demand are consequently derived 
from the relative scarcity of a good.  Because the utility of a good determines if a good is 
to be produced, goods that are overly abundant will not be produced because there is not 
utility to be gained as all of the utility possible to be derived from that good is completely 
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realized from free gifts of nature.  Plentiful goods, like water or air, are then valueless 
because there is no utility left to satisfy.  Because these goods are so abundant and easily 
accessible to those who demand them, each consumer can maximize their satisfaction for 
them without having to go to market.  Consequently, because there is no market demand, 
there is no market exchange price, as each consumer’s demand is satisfied by the free 
gifts from nature.  As Jevons writes:  
 
We cannot live without water, and yet in ordinary circumstances we set no value 
on it. Why is this?  Simply because we usually have so much of it that its final 
degree of utility is reduced nearly to zero.  We enjoy, every day, the almost 
infinite utility of water, but then we do not need to consume more than we have. 
Let the supply run short by drought, and we begin to feel the higher degrees of 
utility, of which we think but little at other times. (p. 7) 
 
Utility and price develop from scarcity, when more of a particular good is desired than 
is available in quantity.  The equilibrium price and quantity supplied are dependent upon 
a goods scarcity, the law of demand (where demand increases with a decrease in price) 
and the marginal utility theory (marginal utility increases as the per-unit of quantity 
consumed decreases).  The use value of a good is consequently higher when a good is 
relatively scarcer and is valueless when a good is overly abundant.  The exchange value 
is effectively the same thing as use value where goods that possess a value in exchange or 
price are those that are relatively scarce, compared to demand, and which require 
production.  The exchange value or equilibrium price is determined at the equilibrium 
point between supply and demand.  While water may have the potential to be more useful 
than a diamond, because it is overly abundant, the supply is so great that the demand is 
always met so that there is no reason for production and consequently no reason for 
exchange and no exchange value.  For a diamond on the other hand, because it is so 
scarce relative to the demand for diamonds, the utility for a diamond is not satisfied so 
the price of the diamond is bid up.  Scarcity consequently explains why relatively more 
abundant goods like water and food are cheaper than scarce goods that are generally less 
useful.  In the neoclassical theory, whether a good has the potential to be more useful is 
irrelevant to its value, because utility is reduced through consumption or it is not, and 
value is ultimately determined by the scarcity of supply relative to the amount demanded.  
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The importance of scarcity in the neoclassical model is what led Lord Lionel Robbins to 
declare that economics is the science which studies human behavior as a relationship 
between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses. 
 
For Menger, value refers to an individual’s understanding of how useful a thing is in 
the satisfaction of need or desire.  Use value refers to and is defined as the value of those 
goods that directly satisfy desire, whereas exchange value refers to and is defined as the 
value of those goods that are used to indirectly satisfy desire: 
 
Use value, therefore, is the importance that goods acquire for us because they 
directly assure us the satisfaction of needs that would not be provided for if we 
did not have the goods at our command.  Exchange value is the importance that 
goods acquire for us because their possession assures the same result indirectly. 
(p. 228) 
 
While a good is directly used or indirectly used to satisfy desire, it is valued based on 
the individual’s understanding of how any particular thing can be used to satisfy desire, 
whether this is from a knowledge of the causal connections or in the ability to command a 
particular thing to satisfy desire.  Exchange value, consequently, is practically identical to 
the value of all other second or higher order goods that are indirectly used to ultimately 
satisfy desire: 
 
It is true, as we have seen, that the importances of goods to us with respect to a 
direct employment and with respect to an indirect employment for the satisfaction 
of our needs are only different forms of a single general phenomenon of value. 
But their importance to us may simultaneously be very different in degree in the 
two forms. (pp. 229-230) 
 
As people attempt to maximize their wellbeing, they economize those goods under their 
command, using these goods to satisfy their desires.  When desires are satisfied the value 
of a previously used useful thing is zero or low enough that it is in the interest of the 
person to trade these goods that are now valued less for those goods that are valued more.  
As the use value of a good varies relative to a person’s need for it to satisfy desire, the 
exchange value of the good is the use value that can be obtained indirectly through the 
ultimate acquisition of another good that can directly satisfy a need or desire.  Whether a 
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good is ultimately more useful or valuable when directly used or indirectly used, 
determines if a good is used or exchanged: 
 
The owner of a forest, for example, to whom the yearly cut of timber has only 
exchange value, will probably immediately discontinue exchanging his timber for 
other goods if he constructs a blast furnace to melt iron and needs the full output 
of his timberland for its operation. An author who previously sold his work to 
publishers will not do so in the future if he founds his own magazine, and so on. 
(p. 233) 
 
Menger treats the development of price very similarly to the neoclassical equilibrium 
approach, but stresses the idea that prices and quantities are not objective and are 
incomparable because exchanges are not reversible; the reason for exchange derives from 
an inverse value relationship: “an economic exchange of goods is dependent on an 
economizing individual having command of goods that have a smaller value to him than 
other goods at the command of another economizing individual who values the two 
goods in reverse fashion.” (p. 194)  Price derives from bargaining or as Menger calls it, 
‘the price duel.’  Each bargainer attempts to acquire as large a portion as possible of the 
economic gain that can be derived from the exploitation of the exchange opportunity, and 
the opposing efforts of the bargainers to derive the greatest possible gain from the 
transaction will balance or average the final ratio of exchanged goods or price between 
the extreme possible limits.  Price is determined similarly to the neoclassical supply and 
demand model, however, rather than consumers and producers, the actors exchange 
goods because each bargainer identifies that indirectly the trade will lead to greater 
wellbeing.  Value is related to price or the ratio of goods exchanged.  A particular ratio of 
goods exchanged, or price, reflects only an intermediate relationship between the 
perspective values the bargainers relate to each of the goods traded.  Price, consequently, 
is an arbitrary measure that relates the ratio of goods that can be traded and outside of this 
relationship price possesses no value or meaning. 
 
The divergence between water and a diamond in value is related to how each of these 
useful things is causally related to the satisfaction of desire.  Water possesses a high value 
because water is useful in satisfying thirst and is generally required and desired 
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physiologically.  Water possesses a low price because it is so abundant that it is 
unnecessary to exchange for it.  If water became scarce, those in control of it would be 
able to trade it to those who value it more than the other goods they are willing to trade.  
Ultimately, as the desire for water goes unsatisfied and the need to acquire water 
increases, those other goods that a person commands that are less effective in satisfying 
desire will be traded for water.  Those who can least afford to trade for water (i.e., those 
who are least productive) will either go without or will sacrifice a significant portion of 
the goods that they would otherwise have used to satisfy their other desires.  Those less 
able to afford the more basic goods will be significantly more dissatisfied than those who 
are more able. 
 
Diamonds, like gold, were thought to not possess direct use value, but primarily 
because of their physical properties (durability and scarcity) diamonds and gold are used 
indirectly as a medium of exchange.  Whatever the social rate of exchange is set at for 
such goods determines the goods relative value to other goods.  Similar to fiat money, 
these goods are useful because they embody a durable contractual standard of value that 
all goods can be exchanged into, whereby the exchange value of perishable goods can be 
stored for use at some future time.  Like fiat money, if too much of the standard exists 
relative to the amount of goods that are traded, the price or relative value of the currency 
will decrease.  Conversely, if not enough of the medium of exchange exists relative to the 
number of goods traded, the price will increase.  The value derived from diamonds and 
gold is derived from a social contract and the general acceptance of the goods use as a 
medium of exchange.  Like Fiat money, the money itself is practically worthless (no use 
value), but through social arrangement, the good serves indirectly as a standard of value 
that generates its relatively high exchange price. 
 
The primary divergence between the two approaches derives from different 
interpretations of how goods are valued.  For Jevons, value depends solely on the final 
degree of utility and scarcity, where the degree of utility depends upon having more or 
less of a commodity to consume.  Menger on the other hand writes that “The value of 
goods arises from their relationship to our needs, and is not inherent in the goods 
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themselves. With changes in this relationship, value arises and disappears.” (p. 120)  
Jevons’ view of utility determining value is inconsistent with Menger’s version and fails 
to address the motivation for choosing and the causal connection between particular 
goods and the desires themselves. 
 
The difference between Jevons’ and Menger’s treatment of the process of choice is 
distinct, but is confused by the use of similar terminology and the subtle, yet important, 
difference between the two treatments.  F.A Hayek, in his 1976 Introduction to the 
English version of Menger’s Principles of Economics, refers to Jevons and Menger’s 
“independent and practically simultaneous discovery of the principle of marginal utility” 
(p. 12), however, he admits that Menger never uses the term utility, and comments on 
Menger’s description of value as a “clumsy but precise phrase”.  Each researcher 
attempts to discuss the process of choice, and describe the same phenomena using similar 
terminology with different meanings and emphasis, and each theory is inconsistent, 
specifically as Menger rejects Jevons’ concept of utility. 
 
When Jevons refers to the determinant of value he equates the final degree of utility or 
the satisfaction derived from the last unit of a good consumed to equal value.  Menger 
refers to value as the understood usefulness or efficiency of a particular thing used to 
satisfy a desire.  Jevons refers to degree of utility as the magnitude of satisfaction derived 
through the consumption or use of a unit of a particular good from one moment of 
consumption to the next, where a single good’s utility changes to a degree based on the 
quantity of the good consumed or used.  Menger views utility, or as he calls it, the ‘use 
value’, as a constant, and describes different degrees of usefulness as the difference 
between particular things in their ability to satisfy a desire; meaning different types of 
wood are more or less efficient (more or less useful to a degree) when used as fuel.  
Jevons describes how goods possess little or no value as a result of a lack of scarcity or in 
terms of quantity consumed, and suggests that as more is consumed the marginal utility 
of the last unit consumed decreases until the person can no longer be satisfied.  Menger 
on the other hand describes how value is derived only from those things that can be used 
to satisfy desire.  Consequently, a thing becomes valueless once a desire or need is 
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satisfied, or if no need exists.  With each interpretation, the same phenomena are 
described differently. 
 
The problem is that Jevons’ concept of utility is intended to encapsulate many specific 
variables into a very ambiguous and overly simplified term.  The magnitude of 
satisfaction, the difference between desires, the causal connections between goods and 
desires, the physical nature of particular goods, the changing magnitudes of desire, a 
person’s understanding of the usefulness of a good, and the relationship or effect between 
quantity and satisfaction are all attempted to be consolidated into the single term ‘utility.’  
Menger, on the other hand, focuses on isolating the causal relationships between the 
many variables that when combined effect human behavior and choice.  Menger 
recognizes the folly of over-simplification and rejects the concept of utility as it is 
commonly used.  Instead of marginal utility, Menger addresses marginal satisfaction and 
wellbeing maximization rather than utility maximization.  Each theorist addresses the key 
concepts involved in the process of choice but combines them differently to create two 
distinctly different theories. As was demonstrated by the failure of the utility approach 
over the last century, an empirical approach that simplifies only for the sake of clarity, 
rather than for syllogistic or mathematical malleability, should be adopted to develop a 
realistic theory of choice, which should provide a solid foundation for an economic 
science. 
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 Chapter 5.  Empirical Foundations of a New Consumer Theory 
 
Pure economics has a remarkable way of producing rabbits out of a hat –
apparently a priori propositions which apparently refer to reality.  It is fascinating 
to try to discover how the rabbits got in; for those of us who do not believe in 
magic must be convinced that they got in somehow.  I have become convinced 
myself that they get in two ways.  One is by the assumption, at the beginning of 
every economic argument, that the things to be dealt with in the argument are the 
only things that matter in some practical problem.  (This is always a dangerous 
assumption, and nearly always more or less wrong-which is why the application 
of economic theory is such a ticklish matter.)  That takes us much of the way, but 
it does not take us the whole way.  The other assumption is that which we have 
just isolated, an assumption that kinks can be neglected that there is a sufficient 
degree of regularity in the system of wants also, as we shall see later, in the 
productive system) for any set of quantities in the neighborhood of those with 
which we are concerned to be a possible position of equilibrium at some system 
of prices.  Again, this assumption may be wrong; but being the simplest 
assumption possible, it is a good assumption to start with; and in fact its 
accordance with experience seems definitely good. 
 
Value and Capital, Sir John Richard Hicks 
 
I. Basic Assumptions - The Consumer 
Rational Action (Rationality and Irrationality) 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the assumption of rationality is not stated strongly 
enough in consumer theory.  In economic theory, rational behavior is often referred to as 
a deliberative process where a consumer weighs the expected cost and benefits prior to 
making a decision.  While people certainly act in this way, what is often neglected is that 
the entire process of consciousness in general revolves around the development of an 
understanding of reality and its use as the instrument in making decisions and directing 
action.  In the post-neoclassical approach, rational behavior refers to the cross-wise 
comparison of all baskets of goods and the ordinal ranking of preference between these 
different baskets of goods.  This definition is not what is meant by the broader definition 
of rationality.  Human behavior, which is always rational because human action is always 
purposeful, involves the consideration of correlating an understanding of reality to the 
effectiveness of particular means and actions to satisfying particular desires or achieving 
desired objectives.  In this sense, the consistency in human behavior would be the ability 
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to consider different cause and effect relationships and rationalize a course of action that 
is consistent with a person’s objectives.  While this treatment of rationality may appear to 
be less precise than the rational axiomatic view, the rationality described in the axiomatic 
model gains it’s so called ‘precision’ by eliminating from discussion and its definition the 
majority of those essential factors that combine in the process of choice to manifest 
human behavior.  A broader more robust empirical treatment of rationality will ultimately 
lead to a superior model of consumer behavior that will be able to realistically address 
both what the post-neoclassical model currently attempts to explain and will be able to 
address the majority of other human behaviors that are currently treated exogenously and 
which are relevant to the science of economics. 
 
People are always rational because human action is always purposeful and 
consequently supported by rationales that guide choice.  Suggesting that a person’s 
choices or behavior is irrational demonstrates a failure in the understanding or model 
used by the researcher to analyze the behavior.  Because models are designed to explain 
behavior and not the other way around, statements of irrationality should always be taken 
as a sign that the underlying model or paradigm used to explain the behavior is 
inadequate, rather than to suggest that people prefer to choose what they know is not in 
their interest.  From Chapter Four, people who have different experiences will base their 
decisions on different information and consequently will have different understandings of 
reality.  The variance in peoples’ choices derives from differences in understanding, 
differences in motivation or desire, and differences in current capability and situation.  
Far from contradicting rational behavior, the identification of irrationality merely 
demonstrates ignorance on behalf of the observer of these root causes. 
 
It is essential to an empirical analysis of human behavior that all behavior is rational.  If 
there is no reason or rationale behind behavior then there is no basis, no cause and effect 
relationship, no empirical data upon which to base and develop an empirical theory of 
consumer choice.  The argument of rational behavior developed in the previous chapter is 
of crucial importance because it establishes that human behavior can be scientifically 
analyzed and quantifiably measured.  While the process of choice is limited by a number 
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of factors, and the rationality in human decision making is significantly different than the 
post-neoclassical formal rational assumptions, there appears to be empirical evidence 
supporting the claim that all behavior is rational.  As suggested by von Mises, while 
particular choices or actions may be poorly thought out or ill conceived, this does not 
mean that the process of choice is not rational.  Rationality only means that the process of 
choice and the consistency through which it manifests is more complicated than 
originally thought.  Whether people use heuristics or framing as Kahneman and Tversky 
have suggested, or satisfice, as Herbert Simon has suggested, what people choose and 
how they formulate their decisions is by no means random, or in violation of the laws of 
nature. 
 
Through understanding and consequently removing the relevance of the proposition of 
irrational behavior from economic discussion, the unknown design of seemingly erratic 
behavior must be accepted to be rational.  The focus of scientific inquiry should then be 
directed in understanding the root causes of these erratic behaviors.  Situational factors, 
physiological constraints, memory limitations, emotional demands, limitations of 
consciousness, and other uncharacteristically economic discussions may be found to 
affect the decision making of people seeking to acquire consumer goods, and may be of 
significant importance to researchers attempting to control the heteroscedasticity in their 
studies of consumer behavior.  In a more empirical science, the economist is required to 
learn many of the techniques that are used in psychology.  By utilizing Ockham’s Razor, 
the experienced observer should be able to distinguish the root cause of choice and action 
and be able to record and compare these causes to develop a clearer understanding of the 
process of choice and more generally the nature of consumer behavior.4   With an 
understanding and record of actual consumer rationales, accurate prediction of future 
consumer choice will improve, and with each improvement, the science of consumer 
behavior and the process of choice will become more refined and realistic. 
                                                 
4 A logical principle attributed to the medieval philosopher William of Ockham: “A rule in science and 
philosophy stating that entities should not be multiplied needlessly. This rule is interpreted to mean that the 
simplest of two or more competing theories is preferable and that an explanation for unknown phenomena 
should first be attempted in terms of what is already known. Also called law of parsimony.”  Quoted from, 
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition.
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 Pursuit of a Perceived Best Interest in the Moment  
One of the basic assumptions economists make concerning human behavior is that 
buyers and sellers are goal-oriented; that is people are interested in fulfilling their own 
personal goals.  The assumption of goal-orientated behavior is often taken to indicate that 
individuals are self-interested.  In economic models, this goal orientated behavior that 
economists propose is often thought to be selfish because goal oriented behavior is 
generally discussed in terms of utility maximization.  To maximize utility, the consumer 
chooses goods in quantities where the marginal utility or the marginal benefit from each 
good chosen is proportional to the marginal disutility, the marginal cost or price of the 
good.  Given the assumption that consumers can always benefit from having additional 
spending power or always benefit from additional goods or services, goal seeking 
behavior suggests that the goal of consumer behavior is the attainment of greater wealth 
and consequently the consumption of a greater number of goods and services. 
 
What is often misperceived by those unfamiliar with economic theory is that economic 
theory deals only with a subset of human behavior, or as Lord Robbins has emphasized 
in, An Essay on the Nature & Significance of Economic Science, economics is “the 
science which studies human behavior as a relationship between scarce means which 
have alternative uses.” (p. 16)  As discussed previously, the exclusion of ‘non-economic’ 
behavior was the result of a view that human behavior is subjective and not fit for 
scientific inquiry, as it is psychological or physiological in nature, and should be handled 
by psychologists and physiologists.  Underscoring this separation, human economic 
behavior is often euphemized, using terminology like consumer and homo-economicus to 
designate the distinction between economic behavior and human behavior.  The problem 
with this distinction is the difficulty in studying economic behavior without first 
understanding human behavior more broadly, and the difficulty in determining how to 
accurately describe economic behavior without addressing its psychological or 
physiological nature.  The difficulty for economists and some non-economists was to 
separate the limitations of economic explanations and predictions of human behavior 
while attempting to push the limits of the theory to explain psychological choices. 
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 Suggesting that people exhibit goal-seeking behavior only vaguely addresses the issue 
of what motivates behavior.  The theory of motivation in economics is purposely vague 
and generally avoided, because economists are hesitant to accept a new theory of 
motivation after spending most of the past century attempting to work around utility 
theory.  Consequently, modern neoclassical theory is still tied to Sir Hicks’ ordinal 
approach.  According to the ordinal approach or the ordinal ranking of preference, a 
consumer prefers the utility-maximizing group of goods where the consumer’s highest 
indifference curve attainable is the one that just touches, or is tangent to the budget line, 
or where the marginal rate of substitution between all goods is equal to the ratio of the 
chosen goods’ prices (MRSab = Pa/Pb).  While this approach describes relationships that 
could potentially describe the logic within a consumer’s choice, it does not address why 
goods are preferred, it does not address how a consumer discriminates between 
alternatives, and it is not based on empirical evidence.  Because utility and indifference 
cannot, or more accurately, has not been measured, there is no empirical evidence upon 
which to develop a test to support the formal conclusions of the ordinal theory of 
consumer choice.  The rejection of psychological and physiological research in 
economics has significantly affected the development of economics because it prevents 
the development of a scientific theory of consumer choice.  As Amartya Sen has 
suggested in response to objections that psychological assumptions should not be and are 
not included in the neoclassical theory, it is “not because no psychological assumptions 
are used but because the psychological assumptions used are sensibly chosen.” (243) 
 
Presuming people are always rational in their decisions, people will pursue their 
perceived interest in the moment of decision.  It does not make sense to assume that a 
person will pursue an interest that they do not understand or one outside of their interest.  
A person would not be lazy if they perceive it is in their interest to not work so hard.  
People should be characterized as pursuing their perceived best interest in the 
maximization of their welfare, regardless of how other people interpret their chosen 
actions.  The key to this discussion is that the chooser chooses because they rationalize or 
identify that a particular course of action is in their best interest.  While this particular 
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distinction may appear unnecessary, it is important because it now describes all choices 
as being perceived to be in the perceived best interest of the chooser.  Laziness is not a 
necessarily a market inefficiency, it is a mode of behavior understood by some to lead to 
the maximization of their wellbeing.  What is important in why people choose is not that 
they take action in accordance with some universal best course of action, but that they 
choose the best course of action given the limits of their understanding.  All human action 
or inaction can consequently be described in terms of a pursuit to maximize welfare.  
While decisions and actions made in exchange markets are generally considered 
economic in nature, decisions and actions made outside of exchange markets are directed 
towards the same desire to maximize satisfaction or wellbeing.  Suggestion that a 
consumer’s welfare or wellbeing is only a function of their income and the quantity of 
goods and services they can acquire only encompasses a fraction of the total number of 
choices and actions carried out day-to-day that are directed toward the improvement of 
their wellbeing.  Shifting one’s body-weight from an uncomfortable to a comfortable 
position, while sitting in a chair, is identical in intent to acquiring a consumer good to 
improve wellbeing.  While practically this distinction is meaningless in a discussion of 
economics because a consumer is still limited by their income in procuring goods and 
services in an exchange market, the distinction is relevant because it defines and expands 
the scope of the process of choice and emphasizes the importance of non-market factors 
in the pursuit of increasing wellbeing. 
 
The primary motivation for behavior is physiological desire.  In the pursuit of a 
person’s perceived best interest a person seeks to best satisfy their desires.  If this is true, 
human and consumer behavior should be consistent to the extent that all homo-sapiens 
possess similar physiological needs and manifest similar desires.  By accounting for 
physical and environmental limitations and by accounting for the different experiences, 
understanding and consequent rationales people use to satisfy their desires, a significant 
portion of the variability in human behavior could be explained and these explanations 
could be used to increase the accuracy in predicting future behavior.  As von Mises has 
argued, just because a person is motivated to satisfy their personal desires does not mean 
that a person cannot act altruistically or greedily.  If a person perceives that it is easier to 
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satisfy their desires or seek their best interest through greed, through cooperation or 
through altruistic pursuits, then they will pursue courses of action in accordance with this 
guiding philosophy.  An environment that allows or facilitates the benefits of greed will 
perpetuate greed as a guiding philosophy because it will be in the interest of those in such 
an environment to not cooperate, where conversely, in an environment that promotes 
cooperation and penalizes greed, greed will be less prevalent as a guiding philosophy 
because greedy behavior will be less effective in facilitating the satisfaction of desire.  To 
an extent, cooperation or altruism favors long term greed, whereas selfishness favors 
short term greed. 
 
In the moment, a consumer is faced with numerous competing desires, but is limited in 
time and physical capability to pursue all of these desires simultaneously.  While some 
desires may be satisfied simultaneously with others, for example eating a meal while 
socializing, each conscious moment is the product of a synthesis of interpreting the 
environment a person finds themselves in and choosing what to do next.  When eating a 
meal, momentary decisions are made based on the guidance of one’s physiological 
desires on which part of the meal to eat first; whether it be take a drink of water, to 
quench a dry throat or to choose between a piece of chicken or a bean.  Observance of 
such details may seem unnecessary, but decisions made from second to second stream 
together to form consciousness and connect larger more complicated ideas and rationales.  
Many of these details once understood, much like learning how to tie one’s shoe laces 
become autonomous motor responses.  They become routine and are never thought of 
again in terms of the complicated process that was discovered when the course of action 
was first developed.  Just how these momentary thoughts develop and fit together to 
produce choice and ultimately action in accordance with a person’s desires is beyond the 
scope of this discussion.  Suffice it to say that these momentary decisions are the basis of 
a more complicated system of discrimination whereby the usefulness’ of particular 
alternatives are chosen in favor of others. 
 
As Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin report in “Back to Bentham?  Explorations of 
Experienced Utility,” the strengths of desires are reflected in the moment: “The 
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palatability of salt, for example, increases in conditions of sodium depletion.  On a 
different time scale, the hedonic value of food changes substantially during a single 
feeding episode, and normally drops to zero or becomes negative when feeding continues 
beyond satiation.” (p. 379)  Schelling, on the other hand, in, Choice and Consequence, 
suggests that not all pleasures and pains are biologically programmed.  Prior consumption 
experiences and various social influences can alter the effect of particular stimuli.  For 
example, people learn to like coffee or chili peppers, develop a dislike for rich deserts, or 
acquire a passion for opera.  Positive or negative wellbeing can be evoked by social 
stimuli, such as smiles or frowns, or by purely internal events such as memories of 
embarrassment or amusing thoughts.  Again, according to Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin: 
“In spite of the immense diversity in the occasions that evoke pleasure (or displeasure) in 
the human adult, the hedonic attribute that they share is salient and readily recognized.” 
(p. 379)  Despite how a person physiologically reacts to particular internal or external 
phenomena, people react to these manifestations rationally seeking their perceived best 
interest from moment to moment in an attempt to maximize their overall wellbeing. 
 
II. Basic Assumptions – Goods 
Theories of Value and Useful Things  
One of the great features in the writings of the early Marginalists is their expansive 
treatment of the most fundamental theoretical propositions in economics.  The classical 
economists, Smith, Ricardo and Marx, had referred to a Political Economy, however, 
with the neoclassical movement, the term economics was coined around 1870 and was 
popularized during the neoclassical movement, principally by Alfred Marshall.  Both 
economy and economics derive from the Greek oikos, meaning ‘house’ or ‘settlement’, 
and ‘nomos’, meaning ‘laws’ or ‘norms’.  The new economics of the Marginalists 
disconnected itself from politics and other subjective concerns and began to concentrate 
on developing the theoretical foundation of a science of human behavior.  As Carl 
Menger has written in the preface of his, Principles of Economics: 
 
Economic theory is related to the practical activities of economizing men in much 
the same way that chemistry is related to the operations of the practical chemist. 
Although reference to freedom of the human will may well be legitimate as an 
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objection to the complete predictability of economic activity, it can never have 
force as a denial of the conformity to definite laws of phenomena that condition 
the outcome of the economic activity of men and are entirely independent of the 
human will. It is precisely phenomena of this description, however, which are the 
objects of study in our science. (p. 48) 
 
To a significant extent, a detailed discussion of the terminology and many of the 
important concepts used in economics are not adequately addressed.  This is the result of 
economic thinking pervading the social landscape much more than it did in the nineteenth 
century.  Perhaps one of the most important concepts in economics, the theory of the 
good, is usually only addressed cursorily, restricted to a sentence or two in most basic 
economics texts, and virtually absent in most advanced economics texts. 
 
Many of the basic definitions of economic terms were developed over a century ago 
and possessed very specific meanings.  Because much of the psychological import in 
economics has been removed, there has been little need to define these propositions.  
Many of these propositions can be found empirically discussed in Carl Menger’s, 
Principles of Economics, but much of this theory today remains unknown or forgotten.  
In the introduction to the 1981 publication of Carl Menger’s, Principles of Economics, 
F.A. Hayek writes: “But there must be few instances, in economics or any other branch of 
knowledge, where the works of an author who revolutionized the body of an already 
well-developed science and who was generally recognized to have done so, have 
remained so little known as those of Carl Menger.” (p. 11)  First published in German in 
1871, it was not until 1950 with a forward by Frank Knight, that Carl Menger’s 
Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre, was first published in English; almost 80 years 
after its first publication it finally became available to English economists. 
 
It was in 1871 when both William Stanley Jevons’, Theory of Political Economy, and 
Menger’s, Principles of Economics, were published that is now generally regarded as the 
beginning of the modern period in the development of economics.  The Grundsätze der 
Volkswirtschaftslehre, is important because it develops the empirical foundation of 
several important economic concepts.  In it, Menger discusses a general theory of the 
good, a theory of value, a theory of exchange, a theory of price, a theory of the 
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commodity, and a theory of money.  Menger’s ideas are of tremendous importance 
because he empirically defines the basic foundation and terminology of an empirical 
economic theory.  While Jevons’ marginal theory ultimately led to Marshall’s, Principles 
of Economics, and to the development of neoclassical economics, Menger’s distinctly 
different approach never developed because of the limited exposure of the Austrians to 
the rest of the world, the attacks from the German Historicists, the geo-political climate in 
the world after his discovery, and the ultimate disintegration of the Austrian school and 
Austrian State in the early 1930’s. 
 
The Nature of a Good – Incomparable and Mutually Exclusive 
Carl Menger’s ‘General Theory of the Good’ develops not only the foundation of how 
goods should be considered, but also addresses scientifically the relationship between 
goods and the satisfaction of human desire.  Menger’s analysis of the good is 
comprehensive and the clarity of his empirical analysis easily illustrates how the current 
theoretical assumptions of the formal neoclassical model and the theory of consumer 
choice in general may need to be improved.  Interestingly, while credited with the 
discovery of marginal utility as with William Stanley Jevons in 1871, Menger never uses 
the terminology and quite contrarily maintains a very different and distinct conception of 
utility which is empirically based and significantly more accurate than Jevons’ view that 
utility is the value to a consumer of an additional unit of a product that is inversely 
related to the number of units of that product a consumer has already consumed.    
 
According to Menger, things that are causally connected with the satisfaction of human 
needs should be considered useful things, and those useful things that are both understood 
to be useful and are used to direct the satisfaction of needs are called goods.  To designate 
this very specific view, he suggests that there are four prerequisites that must 
simultaneously exist before a useful thing can be considered a good: 
 
 
1. A human need. 
2. Such properties as render the thing capable of being brought into a causal 
connection with the satisfaction of this need. 
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  3. Human knowledge of this causal connection. 
  4. Command of the thing sufficient to direct it to the satisfaction of the need. 
  (p. 52) 
 
Hence, a useful thing loses its quality of being a good if any of these four requirements 
are violated:  
 
(1) if, owing to a change in human needs, the particular needs disappear that the 
thing is capable of satisfying, (2) whenever the capacity of the thing to be placed 
in a causal connection with the satisfaction of human needs is lost as the result of 
a change in its own properties, (3) if knowledge of the causal connection between 
the thing and the satisfaction of human needs disappears, or (4) if men lose 
command of it so completely that they can no longer apply it directly to the 
satisfaction of their needs and have no means of reestablishing their power to do 
so. (p. 53) 
 
Menger carefully interprets the usefulness of each good in terms of its causal connection 
with the satisfaction of need, or as discussed in this discourse, desire.  This causal 
connection which determines the characteristic nature of a good, as he explains, can 
directly or indirectly satisfy a desire.  He designates that goods that directly satisfy 
desires, like clothes, beverages, and jewelry, are of a first order, while tools and 
equipment are of a second order.  The more indirectly causally related a useful thing is to 
the satisfaction of desire, the higher the order.  In this way, all goods are useful things 
that are understood to be useful and can be used to directly or indirectly lead to the 
satisfaction of human desire.  As Menger suggests: “As a people attains higher levels of 
civilization, and as men penetrate more deeply into the true constitution of things and of 
their own nature, the number of true goods becomes constantly larger”. (p. 53) 
 
A thing is a ‘useful thing’ if it can satisfy human desire, and it is a ‘good’ if it is 
understood to be useful in satisfying a desire.  Because there is a causal connection 
between goods and desires, there must be at least as many desires as there are first order 
goods.  Each of these different desires, or as Menger refers to them, needs, can be 
satisfied to a degree by a good that has the physical properties or unique characteristics 
that facilitate the satisfaction of the desire.  For example, when hungry, only those things 
which are nourishing will be useful and can satisfy the desire.  Each good is consequently 
different in its usefulness as each desire is different in its requirements for satiation.  
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Those goods that satisfy a similar desire are substitutes, and those goods that must be 
combined to satisfy a particular desire are compliments. 
 
Beer and Nuts are often considered complements, but in fact are not unless the term 
complement is used to refer to goods that are generally consumed together because their 
affected desires are correlated (eating salty food increases the desire for refreshment).  By 
not carefully distinguishing the difference, there is a risk that the causal relationship 
between a good and the desire it satisfies and the useful properties of a good become 
confused.  For example, the parts of a bicycle by themselves are second order goods, but 
when combined are a first order good that satisfies a desire for quicker movement.  When 
combined together, these useful things are compliments; whereas, beer satisfies thirst, 
nuts satisfy hunger, and when combined they form mush. 
 
The usefulness of a good is consequently a function of desire, as a good is only useful 
when it satisfies a desire, and each good is only comparable to other goods through its 
ability to satisfy a particular desire.  Because useful qualities are different, for example, 
pancakes can be substituted and replace an omelet to satisfy hunger but can not be 
substituted for a bicycle (a faster mode of transportation), the usefulness of goods that 
satisfy different needs cannot be compared.  The only measure of comparison between 
goods is the level of satisfaction a good is capable of effecting, and this comparison of 
satisfaction is dependent upon the relative magnitude of the desire for the useful thing in 
a particular moment.  Even with this measure, because desires are different and can only 
be satisfied by particular goods, the satisfaction gained from using a particular good may 
fluctuate as the specific magnitude of need or desire changes over time.  Overall total 
desire is the sum of the want for satisfaction of all of the different competing mutually 
exclusive desires.  A general level of welfare is said to exist, and is generally related to 
the degree to which a person’s many needs and desires are generally satisfied, and a 
person’s overall satisfaction or a person’s wellbeing develops derives from how well the 
person was able to satisfy these desires in any one moment, or over a particular period of 
time.  Goods consequently can be characterized as being comparable in use if they can 
satisfy the same desire, or must be characterized as being mutually exclusive in use if 
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they can only be used to satisfy different desires.  Each mutually exclusive good is 
consequently only comparable to other goods through the relative degree of wellbeing or 
satisfaction that goods are capable of producing when it is used. 
 
III. Basic Assumptions – Diminishing Marginal Utility and Non-Satiation 
If a useful thing is a good if it is perceived to be useful and can be used in the 
satisfaction of desire, then a useful thing is valuable or is valued based on how it is 
perceived to be useful in satisfying desire.  As Menger points out: “Value is thus nothing 
inherent in goods, no property of them, nor an independent thing existing by itself.  It is a 
judgment economizing men make about the importance of the goods at their disposal for 
the maintenance of their lives and well-being.” (p. 120)  While people’s understanding of 
a useful thing relates to the objective qualities and causal connection between satisfaction 
and a useful things physical properties, whether value is a subjective characteristic, in 
that people form different views of a things usefulness that can not be measured directly 
between goods, the objective characteristics of the good effectively limit the good’s 
actual usefulness.  Regardless of whether people understand the usefulness of a good in 
satisfying desire or value the good similarly or not, the objective qualities of the good 
should create the same effect, unless through insight or ignorance the thing is more or 
less efficiently used.  Because value is a function of understanding, it is possible for non-
economic goods, or those things that are not useful in satisfying desire, to be perceived as 
possessing value, or ‘imaginary value’.  Menger writes: “Regarding this knowledge, 
however, men can be in error about the value of goods just as they can be in error with 
respect to all other objects of human knowledge.” (p. 120) 
 
Confusion in clearly defining the key terminology used to discuss economic issues has 
contributed greatly to confusion about the basic principles of economics.  Perhaps the 
most significant confusion over the last century regards the importance and nature of 
utility.  While both are credited with the discovery of marginal utility, there is a key 
difference between Jevons and Menger’s interpretation of the phenomenon they discuss 
in their theories of value.  A good discussion of difference between Jevons and Menger’s 
theory of value can be found in Maurice Lagueux’s paper, “Menger and Jevons on Value: 
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A Crucial Difference”.  The key variable in Jevons’ analysis of choice is the usefulness of 
a good, whereas the key variable in Menger’s analysis is the satisfaction derived from a 
good.  According to Menger, utility is the capacity of a thing to serve for the satisfaction 
of human needs.  It is this capacity of a useful thing, its physical properties, that are 
useful and causally connected in a particular way that satisfy human needs or desires.  
Menger does not use the same definition of utility that Jevons uses and argues that “a 
large number of economists attribute use value (though not exchange value) to non-
economic goods, and if some recent English and French economists even wish to banish 
the concept of use value entirely from our science and see it replaced with the concept 
utility, their desire rests on a misunderstanding of the important difference between the 
two concepts and the actual phenomena underlying them.” (p. 118) 
 
Jevons on the other hand uses Senior’s view of utility, where “Utility denotes no 
intrinsic quality in the things which we call useful; it merely expresses their relations to 
the pains and pleasures of mankind.” (III)  The difference between these views is subtle 
and significant.  For Jevons: “Utility may be treated as a quantity of two dimensions, one 
dimension consisting in the quantity of the commodity, and another in the intensity of the 
effect produced upon the consumer.” (III)  Based on this view he states as a general law, 
that “the degree of utility varies with the quantity of commodity, and ultimately decreases 
as that quantity increases.” (III)  He continues: “No commodity can be named which we 
continue to desire with the same force, whatever be the quantity already in use or 
possession.  All our appetites are capable of satisfaction or satiety sooner or later, in fact, 
both these words mean, etymologically, that we have had enough, so that more is of no 
use to us” (III)  Based on this understanding, Jevons conceives of what is now regarded 
as the marginal utility theory and the law of diminishing marginal returns.  What is most 
important about Jevons’ distinction is his assertion that the ‘degree’ or the level of utility 
varies with the quantity consumed.  From this point forward in Neoclassical theory, value 
is thought to derive from utility, and utility is defined as a two dimensional quality that 
equates the diminishing usefulness of a good in satisfying desire with an increase in the 
amount of a good consumed. 
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In Sir John Hicks (1939) book Value and Capital: An Inquiry into Some Fundamental 
Principles of Economic Theory, he reworked the theory of utility-based demand and 
demonstrated that the Principle of Diminishing Marginal Utility was neither necessary, 
nor sufficient, for the Law of Demand to hold.  Concerned that the procedure used to 
discover the law of diminishing marginal utility was not very scientific, and seeking to 
eliminate the need for a quantitative measure of utility (because no empirical measure of 
utility was discovered), Sir Hicks replaced marginal utility with the marginal rate of 
substitution.  The marginal rate of substitution is defined as the quantity of Y which 
would just compensate the consumer for the loss of a marginal unit of X.  Sir Hicks noted 
that there was a logical inconsistency in Alfred Marshall’s treatment of Jevons’ utility 
maximizing consumer.  According to Sir Hicks, Marshall’s view that a consumer seeks to 
maximize their utility by acquiring goods that possess utility functionally in relation to 
the quantity acquired is inaccurate because if utility is maximized between goods, then 
utility will be maximized when the marginal unit of expenditure for each good brings the 
same increment of utility: 
 
Let us first remind ourselves of the bare outline of Marshall’s main argument. A 
consumer with a given money income is confronted with a market for 
consumption goods, on which the prices of those goods are already determined; 
the question is, How will he divide his expenditure among the different goods? It 
is supposed, for convenience, that the goods are available in very small units.  It is 
assumed that the consumer derives from the goods he purchases so much ‘utility’, 
the amount of utility being a function of the quantities of goods acquired; and that 
he will spend his income in such a way as to bring in the maximum possible 
amount of utility. But utility will be maximized when the marginal unit of 
expenditure in each direction brings in the same increment of utility. For, if this is 
so, a transference of expenditure from one direction to another will involve a 
greater loss of utility in the direction where expenditure is reduced than will be 
compensated by the gain in utility in the direction where expenditure is increased 
(from the principle of diminishing marginal utility). Total utility must therefore be 
diminished, whatever transfer is made. Since, with small units, the differences 
between the marginal utilities of two successive units of a commodity may be 
neglected, we can express the conclusion in another way: the marginal utilities of 
the various commodities bought must be proportional to their prices. (p. 1) 
 
In 1932, Sir Hicks eliminated a need for a discussion of measurable utility by 
developing a theoretical model that uses an ordinal rather than cardinal measure of utility, 
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where the ordinal measure is based on the marginal rate of substitution between goods or 
the ranking rather than the measure of different goods usefulness to a consumer.  Over 
sixty years earlier, Menger had objected to the same cardinal measure, suggesting that 
utility is a subjective quality of the state of peoples understanding of goods.  While Sir 
Hicks identifies this limitation, and substitutes an indifference curve for Marshall’s utility 
curve, he as Bishop Berkley arguing Locke’s disjunction, as discussed in Chapter Three, 
succumbs to the same logical trap of arguing the logical consistency of an argument and 
basing his theory on the remaining assumptions; rather than developing a new empirical 
model that explains the inclusion of new empirical evidence, which more accurately 
describes reality. 
 
In his refutation of Marshall’s marginal utility theory, Sir Hicks admits that his own 
theory is essentially built on the same evidence as Marshall’s, be it however that it 
requires only an ordinal scale of preference which Sir Hicks borrows from Pareto’s, 
Manuel d’economie politique, (1909), and not a quantitative measure of utility: 
 
If, however, we throw over diminishing marginal utility as being in any case 
dubious, and now certainly irrelevant, can we base upon similar ‘experience’ a 
general principle of diminishing marginal rate of substitution?  Again, I suppose, 
we might get away without being challenged; but one would like a surer 
foundation. (p. 9) 
 
While developing a brilliant new approach to analyzing consumer choice, his 
uneasiness with the foundation of his theory of the diminishing marginal rate of 
substitution is apparent.  His theory offers a less erroneous analysis of the choice 
problem, but because he upholds the role of utility as the primary measure of value in 
choice, he is forced to make particular assumptions that he identifies as being unrealistic.  
If Sir Hicks had the opportunity to read Menger’s Principles of Economics prior to the 
development of his marginal substitution theory, economic theory today may have been 
completely different: 
 
We can, I think, get a surer foundation if we reflect on the purpose for which we 
require our principle.  We want to deduce from it laws of market conduct –laws, 
that is, which deal with the reaction of the consumer to changes in market 
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conditions.  When market conditions change, the consumer moves from one point 
of equilibrium to another point of equilibrium; at each of these positions the 
condition of diminishing marginal rate of substitution must hold, or he could not 
take up such a position at all.  So much is clear directly; but to proceed from this 
to the law of diminishing marginal rate of substitution, as we need it in economic 
theory, an assumption is necessary.  We have to assume that the condition holds at 
all intermediate points, so that there are no kinks in the curves between the two 
positions of equilibrium.  … The general principle of diminishing marginal rate of 
substitution merely rules out these oddities; by that principle we select the 
simplest of the various possibilities before us. (p. 9) 
 
To Menger, utility is objective, lacking in psychological content, and has no 
quantitative relationship to value.  What is considered valuable to the consumer is 
determined from a judgment based on a person’s understanding of the usefulness of a 
good.  Once a person understands this usefulness, the usefulness they conceive does not 
change, unless their understanding of its usefulness changes.  What changes and what is 
variable in a consumer’s choices is the relative strength of a person’s particular desires as 
they become satisfied or as they grow or fester.  In Jevons’ two dimensional view of 
utility he viewed the usefulness of a good as changing as desire becomes satisfied.  When 
a desire increasingly becomes satisfied, there is less desire and consequently goods that 
are useful in satisfying that desire are less useful or possess less utility than when the 
desire for the good was stronger.  Jevons confuses the changing degree of satisfaction 
with a change in the usefulness of a good because he considers all goods as homogenous 
in usefulness; not taking into account the causal connections between a good and the need 
or desire it satisfies.  By combining a consumer’s perception of the usefulness of a good 
and the consumer’s changing desires into one term (utility), the change in desire for a 
good can not be measured, nor compared between two people without explaining both the 
difference between the two peoples understanding of value, and taking into consideration 
the differences in strength of their many desires.  There is no standard measure, because 
the usefulness of any good is subject to interpretation as each person determines value 
based on their understanding.  By suggesting that a good’s usefulness is directly 
proportional to the strength of a person’s desire for a particular good, he establishes a 
relationship between satisfaction and quantity, where an additional unit of a good will 
always lead, even if marginally, to increased satisfaction.  This is an entirely unrealistic 
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proposition and can be demonstrated in an enormous number of situations, for example, 
in the refusal of food when stuffed.  Jevons admits that people can become satiated, 
although his model of choice is incapable of leading to this conclusion. 
 
It is not that the same unit of a good becomes less useful.  It is rather that there is less 
need for its useful qualities.  Using usefulness in this way confuses the useful qualities of 
a good with its momentary usefulness.  As a person becomes more satisfied, a particular 
good that satisfies the desire becomes relatively less useful, meaning relatively less able 
to satisfy desire, as there is less desire to satisfy, however, this is not to mean that the 
useful properties of the good have diminished in any way.  For the useful properties of a 
good to diminish, the physical qualities of the good that make it useful would have to be 
affected, as when the handle of an axe breaks.  The error in utility theory was to assume 
that these two qualities of usefulness are identical.  In Kahneman and Tversky’s, 
“Prospect Theory, A Theory of Decision under Risk,” they identify these same two 
properties; however they refer to them as experienced utility and decision utility.  
Experienced utility merely refers to the amount of satisfaction that a good can actually 
provide in the moment, whereas, decision utility refers to the understanding of the useful 
qualities of a thing.  Confusion in regards to the separate nature of these two distinct 
phenomena can be found in all discussions of utility. 
 
The confusion and the irrelevance of utility as the proper focus of a theory of choice is 
no more apparent than in Senior’s “Law of Variety”: 
 
It is obvious that our desires do not aim so much at quantity as at diversity. Not 
only are there limits to the pleasure which commodities of any given class can 
afford, but the pleasure diminishes in a rapidly increasing ratio long before those 
limits are reached. Two articles of the same kind will seldom afford twice the 
pleasure of one, and still less will ten give five times the pleasure of two. In 
proportion, therefore, as any article is abundant, the number of those who are 
provided with it, and do not wish, or wish but little, to increase their provision, is 
likely to be great; and, so far as they are concerned, the additional supply loses all, 
or nearly all, it’s utility. And, in proportion to its scarcity, the number of those 
who are in want of it, and the degree in which they want it, are likely to be 
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increased; and its utility, or, in other words, the pleasure which the possession of a 
given quantity of it will afford, increases proportionally. (p. 49)5
 
Because Senior was focused on using utility to explain how many different goods are 
preferred rather than just one specific good being chosen over and over, he confuses the 
causal relationship between goods and the desires they satisfy and assumes that all goods 
are comparable in usefulness.  He does not recognize the fact that people have many 
different desires that cannot be satisfied by the same good.  It goes without saying that a 
fish does not make for good reading, a bed does not make for good eating, and a book 
does not make for good sleeping.  The belief that all goods can be compared in use 
(measurable utility) is the primary flaw in utility theory.  It assumes that there is no 
causal relationship between useful things and their capability in satisfying desires, and 
prevents simple empirical explanations for variety in use, demand, and equilibrium. 
 
The natural extension of the differences between Jevons and Menger’s theory of value 
is that the people Jevons describes maximize utility or the usefulness of goods, while the 
people for Menger describes maximize their satisfaction.  Utility theory focuses the 
discussion of human pursuits on the relative effectiveness of things, whereas, empirical 
economics focuses the discussion of human pursuits on the satisfaction of human desires.  
Rather than balancing the marginal utility of particular goods to maximize welfare, 
people focus on completely satisfying desires which leads to the maximization of 
satisfaction over time.  Menger similarly maintains that people have requirements for 
particular useful things and that there is a direct quantitative relationship between the 
amount of a good that is required to satisfy any particular desire: 
 
The quantity of a good of first order necessary to satisfy a concrete human need 
(and hence also the quantity necessary to satisfy all the needs for a good of first 
order arising in a certain period of time) is determined directly by the need itself 
(by the needs themselves) and bears a direct quantitative relationship to it (them). 
(p. 81) 
 
                                                 
5 This quotation was taken from William Stanley Jevons’, The Theory of Political Economy.  Jevons’ 
original citation is:  Encyclopœdia Metropolitana, art. “Political Economy,” p. 133. 5th ed. of Reprint, p. 
11.   
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Satisfaction is still a function of quantity; however, it is not a continuous function.  
Once satisfied, those useful things that are causally related to the satisfied desire are no 
longer goods, or are no longer first order goods for that desire.  The satisfaction of desire 
is the primary condition that underlies exchange, as once satisfied, those useful things in 
excess can become higher order goods if they can be exchanged for first order goods that 
can satisfy other unsatisfied desires.  Unlike with ‘utility theory,’ because the properties 
of useful things do not change, differences in demand derive from different desires and 
different magnitudes of desire, which can be observed and measured.  Unlike the inability 
to measure utility in terms of the ‘util,’ satisfaction can be measured as the inverse of 
dissatisfaction which is the magnitude of the desire for satisfaction. 
 
As Tversky and Kahneman suggest, the view that hedonic states, or desires, cannot be 
measured because they are private events is widely held but incorrect.  The measurement 
of subjective experiences and the determination of the functions that relate subjective 
variables to features of present and past stimuli are topics in the well-established field of 
psycho-physical research. An interesting treatment of this research can be found in 
Stanley Stevens’, Psychophysics: Introduction to its Perceptual, Neural, and Social 
Prospects, or Wegner et al.’s, Social Attitudes and Psychophysical Measurements.  The 
loudness of a noise and the felt temperature of a limb are no less subjective than pleasure 
and pain.  The main argument for considering these experiences measurable is that the 
functions that relate subjective intensity to physical variables are quantitatively similar 
for different people. Subjective intensity is often a power function of physical magnitude, 
with an exponent that varies for different sensory dimensions.  In Stevens’ book, pleasure 
and distress are shown to have the same status: the psychophysical functions that govern 
the pleasure of drinking sugar solutions and the pain of electric shock are orderly and 
interpersonally similar.  Verbal and numerical reports of hedonic value can be 
supplemented by physiological indicators of emotional quality and intensity, including 
objective measurements of subtle facial expressions as described in Robert Frank’s, 
Passions within Reason: The Strategic Value of the Emotions.  As Kahneman and 
Tversky conclude, the correlations among these measures are imperfect; however, the 
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variance they share can serve to operationalize the concept of instant experienced utility, 
which is seemingly just another term that refers to satisfaction. 
 
If, as asserted in the previous section, it is true that people pursue their perceived best 
interest in the moment for the purpose of increasing their welfare or wellbeing, then it 
follows that people pursue their perceived best interest in the moment by maximizing 
their satisfaction, or inversely, by minimizing their dissatisfaction.  Given that people 
possess different desires with different magnitudes of desire in each moment, they will 
seek to satisfy those desires which they perceive best lead to their wellbeing.  Intuitively, 
a person’s wellbeing must be considered inter-temporally, for what is conceived in one 
moment is executed in another, and the effect of satisfaction continues as long as the 
desire remains satisfied.  Consequently, wellbeing should be thought of as a temporal 
phenomenon, where the amount of dissatisfaction removed until the desire manifests 
again is the amount of satisfaction gained or dissatisfaction removed over a period of 
time.  Depending upon how an individual understands their ability to satisfy their desires 
and depending on their understanding of how their desires manifest, choices will be made 
in the moment that take into consideration the expected flux of their desires over time 
that are perceived to maximize their wellbeing.  Because the total satisfaction from 
actions taken now may continually contribute to wellbeing over time, longer or shorter 
term perspectives should affect what choices a person will make in the moment and 
should be based on their previous experience and understanding of the benefits and 
negatives of particular actions they have observed in their past. 
 
Generally, the number of active desires a person possesses should aggregate to a 
general level of dissatisfaction; dissatisfaction meaning want to satisfy particular desires, 
whether to remove discomfort, or to obtain pleasure.  If satisfaction can be measured, or 
understood intuitively, as it may be too time consuming to measure every individual 
person’s range of desires, the changes in and the total wellbeing of a person should be 
able to be mapped as the inverse of their reported dissatisfaction.  As the dissatisfaction 
in their desires is increasingly satisfied, their wellbeing increases, and as desires manifest 
or grow stronger, their wellbeing decreases. 
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To maximize satisfaction, as a general rule, people will satisfy those desires that they 
identify lead to the greatest decrease in dissatisfaction over a period of time.  This period 
of time is chosen based on a person’s understanding of their ability to satisfy their desires 
and the person’s understanding of how quickly their desires manifest.  The individual will 
maximize their welfare by concentrating on satisfying those desires that best reduce the 
most amount of dissatisfaction over this period of time as is perceived to be possible.  
Consequently, if the general dissatisfaction between desires is comparable, then total 
dissatisfaction satisfied over a period of time is the only criterion for choice, whether it is 
just a measure of momentary dissatisfaction or a measure of momentary and future 
expected dissatisfaction.  Those goods or means that are most efficiently employed will 
be used until the corresponding desire is completely satisfied.  This analysis contradicts 
the post-neoclassical assumption of non-satiation, as it assumes that particular desires can 
be completely satisfied if the satisfaction per unit of time (efficiency) in the use of the 
means to satisfy a particular desire is greater than the opportunity cost of their ability to 
satisfy the growing dissatisfaction in their other desires.  Additionally, because it takes 
time and effort to switch between the satisfaction of different desires, by using different 
means, techniques, or goods, there is an added benefit in maintaining the satisfaction of 
any particular desire until it is satisfied. 
 
Over a period of time, there is a limit to the quantity and benefit of a useful thing that is 
used to satisfy a particular desire.  A saturation level exists where consuming more 
becomes impossible, unnecessary or even harmful.  Over-consumption can even be 
dangerous and unnecessary, and diverts a person’s vital energy away from more 
important concerns.  Drinking too much water may lead to hyponatremia and drinking 
too much alcohol may lead to alcohol poisoning, both of which can lead to death.  There 
is an interesting treatment of saturation in R.D.G. Allen’s, Mathematical Analysis for 
Economists.  While the consumer must satisfy their desires in accordance with their 
understanding of how best to improve their welfare, given their ability to satisfy their 
desires and the regularity in the increase in their dissatisfaction for each desire, Sir Hicks’ 
dilemma, or the argument that “a transference of expenditure from one direction to 
another will involve a greater loss of utility in the direction where expenditure is reduced 
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than will be compensated by the gain in utility in the direction where expenditure is 
increased” (p. 1), can be avoided because the usefulness of a useful thing does not 
change.  All levels of satisfaction derived from any good are comparable and the 
quantifiable relationship between an increase in desire or the ratio of the satisfaction 
possible, per unit of time, taking into consideration cost, is the primary determinant of 
how long a good is used to satisfy a particular desire and how satiated a particular desire 
becomes. 
 
A more important consideration than usefulness is how long a particular desire will 
remain satisfied and how persistent or how much more dissatisfaction will develop if a 
desire is not satisfied.  Neither of these considerations is discussed in utility theory 
because the focus of consideration revolves around the usefulness of things rather than 
the properties of motivation.  A desire is satiated because the last unit consumed satisfies 
not just the momentary desire, but the desire that would have existed in all future periods 
had the person not satisfied it.  In this way, all decisions are temporal. 
 
Consequently, the introduction of goods that are more efficient in the satisfaction of 
particular desires can increases in productivity, and lead to an increase in wellbeing and a 
decrease in dissatisfaction.  Vague desires, like a desire for security or increased 
opportunity are harder to achieve, especially emotionally, and are more difficult to 
satisfy.  Because the scope of these desires are broad, and there is uncertainty in how they 
can be satisfied, the length of time required to satisfy, or at least the amount of time 
required to attempt to satisfy these desires, must be greater and consequently, given the 
opportunity cost in satisfying their more immediately satisfiable desires, these desires 
will likely only be sought to be satisfied only when a person’s more easily satisfied 
desires are satisfied.  A similar explanation of behavior is described in Abraham 
Maslow’s book, Motivation and Personality, where people seeking homeostasis are most 
affected first by their most basic needs, like a need for air and food, and then as their 
more basic needs become satisfied they move up a hierarchy of needs, which he defines 
in terms of different stages.  After the basic physical needs are satisfied, people move on 
to satisfying desires for stability and safety, then love and belongingness, esteem, and 
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finally self actualization.  Interestingly, how these more advanced, or higher order, 
desires are to be satisfied is vague, and may not be pursued as readily as the more basic 
desires because they are not as well understood and as easily satisfiable.  Many of the 
ideas discussed in this section may lend greater fidelity and possibly some credibility to 
the Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. 
 
If the process of choice is characterized by the pursuit of the maximization of 
wellbeing, then the motivation in choice is the minimization of dissatisfaction, and its 
inverse the maximization of satisfaction.  While generally there always are particular 
desires that are not satisfied, it is possible to satisfy a desire, as this is the goal of 
consumption.  While the satisfaction of each desire is quantitatively related to the amount 
of particular goods required to satisfy the desire, more for stronger, and less for weaker 
desires, there is a limit to the amount of any one particular good required to satisfy a 
desire over a period of time.  This contradicts the diminishing marginal utility theory.  
Utility theory is flawed in that it assumes that the usefulness of a good is variable rather 
than desire.  Consequently, the motivation behind the process of choice is the 
maximization of satisfaction or the minimization of dissatisfaction.  While the formal 
model of consumer choice theory assumes that people are never satiated in their desires, 
which develops from the theory of diminishing marginal utility, and the theory of 
diminishing marginal rate of substitution, there is no actual empirical evidence for either 
of these propositions, and by using Ockham’s Razor, the simpler solution is that people 
are motivated in their choice by a desire to maximize their wellbeing or satisfaction, 
although this maximization is in accordance with how they understand or perceive how to 
best be able to do this. 
 
IV. Basic Assumptions – Transitivity 
The assumption of transitivity is generally taken to mean that if a consumer prefers 
good A to good B, and good B to good C, then logically good A will be preferred to good 
C.  In the formal model, the axiom of transitivity is combined with the axiom of 
completeness to model how a consumer can completely rank any finite number of goods 
in a consumption set.  A consumer is considered to be able to make binary comparisons 
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between different sets or baskets of goods and can determine if one basket is preferred or 
is at least as good as another, or at least as good as another if they are indifferent between 
two baskets.  The axiom of completeness says that a consumer can examine any two 
consumption plans, x1 and x2, and determine if one is at least as good as the other, and 
axiom of transitivity says that for any three consumption plans, if x1 is at least as good as 
x2, and x2 is at least as good as x3, then x1 will be at least as good as x3.  This preference 
relationship enables the consumer to construct preference ranking because their 
preferences can be represented ordinally as binary comparisons. 
 
Because the casual connections between useful things and the desires that they are able 
to satisfy are not addressed in modern post-neoclassical economics, and because goods 
are thought to be comparable in usefulness, a good or a basket of goods chosen in one 
moment is thought to be always preferred over all other alternative individual goods or 
combinations of goods.  The problem with this analysis, as discussed in the previous 
section, is that the usefulness of a type of thing is not variable from one moment to 
another.  The usefulness of a particular good may change physically if for example it was 
melted, and may change subjectively if its application in the satisfaction of particular 
desires is more or less understood by the consumer, but the usefulness of a useful thing is 
dependent on its physical properties and capacity for satisfaction, which does not change 
from one moment to another.  Rather what does change from moment to moment is the 
magnitude of each of a consumer’s many desires.  Assuming a consumer has the exact 
same spectrum of desires from one shopping trip to another, everything else held constant 
(no left over goods from the first trip, no change in prices, no change in income, no 
change in understanding of the usefulness of any of the goods, no change in the 
magnitude of any desire, etc…), then the consumer should pick the exact same basket of 
goods as the first time. 
 
What becomes immediately apparent is that the re-choosing of the exact same basket of 
goods, which is the suggested norm in the post-neoclassical model, is highly unlikely to 
occur again; even if prices and income are held constant.  Additionally, because the 
purpose of consumption is to satisfy a desire, a good is more likely to not be chosen again 
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amongst other goods because it has already been used or will be used to satisfy the desire 
that motivated the consumer to choose the good in the first place; consequently the 
motivation for choosing was satisfied or reduced.  If the utility of goods can not be 
compared, then we must ask again Sir Hicks question to Marshall; how will the consumer 
divide their expenditure among different goods?  There must be a relationship between 
the dissatisfaction a good can satisfy, the quantity of the good needed to satisfy the 
desire, and the dissatisfaction generated in the acquisition of this quantity.  While this 
relationship may not be comparable to other goods, it is comparable in choice, as for 
those goods where the ratio between the dissatisfaction satisfied to the dissatisfaction 
incurred is higher, the good will be preferred to similar goods and will be chosen first 
over other goods that are useful in satisfying other desires because a greater amount of 
dissatisfaction can be reduced per unit of time which leads to maximization of welfare. 
 
The question then arises how able are people to understand and predict with any 
certainty when they will need to satisfy a particular desire.  The longer it takes to satisfy a 
desire the greater dissatisfaction a person will endure and the lower their total wellbeing.  
In a book that was influential outside of economics, The Joyless Economy: An Inquiry 
into Human Satisfaction and Consumer Dissatisfaction, Tibor Scitovsky suggests that 
people are not generally able to solve the problem of maximizing experienced utility 
subject to a budget constraint, at least in part because of their limited understanding and 
ability to predict their own enjoyment of goods and activities.  He argues that American 
consumers tend to over-invest in comforts and to under-invest in pleasures.  In Gary 
Becker’s analysis of individual behavior in, Accounting for Tastes, on the other hand, he 
argues that people correctly anticipate the effects of consumption on future preferences 
and correctly incorporate these predictions in their choices.  In, “Predicting a Changing 
Taste: Do People Know What They Will Like?” Kahneman and Snell have experimented 
on whether people are able to predict specific future desires and have demonstrated that 
people are generally not able to predict how their own taste for ice-cream, low-fat yogurt, 
or music will change over a week of repeated consumption.  In Itamar Simonson’s, “The 
Effect of Purchase Quantity and Timing on Variety-Seeking Behavior,” and in 
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Lowenstein and Adler’s, “A Bias in the Predictions of Tastes,” they have published 
similar results. 
 
It is currently uncertain whether the guiding utility based theory or whether 
unrecognized and uncontrolled variables are biasing these studies.  Empirically, and 
theoretically, the evidence seems to support the view that people use past trends in their 
consumption habits to guide and predict their present and future consumption, which is 
the focus of Gary Becker’s work, however, people are generally unable to predict with 
any accuracy what the magnitude of any particular desire will be in a future period of 
time.  People appear to develop preventive strategies, where desires can be quickly 
satisfied by readily available means if a particular desire should manifest.  In this way, a 
person maximizes their wellbeing by quickly satisfying a desire that would otherwise 
continue to add to total dissatisfaction moment after moment until it is satisfied.  The 
total dissatisfaction is then reduced and wellbeing is maximized over a period of time in 
consideration.  This possibility suggests that people may satisfice, knowing only that 
desires tend to increase over time, but not knowing specifically or exactly how they will 
manifest. 
 
As for the assumption of transitivity, there seem to be effectively only four different 
ways the proposition can be used in describing choices and only two of them accurately 
describe human behavior.  Transitivity can be considered momentarily, temporally, in 
regard to goods that are useful in satisfying other desires and in regard to substitutes.  
Momentarily, or in the moment, the transitivity assumption as described in the theory of 
consumer choice holds, because all variable factors, magnitudes of desires, circumstance 
and cost, perception and understanding are all constant.  In appears that good X is 
preferred to good Y, good Y preferred to good Z, and good X preferred to good Z.  As 
soon as the moment is over however, the choice in consumption affects the spectrum of 
motivation that existed when the choice was made in the first moment.  In proceeding 
moments the relationship between the goods may still be the same, however, this is not 
necessarily so. 
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Inter-temporally, the transitivity assumption is violated.  This is not surprising, as Jehle 
and Reny note in “Advanced Microeconomics,” “Experiments have shown that in various 
situations, the choices of real human beings are not always transitive” (p. 6).  Other 
propositions that are based on transitivity, like revealed preference, must be rejected or 
re-evaluated.  While revealed preference is no longer an indirect proof that one set of 
goods is preferred to another from moment to another (this was never empirically proven 
to begin with), a persons preferences from moment to moment are revealed, because 
people cannot help but seek to maximize their own best interest.  By analyzing peoples’ 
choices from one moment to another, a person's choices will causally reflect changes in 
their methods of maximizing wellbeing and changes in the magnitude of their desires. 
 
If temporal transitivity or revealed preference accurately described temporal choices, no 
where would it be more observable than during a shopping trip in a grocery store.  No 
more poignantly is the assumption of transitivity and revealed preference violated than in 
the act of the shopper choosing different goods in a store, one after another.  If particular 
goods from one moment to another are really consistently preferred, then the shopper 
would consistently pick their most preferred good over and over again.  The fundamental 
error in the utility theory is the assumption that all goods are comparable in usefulness 
and the failure to address the causal nature of goods and the mutually exclusive desires 
they are used to satisfy.  In the act of placing a useful thing in a cart, the conditions for 
minimizing disutility have changed, and consequently affected the future choice of the 
shopper, even if a previously chosen item is knowingly removed from a person’s cart, the 
person will seek to replace it, but would not add another over the amount they have 
already chosen without a corresponding change in desire or understanding.  Interestingly, 
shoppers will choose to drink a beverage or eat food that they have not paid for while 
shopping, apparently to maximize their wellbeing by quickly reducing a growing hunger 
or thirst that would over the course of their shopping trip lead to unnecessary 
unpleasantness or dissatisfaction. 
 
Thirdly, to suggest that people are transitive between baskets of goods is false and can 
be easily demonstrated.  A person rarely if ever purchases the same quantities of goods 
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from one shopping trip to another.  This is because the magnitudes of the person’s many 
needs and desires are different on these trips.  The post-neoclassical model ignores this 
purposeful behavior and assumes away the behavioral substance that explains why and 
how people choose to consume things.  As desires change, what will motivate action and 
be chosen and consequently preferred changes.  Preferences between dissimilar goods are 
not transitive unless the structure of a person’s situation, desires and understanding are 
identical in separate moments of choice. 
 
The fourth way the transitivity assumption can be considered is between substitutes.  
Because substitute goods satisfy the same desire, the preference ranking amongst 
substitute goods will only change if the understanding of a good’s usefulness changes, or 
if the effectiveness in employing a good (the ratio of dissatisfaction removed to 
dissatisfaction incurred in use) changes over time.  An increase in the price of a good will 
lead to greater dissatisfaction incurred, as the additional cost could have been expended 
on other goods that could have, but no longer will, decrease dissatisfaction.  As long as a 
person’s understanding of the usefulness of a useful thing (value), and the relative ratios 
of effectiveness between substitutes does not change, the rank order of preference 
between substitutes will not change over time.  For example, if the desire is to get from 
point A to point B quickly, and a person has roller skates, a bicycle, public transit, a 
motor cycle and a car to choose from, they will consistently pick the good they perceive 
will most effectively get them from A to B.  The chooser must balance the trade off 
between cost and benefit.  Whereas the car goes the fastest, enables hauling, and protects 
the driver from the elements, it is costly to run, and time consuming to start up and park.  
While the car is the preferred mode of transportation over a long distance and when it is 
raining, a motorcycle may be preferred to a car when it is not raining because it is 
cheaper to run and easier to park.  Similarly, when moving only a short distance, walking 
or bicycling may be preferred to driving.  While each is a substitute for moving faster, the 
effectiveness of each depends on the conditions in which it will be used.  In any 
particular situation however, the chooser will consistently choose the same means in 
order of preference from one moment to another; for example, for short distances always 
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walk.  If a person changes their routine than their understanding of their situation has 
changed. 
 
V.  Basic Assumptions – Motivation, Discrimination and Choice 
Human behavior and choice is characterized by an attempt to resolve numerous 
simultaneously disparate desires.  People pursuing their perceived best interest in 
attempting to maximize their wellbeing in the moment are motivated by their desires to 
choose, and they discriminate in their choice by choosing those courses of action that 
they understand best reduce their dissatisfaction given their understanding of how their 
many desires will change over time.  Because people are able to generally predict that 
particular desires will occur in the future, but are unable to accurately predict the 
magnitude of specific desires in the future, people may develop preemptive strategies 
designed to promote quick satisfaction of particular desires when they occur.  It is for this 
reason that many peoples’ homes are likely filled with numerous gadgets and 
unconsumed useful things.  For each useful thing or course of action, a person 
understands a relationship between its effectiveness in reducing dissatisfaction and the 
cost in dissatisfaction that is incurred through its consumption, use or pursuit.  This 
represents the classic cost benefit analysis.  While there are numerous useful things, not 
all may be appreciated as a ‘good’, as the usefulness of a thing in satisfying a particular 
desire may not be understood. 
 
Because people do not make decisions isolated from their past or from their 
expectations of what the future will hold wellbeing is an inter-temporal concept.  While 
all actions and decisions are momentary, they are the manifestation of a person’s 
conscious understanding of consequence and their perception of what will happen in the 
future.  It is the induction of the many choices a person makes that seems to define a 
person’s personality, and consequently, human behavior is characterized by peoples’ 
desires and how people react to them based on their understanding of past experience.  If 
over a period of time, the multiplicity of a person’s choices can be recorded, and if there 
is consistency in their recurring desires, then as Alfred Marshal has suggested, a demand 
schedule can be developed.  If each individual in an economy’s demand schedule is 
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added together, the total demand schedule for the economy should be obtained.  Further 
fidelity could be reached by examining when particular desires occur and how much of 
particular goods are required to satisfy them.  In doing so, an empirical study would 
likely reveal significant consistency between the frequency and requirement for 
satisfaction between all people.  By recording and tracking the objective qualities of these 
physical characteristics and social behaviors, many consistencies in human behavior will 
be likely discovered. 
 
While people likely face similar physiological requirements, the decisions people make 
are certainly affected by their relative wage, income and general wealth.  While most 
people who understand the usefulness of a thing will generally intuit a similar efficiency 
in the reduction of dissatisfaction per unit of a thing, if they discriminate in their choice 
based on their understanding of the effectiveness of particular useful things in satisfying 
particular desires, then they will base their understanding of the dissatisfaction incurred 
through its obtainment for consumption on the relative dissatisfaction that develops from 
the labor or equivalent costs required to obtain it.  Those who are relatively more 
productive relative to the acquisition of the medium of exchange will labor less and 
consequently associate a lower dissatisfaction incurred in a standard amounts obtainment 
and use.  Consequently, those who are more productive will be more inclined to spend 
relatively more of their procured medium of exchange to obtain a useful thing than those 
who are less productive and who associate a higher level of dissatisfaction to the same 
price.  Because people will determine what to choose based on the ratio of dissatisfaction 
removed to the dissatisfaction incurred when making decisions to maximize utility, they 
will make different choices, preferring cheaper substitutes or possibly forgoing the 
satisfaction of particular desires.  Those who are relatively more productive are more able 
to satisfy their many desires and when able will seek to acquire goods of a higher quality, 
for example food that is more flavorful and that is eaten in a location with a richer 
ambiance, or products that are made from more durable or useful materials. 
 
The longer it takes, or the higher the cost in satisfying a desire, the fewer number of 
desires can be satisfied over a period of time.  Those people who are better able to satisfy 
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their desires consequently should possess lower levels of dissatisfaction and higher levels 
of wellbeing, while those who are less able to satisfy their desires should be relatively 
less dissatisfied and be less satisfied with their wellbeing.  In Richard Easterlin’s articles, 
Income and Happiness: Towards a Unified Theory, and “Happiness and Economics: How 
the Economy and Institutions Affect Wellbeing,” he finds that people with a higher 
income generally report a higher wellbeing than those with lower incomes.  He notes that 
there exists a trend that material aspirations increase as wealth increases.  Whether this is 
the result of an increased ability to procure more goods, or some other psychological 
factor, he concludes that while increased material aspirations constitutes a negative effect 
on peoples’ overall wellbeing, they do not alter the trend that increased wellbeing is 
positively correlated to higher levels of income. 
 
Generally, as an increased understanding of the casual nature between things and 
human welfare develops, people are better able to use their understanding to be more 
productive and take advantage of the capability particular goods possess in the 
satisfaction of desire. Historically, the progression of the development of civilization is 
similar to the progression of the development of an individual’s understanding and 
increased ability to satisfy their desires.  As Menger writes: 
 
Consumption goods, which before were the product of an accidental concurrence 
of the circumstances of their origin, become products of human will, within the 
limits set by natural laws, as soon as men have recognized these circumstances 
and have achieved control of them. The quantities of consumption goods at 
human disposal are limited only by the extent of human knowledge of the causal 
connections between things, and by the extent of human control over these things. 
Increasing understanding of the causal connections between things and human 
welfare, and increasing control of the less proximate conditions responsible for 
human welfare, have led mankind, therefore, from a state of barbarism and the 
deepest misery to its present stage of civilization and wellbeing, and have 
changed vast regions inhabited by a few miserable, excessively poor, men into 
densely populated civilized countries. Nothing is more certain than that the degree 
of economic progress of mankind will still, in future epochs, be commensurate 
with the degree of progress of human knowledge. (p. 74) 
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Chapter 6.  The Unknown and Human Decision Making 
 
God does not play dice. 
 
Albert Einstein 
 
I. Uncertainty and Economics 
In the previous chapter, a person’s choice is discussed in terms of how different goods 
or actions are more or less useful in satisfying particular interests and desires.  A scale of 
preference can be constructed based on the relative effectiveness of the many possible 
means to a particular end, where the preferred mean chosen or action taken is that which 
appears most effective in satisfying a particular end or desire.  The usefulness of 
particular goods and actions is suggested to be dependent upon several factors.  The 
situation a person is in when they make their choice, the concern a person is focused on, 
and the understanding of potential means to resolve a concern effect what good or action 
is chosen in the moment of decision.  Uncertainty in what and how particular means are 
able to reach a desired outcome is an important factor in what a person will prefer and in 
what choices they will make. 
 
As discussed previously, both the options and the relative usefulness of a means to an 
end are limited in the decision making process by the chooser’s understanding of reality.  
If the chooser is very knowledgeable they will be able to conceive of more options and 
understand the nature of those options more clearly than a chooser who is less 
knowledgeable.  Regardless of how knowledgeable the chooser is, as a mortal human, 
their understanding will always be subject to degrees of uncertainty.  How uncertainty 
affects the process of decision making and why particular goods are preferred over others 
is the subject of this chapter. 
 
It might be said that the formal incorporation of risk and uncertainty into economic 
theory began in 1944, when von Neumann and Morgenstern published their, Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior; however, the foundation of modern neoclassical 
economics was introduced long before by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738.  Bernoulli introduced 
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the idea of expected utility, which decomposed the valuation of a risky venture as the 
sum of utilities from outcomes weighted by the probabilities of outcomes, which is the 
essential notion supporting von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Game Theory.  When he 
introduced the idea it did not seem sensible for rational agents to maximize expected 
utility.  Bernoulli’s assumption of diminishing marginal utility seemed to imply that, in a 
gamble, a gain would increase utility less than a decline would reduce it.  Consequently 
many concluded, the willingness to take on risk must be “irrational”, and thus the issue of 
choice under risk or uncertainty was viewed suspiciously, or at least considered to be 
outside the realm of an economic theory which assumed rational actors. 
 
The great task of von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944) was to lay a rational 
foundation for decision-making under risk according to the rules of expected utility 
theory.  Once this was done, the floodgates opened.  The novelty of the axiomatic 
method, combining sparse explanation with often obtuse axioms, ensured that most 
economists of the time would find their contribution inaccessible and bewildering.  
Indeed, there was substantial confusion regarding the structure and meaning of the von 
Neumann and Morgenstern utility hypothesis itself.  Restatements and re-axiomatization 
by Jacob Marschak in, “Rational Behavior, Uncertain Prospects, and Measurable Utility,” 
Paul Samuelson in, “Probability, Utility, and the Independence Axiom,” and Israel 
Herstein and John Milnor in, “An Axiomatic Approach to Measurable Utility,” did much 
to improve the situation. 
 
Inspired by Frank P. Ramsey’s, “Truth and Probability,” Bruno de Finetti’s, Theory of 
Probability: A Critical Introductory Treatment, and Leonard J. Savage’s, The 
Foundations of Statistics, the expected utility hypothesis was derived without imposing 
objective probabilities but rather by allowing subjective probabilities to be determined 
jointly.  Francis Anscombe and Robert Aumann in, “A Definition of Subjective 
Probability,” modified Savage’s approach to develop the Savage-Anscome-Autmann 
“subjective” approach to expected utility which is considered more “general” than the 
older von Neumann and Morgenstern concept.  During this time, Kenneth J. Arrow in, 
“Admissible Points of Convex Sets,” and Gerard Debreu in, Theory of Value, introduced 
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the “state-preference” approach to uncertainty.  Although not necessarily “opposed” to 
the expected utility hypothesis, the state-preference approach does not involve 
assignment of mathematical probabilities, whether objective or subjective.  The structure 
of the state-preference approach is more amendable to Walrasian general equilibrium 
theory where “payoffs” are not merely money amounts but actual bundles of goods.  The 
method became popular after useful applications were pursued by Jack Hirshleifer in, 
“Investment Decision Under Uncertainty: Choice-Theoretic Approaches,” and, 
“Investment Decision under Uncertainty: Applications of the State-Preference-Approach, 
Peter Diamond in, “The Role of a Stock Market in a General Equilibrium Model with 
Technological Uncertainty,” and Roy Radner in, “Competitive Equilibrium Under 
Uncertainty,” and, “Existence of Equilibrium of Plans, Prices, and Price Expectations in a 
Sequence of Markets,” and has since become the dominant method of incorporating 
uncertainty in general equilibrium contexts. 
 
The current economic tool kit of economic techniques and models used to understand 
how human decision makers incorporate uncertainty in their decision making is 
seemingly incomplete.  George L.S. Shackle in, Expectations in Economics, Maurice 
Allais in, “Le Comportement de l’Homme Rationnel devant le Risque, Critique des 
Postulats et Axiomes de l’Ecole Americaine,” and Daniel Ellesberg in, “Risk, Ambiguity 
and the Savage Axioms,” were among the first to challenge the expected utility 
decomposition of choice under risk or uncertainty and to suggest substantial 
modifications.  Influential experimental studies, such as those by Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky in, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,” have 
reinforced the need to rethink much of the theory.  Towards this end in recent years, 
many attempts have been made to re-axiomatize the theory of choice under uncertainty, 
with weighted expected utility in John Quiggin’s, “A Theory of Anticipated Utility,” and 
Menahem Yaari’s, “The Dual Theory of Choice Under Risk, regret theory in Graham 
Loomes and Robert Sugden’s, “Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational 
Choice Under Uncertainty,”, non-additive expected utility in George Shackle’s, 
Expectations in Economics, and David Schmeidler’s, “Subjective Probability and 
Expected Utility Without Additivity,”, and state-dependent preference in Edi Karni’s, 
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Decision Making Under Uncertainty: The Case of State-Dependent Preferences.  The 
systemic problems with economic theory today are not the result of a lack of intelligence, 
not the result of fanaticism or a lack of skill and logic, rather, as demonstrated with each 
of the above abridgments to Bernoulli’s expected utility hypothesis, the problem with 
economic theory today appears to reside in the reluctance to go back to basics and to re-
conceptualize the foundations of human behavior, and develop an empirical behavioral 
theory of uncertainty. 
 
 
II. The Nature of Uncertainty and Models of Human Decision Making 
The nature of reality and the application of logic to improve understanding are the key 
elements that must be understood to remove confusion from any discussion concerned 
with clarifying the role of uncertainty in human decision making.  If scientific evidence 
supporting the Law of Causality, the Indestructibility of Matter, the Conservation of 
Energy, and other physical properties and principles of reality are to be accepted, then it 
is clear that the nature of reality is structured and predictable.  How this reality is 
understood and how this understanding is used to inform choice is the subject of this 
chapter.  Unlike God, people are not omniscient, and as a result make decisions based on 
ignorance and ambiguous information. People do not know what they do not know, and it 
is not possible for a person to know for certain that any of their understandings accurately 
and fully depict reality.  What people are able to do is to develop an expectation based on 
previous experience, establishing relative certainty based on observed consistency in 
outcome.  How detailed or accurate these expectations are, as discussed in Chapter Three, 
depends upon perceived experience. 
 
Confusion regarding the nature of uncertainty derives back to Frank Knight’s doctoral 
dissertation, Risk Uncertainty & Profit, where he examined the relation between 
knowledge and changes in an economy.  Knight suggested that future trends could be 
approximated by past trends, if the underlying system supporting the trend remains 
constant.  Businesses could then join together to mitigate the consistent average cost of 
particular events over a period of time by pooling their resources.  The risk Knight refers 
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to is the consistency in the occurrence of particular phenomenon over time.  Knight 
makes the argument that there is a difference between uncertainty, situations when 
“randomness” cannot be expressed in terms of specific mathematical probabilities, and 
risk, situations where the decision-maker can assign mathematical probabilities to the 
randomness which they are faced with.  Randomness is an illusion or property of 
probability that derives from confusion or the irrelevance of the minutia of the 
innumerous cause and effect relationships that lead to particular outcomes.  By restricting 
the focus of concern, certain outcomes will be inevitable.  For example, a coin will land 
on one of its sides when tossed, accidents will happen, a particular card will eventually be 
drawn from a deck, and the conflagration of events that ultimately will lead to these 
occurrences are insignificant to the likelihood that they will ultimately occur.  What 
Knight refers to as risk, however, is really a combination of understanding and 
uncertainty.  The average number of car accidents or house fires from one period to the 
next, ceteris paribus, can be generally discovered by tracking the pattern or number of 
accidents over time.  This pattern of consistency and these averages constitute an 
understanding of the nature of the extent to which these particular incidents can occur.  
While this number of incidents may fluctuate, as the phenomena that cause them are 
affected by unknown forces, the uncertainty in regards to the likelihood of these incidents 
occurring derives from an ignorance of their causes and what is unknown.  Chance, or 
risk comes into play only in relation to the uncertainty in regards to the innumerous 
factors that lead to the average, and the uncertainty that from one period to the next that 
these tendencies will change or continue in the same pattern.  Knight’s risk really 
represents an educated guess based on the stability of certain factors and as a result of 
certain uncertainties and certain knowledge. 
 
Knight’s notion of risk is in essence the concept underlying Expected Utility Theory 
which stems from Daniel Bernoulli’s expected utility solution to the St. Petersburg 
paradox.  The paradox challenges the idea that people value random ventures according 
to their expected return.6  Daniel Bernoulli suggested that the valuation of a risky venture 
                                                 
6 Posed by Nicholas Bernoulli, the St Petersburg paradox poses the following situation: a fair coin will be 
tossed until a head appears; if the first head appears on the nth toss, then the payoff is 2n ducats.  How 
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is not the expected return of that venture, but rather the expected utility from that venture.  
By Bernoulli’s logic, the valuation of any risky venture takes the expected utility form: 
E(u⎪p, X) = Σx∈X p(x)u(x) where X is the set of possible outcomes, p(x) is the probability 
of a particular outcome x ∈ X and u: X → R is a utility function over outcomes.  What 
people expect to happen is based on their understanding of the past, and on their 
understanding of the cause and effect relationships that lead to particular outcomes.  
Many of the relationships that lead to particular outcomes are uncertain or unknown.  
Because all understanding is developed from experience, each understanding is 
conditioned on a degree of certainty.  How certain is a person that gravity will always 
keep their feet on the ground, how certain is a person that they will need food and water 
to survive, how certain is a person that a trend in automobile accidents will continue into 
the next quarter?  The certainty of any outcome is understood in terms of past experience 
to include knowledge of the cause and effects that lead to that outcome.  Every action and 
every choice is a risk, however, familiarity and greater understanding increases the 
likelihood that our expectations are accurate and will occur. 
 
Because all understanding is conditional in its certainty, all decisions and the options 
considered in the process of deciding are conditional in their likelihood.  Psychological 
research has suggested that memory is imperfect and susceptible to bias.  How past 
experiences are interpreted and remembered greatly effects what people choose.  In 
particular, experience appears to be represented in memory by the features of particular 
moments, and the overall evaluation of a memory is determined mainly by the 
characteristics observed in similar moments.   This subject is discussed in Carol Varey 
and Daniel Kahneman’s, “Experiences Extended across Time: Evaluation of Moments 
and Episodes,” Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, and Redelemeier’s, “When more pain 
is preferred to less: Adding a better end,” and Redelmeier and Kahneman’s, “Patients’ 
Memories of Painful Medical Treatments: Real-Time and Retrospective Evaluations of 
Two Minimally Invasive Procedures.”  Interpretation of experience is an uncertain 
process and is limited to our assessment and memory of it. 
                                                                                                                                                 
much should one pay to play this game?  The paradox, of course, is that the expected return is infinite.  
While the expected payoff is infinite, one would not suppose, at least intuitively, that anyone would be 
willing to pay an infinite amount of money to play this game. 
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In Redelmeier et al.’s, Memories of Colonoscopy: A Randomized Trial, the process of 
human understanding was manipulated in the hopes of improving the return rate of 
patients who have undertaken a colonoscopy.  “The goal was to minimize the level of 
pain during the final minutes of the procedure and thereby allow the patient to retain a 
more positive memory of the experience.” (p. 188)  In agreement with theory, the 
addition of a short interval of minimal discomfort to the final moments of the procedure 
caused patients to retain a more favorable (less aversive) overall memory of the 
experience.  Taking into account a patient’s prior history, specific indications, and 
abnormal findings (three significant predictors in step-wise regression) the procedure 
produced a 41% increase in the odds that a patient would return after the procedure (95% 
confidence interval: 2-96, P = 0.038).  Additionally, the intervention caused about a 10% 
relative decrease in the overall memory of pain and a 10% relative increase in the number 
of patients who returned for follow-up visits.  The fallibility of memory was documented 
for decades in psychological science, even under brief conditions.  Past research indicates 
that the distortions in memory are not entirely random; instead, systematic failures occur 
that are repeated by most people and are predictable in advance.  According to 
Redelmeier et al: 
 
Our findings support past research that overall memory is created by recalling 
selected moments rather than an exact running total of experience.  The duration 
of an episode has relatively small influence unless it is highly salient (e.g. the wait 
for surgery) or correlated with intensity (e.g. the duration of labor).  Last 
impressions may be lasting impressions when people reflect on past life 
experiences. (p. 193) 
 
Uncertainty in decision making, in the last half century was modeled in economic 
theory from von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility hypothesis and Leonard 
Savage’s synthesis of expected utility with subjective probability.  In, Theory of Games 
and Economic Behavior, von Neumann and Morgenstern suggest that preference is not 
determined in terms of outcomes, but rather in terms of the expected return over lotteries.  
The model assumes people will choose the lottery that has the largest randomized return.  
For example, a person will be indifferent between a lottery that rewards a gambler 100% 
of the time with $5 and a lottery that rewards a gambler 1% of the time with $500.  This 
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is because both lotteries if repeatedly played will in the long run provide an average $5 
return per play.  Incorporating the above discussion into the expected utility hypothesis, 
each course of action considered in a decision can be thought of as a lottery.  There is the 
perceived reward, the satiation of hunger by eating a sandwich, and the perceived 
probability that a sandwich will satiate hunger.  What is won is an increase in satisfaction 
or happiness, which is the ultimate goal of winning a lottery and exchanging money for 
goods and services.  In this manner, each option is a lottery, with a probability dependent 
not only on the ability to understanding the option, but also on the ability to 
understanding how the option will resolve concern.  A series of options can be compared, 
as with a series of lotteries to determine the lottery or option that maximizes a person’s 
wellbeing.  Von Neumann and Morgenstern make the assumption that probabilities 
cannot be influenced by the chooser in simple lotteries, however, how a person 
understands the likelihood in simple lotteries and how a person interprets the effect of 
particular outcomes in the lottery will determine what a person will choose.  Because 
people interpret reality in terms of their understanding, there are a multitude of different 
concerns and factors that influence a person’s decision.  For example, if a person has to 
pick between two lotteries where they have a 25% chance to win a glass of water in one 
lottery and a 75% chance to win a sandwich in another, if they are very thirsty and not 
hungry, they may choose the first lottery, even thought the expected market return of the 
second lottery may be much greater. 
 
To illustrate the importance between reality and the perception of reality it is necessary 
to discuss the nature of probability.  Probability is the numerical assessment of likelihood 
on a scale from 0 (impossibility) to 1 (absolute certainty). Probability is usually expressed 
as the ratio between the number of ways an event can happen and the total number of 
things that can happen (e.g., there are 13 ways of picking a card with a diamond on it 
from a standard deck of 52 cards, so the probability of picking a card with a diamond on 
it is 13/52, or 25%).  Probability theory originally grew out of attempts to understand 
card games and gambling. As comparisons between certain biological, physical, and 
social phenomena became more evident probability theory was adopted to explain the 
regularity in particular outcomes of phenomenological processes that were relatively 
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unknown (e.g., the sexes of newborn infants follow sequences similar to those of coin 
tosses).  In A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, Pierre de Laplace explains how 
probabilities are conceived.  However, this gambling theory does not apply to those 
phenomenological probabilities that are identified by recording the consistency of 
particular outcomes that manifest from particular unknown organic processes: 
 
The theory of chance consists in reducing all the events of the same kind to a 
certain number of cases equally possible, that is to say, to such as we may be 
equally undecided about in regard to their existence, and in determining the 
number of cases favorable to the event whose probability is sought.  The ratio of 
this number to that of all the cases possible is the measure of this probability, 
which is thus simply the fraction whose numerator is the number of favorable 
cases and whose denominator is the number of all the cases possible (pp. 6-7). 
 
The notion of probability or chance is commonly misconceived as it is an abstraction 
from reality based on particular circumstances where a trend can be identified amongst 
innumerous causes and effects.  In, Foundations of Science, Henri Poincaré demystifies 
the notion of probability and offers the following suggestion: 
 
Every phenomenon, however minute, has a cause; and a mind infinitely powerful, 
infinitely well-informed about the laws of nature, could have foreseen it from the 
beginning of the centuries.  If such a mind existed, we could not play with it at 
any game of chance; we should always lose.  In this instance the word chance 
would not have any meaning or rather there would be no chance.  It is because of 
our weakness and our ignorance that the word has a meaning for us.  And, even 
without going beyond our feeble humanity, what is chance for the ignorant is not 
chance for the scientist.  Chance is only the measure of our ignorance.  Fortuitous 
phenomena are, by definition, those whose laws we do not know. (p. 395) 
 
Probability and the notion of randomness is based on the relative inconsequence of 
infinitesimal increments, as illustrated by the 50% probability that a flipped coin will land 
on one side, or the 1.9% probability or 1/52 chance that a Queen of Spades will be pulled 
from a full deck of cards.  What is assumed away is just how the coin is flipped and just 
how the cards in the deck are stacked.  To deal with the multiplicity of cause and effect 
relationships in particular systems that are not well understood, the underlying 
phenomena that lead to particular outcomes are substituted or replaced by the theoretical 
concept of randomness, which assumes that each element or outcome in a set has an 
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equal possibility of occurrence.  Randomness therefore proxies what is uncertain in 
regards to the nature of the causal system that manifests particular outcomes. 
 
The formation of expectation is dependent on multiple interpretations of similar 
experiences.  This collage of memory develops into an expectation with an associated 
likelihood of certainty.  In reality the nature of a phenomenon is certain and is dependent 
upon certain causes.  A limited understanding of these certain systems leads to 
uncertainty and the conditional nature of perception and understanding.  In this way, all 
understanding is expected, and all options are subject to a degree of uncertainty which 
can be approximated using expected utility theory.  While randomness does not actually 
exist in reality, it does serve as a useful proposition to organize incompletely understood 
outcomes.  Additionally, while there is no corresponding phenomenon of probability in 
reality, the assumption of probability serves as a useful tool to explain trends that exist 
between relatively poorly understood phenomena.  Uncertainty plays a large role in 
human decision making and each decision should be thought of as a choice between the 
best means to an end, where the best mean is that which is expected to return the most 
satisfaction, or best resolve a person’s needs or desires. 
 
III. The Complexity of Simple Gambles 
Strict adherence to expected utility theory and modern decision theory has lead to 
inadequate results and inaccurate descriptions of human economic behavior, and has been 
demonstrated to be of limited use in application.  In, “Experimental Economics: A 
Reply”, Vernon Smith suggests that theories of decision under uncertainty are 
inconsistent with experimental evidence: 
 
the numerous direct studies of individual decision making under uncertainty, over 
the past 25 years (see the recent papers by David Grether, 1980; Grether and 
Charles Plott, 1979; and especially the survey and evaluation by Paul Slovic and 
Sarah Lichtenstein, 1983), suggest that our theories of decision under uncertainty 
are in several respects inconsistent with controlled evidence.  The results of these 
experiments are robust under replication, and various anti-factual explanations of 
the results (that might have rescued the theory) have been systematically 
eliminated.  The results are not to be idly dismissed by anyone with the slightest 
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interest in evidence. …the results of direct tests are inconsistent with the expected 
utility hypothesis (EUH). (pp. 266-267) 
 
According to Herbert Simon, in, “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,” the 
problem with the post-neoclassical economic view of decision making is the severe 
demands that are put upon the choosing organism: 
 
The organism must be able to attach definite pay-offs (or at least a definite range 
of pay-offs) to each possible outcome.  This, of course, involves also the ability to 
specify the exact nature of the outcomes – there is no room in the scheme for 
“unanticipated consequences.”  The pay-offs must be completely ordered – it 
must always be possible to specify, in a consistent way, that one outcome is better 
than, as good as, or worse than any other.  And, if the certainty or probabilistic 
rules are employed, either the outcomes of particular alternatives must be known 
with certainty, or at least it must be possible to attach definite probabilities to 
outcomes. (p. 103) 
 
Simon suggests that there is a complete lack of evidence, in actual human choice 
situations of any complexity, that these computations can be made or are in fact 
performed: 
 
The introspective evidence is certainly clear enough, but we cannot, of course, 
rule out the possibility that the unconscious is a better decision-maker than the 
conscious.  Nevertheless, in the absence of evidence that the classical concepts do 
describe the decision-making process, it seems reasonable to examine the 
possibility that the actual process is quite different from the ones the rules 
describe. (p. 104) 
 
In “Individual Rationality, Market Rationality, and Value Estimation,” Knez, Smith and 
Williams demonstrate that in direct experimental tests of expected utility theory, in which 
subjects are asked to choose among alternative gambles, or to make judgments as to their 
willingness to pay, and/or their willingness to accept payment for a gamble, the behavior 
of the respondents is inconsistent with the predictions of expected utility theory.   While 
Knez et al note that in surveys conducted by Paul Slovic and Sarah Lichtenstein that are 
published in “Preference Rehearsals: A Broader Perspective” demonstrate that people’s 
behavior is remarkably consistent in a wide variety of contexts and are robust under 
examinations designed to determine the effect of monetary incentives, experience, and 
other factors that might have accounted for the discrepancy between subject responses 
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and the predictions of expected utility theory.  Experimental studies of market behavior, 
on the other hand, based upon expected utility theory models of market decision making, 
have yielded results showing high consistency with the predictions of these models  as 
can be found in Vernon Smiths’ “Experimental Economics: Reply.”  The question Knez, 
Smith and Williams pose is, “are individual revealed preference in some market contexts 
more likely to be ‘rational’ than individual responses to choices among alternative 
prospects?” (p. 397) 
 
Expected utility theory proposes that all probabilities within a series of lotteries are 
universal in nature, meaning each likelihood in a decision is universal to all people 
confronted by a particular set of gambles.  The problem with this broad generalization is 
that it is false.  As discussed previously, how people form an understanding of likelihood 
is dependent upon their understanding of a problem, and each person’s understanding, 
while conforming to the universal truth in reality, is by no means identical.  To suggest 
that each person will understand a problem similarly, let alone all probabilities in a 
problem identically, is tantamount to suggesting that all people will always agree; which 
is certainly not true.  As discussed by John Maynard Keynes in A Treatise on Probability, 
it is not always possible, even when given a simple set of probabilities, to determine 
which alternative should be chosen: 
 
only in a strictly limited class of cases are degrees of probability numerically 
measurable.  It follows from this that the ‘mathematical expectations’ of goods or 
advantages are not always numerically measurable; and hence, that even if a 
meaning can be given to the sum of a series of non-numerical ‘mathematical 
expectations,’ not every pair of such sums are numerically comparable in respect 
of more and less.  Thus, even if we know the degree of advantage which might be 
obtained from each of a series of alternative courses of actions and know also the 
probability in each case of obtaining the advantage in question, it is not always 
possible by a mere process of arithmetic to determine which of the alternatives 
ought to be chosen. … It may be remarked, further, that the difficulty exists, 
whether its numerical indeterminateness of the probability is intrinsic or whether 
its numerical value is, as it is according to the Frequency Theory and most other 
theories, simply known (p. 312) 
 
Mathematical probability is a conceptual technique of making explicit what is 
implicitly contained in a set of premises.  The conclusions to which this technique leads 
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asserts nothing that is new in the sense of not being contained in the content of the 
premises, however, the results obtained are psychologically new.  A person may not be 
aware, before using the techniques of logic and mathematics, what they committed 
themselves to in accepting a particular set of assumptions or assertions.  Unconsciously a 
person will keep a mental tally of events and use this information in a subliminal way to 
judge the likelihood of particular options and outcomes.  Far from being scientific, this 
unconscious accounting will be biased by their experience and may reflect a distorted 
assessment of the true cause and effect relationships in reality.  Similarly, how a person 
interprets a standardized set of probabilities and rewards in a series of lotteries will be 
affected by this same unconscious understanding of reality.  Consciously examining and 
interpreting each gamble, people will consider what variables are important based on 
their understanding and how they interpret the probabilities and outcomes in a gamble 
relate to their perceived best interest.  Given particular parameters placed on determining 
which lottery in a series is the best may lead to a best answer, however, there is no 
guarantee that all people will agree on how to interpret these parameters.  Consequently, 
different people may choose differently based on their understanding of the same lottery 
or simple game.  Expected utility is a tool, and like all tools, how it is used and what it 
can do is heavily dependent upon the goal, skill and imagination of the person who 
commands it. 
 
Even in well defined gambles, the understanding a person draws from to analyze a 
problem effects how a person assesses potential outcomes.  Exogenous to any predefined 
scheme is the likelihood that a person will interpret the scheme in the same way as it was 
intended.  In A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, Laplace suggests that the 
“difference of opinions depends, however, upon the manner in which the influence of 
known data is determined.  The theory of probabilities holds to considerations so delicate 
that it is not surprising that with the same data two persons arrive at different results, 
especially in very complicated questions” (p. 10).  To demonstrate the potential difficulty 
in determining probabilities take as an example the “Monte Hall” puzzle, which was 
printed in the September, 1990, issue of Parade magazine: 
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Suppose you’re on a game show, and you’re given the choice of three doors: 
Behind one door is a car; behind the others, goats.  You pick a door, say number 
1, and the host, who knows what’s behind the doors, opens another door, say 
number 3, which has a goat.  He then asks to you, ‘Do you want to pick door 
number 2?  Is it to your advantage to pick door number 2 or to stay with your 
original choice, door number 1? 
 
Intuitively, a person may expect that there is an identical chance of picking the car 
behind the two doors, but they would be wrong.  The best answer to the question involves 
understanding that it is in your interest to switch your choice to door number 2.  By 
picking the other door, the probability of winning the car rises from 1/3 to 2/3.  The trick 
to the gamble is in identifying that the only way to lose the game is by picking the car on 
the first guess; a 1/3 probability.  The effect of this example illustrates how the 
determination of probabilities depends on a person’s understanding and interpretation of 
a problem; even in simple games.  Using particular heuristics to analyze a problem, 
people will arrive at different conclusions.  The Monty Hall puzzle offers an excellent 
example of this, which becomes no more obvious when one try’s to explain the nature of 
the probabilities in the game to someone who has not previously experienced or had the 
opportunity to examine the game. 
 
What probabilities mean outside of simple games, and determining what probabilities 
mean in more complicated situations is a much more complicated problem.  Take for 
example the following hypothetical situation:  John, who enjoys walking through the 
park, walks through the park each day and each week he runs into his friend James, 
striking up a great conversation.  What is the probability that John will run into James on 
Tuesday?  To answer this question, an assessment must be made in regard to what is 
known and to how this information applies to the question posed.  Given that one out of 
seven days John runs into James, and given that Tuesday is identical to the other six days 
in a week, we can suggest that there is roughly a 1/7 or 14% chance that John will run 
into James on a Tuesday.  While the rationale used in this conclusion is correct, the 
conclusion may not accurately reflect reality.  The question of how accurate and useful 
this conclusion is must be considered.  Is there enough information to answer this 
question?  Is using probability theory appropriate or are we just guessing?  Should the 
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respondent not answer the question as they really do not know what the probabilities are?  
What unrealistic assumptions must be made to apply probability theory to this example?  
If Tuesday is the day that John always runs into James, or alternatively, if James never 
goes to the park on Tuesdays and this information is unknown when the probabilities are 
determined in the first question, then what is the relevance of the first probability 
prediction?  It is easy to change the probability given the new information, however, what 
is the significance of these hypothetical probabilities when the pattern in the unknown 
which is modeled by randomness is never known or understood, and should scientists be 
concerned with likelihoods that are any less than certain? 
 
Because people do not know what they do not know, expectations framed by present 
understanding are formed, which reflect a person’s best guess or expectation of what is 
likely.  Neglected in discussions of expectation and probability theory is just what 
understanding is required to know what the correct probabilities are in a gamble, and 
given that probabilities are not contrived, perhaps the best course of action is to search for 
more information.  Given the diversity of experience, understanding and opinions people 
exhibit, it is unlikely that the subjects in an experiment when presented with an identical 
set of lotteries will all identify the same lottery as being the best, unless all variables 
relevant to the query are controlled for or if there is a significant difference between the 
possible choices. 
 
The expected utility theory is a useful way to think of how people make decisions when 
the outcome of a choice is unknown.  People will base their decision on what they know 
or can infer from their experience.  They will identify an expected utility with a certain 
choice, and they will identify an expected likelihood to their confidence in that choice.  
Because a person can think of only one thing at a time, much of a person understanding is 
stored in their subconscious, and people subconsciously establish likelihoods in 
accordance with their expectations.  Not having to expend conscious energy on which 
utensil or how to use the utensil frees up conscious thought for more pressing concerns.  
Most decisions will have been considered so often in the past that most day to day 
choices are automatic. 
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 If all decisions are based on a degree of uncertainty, then expectation theory that takes 
into consideration the subjectivity in particular peoples’ decisions could be a powerful 
tool to analyze a broad range of human behavior.  However, as John Maynard Keynes 
suggests in, A Treatise on Probability, choices that are relatively less certain are avoided 
in favor of choices where the likelihood of outcome is practically certain: 
 
There seems, at any rate, a good deal to be said for the conclusion that, other 
things being equal, that course of action is preferable which involves least risk, 
and about the results of which we have the most complete knowledge.  In 
marginal cases, therefore, the coefficients of weight and risk as well as that of 
probability are relevant to our conclusion.  It seems natural to suppose that they 
should exert some influence in other cases also, the only difficulty in this being 
the lack of any principle for the calculation of the degree of their influence.  A 
high weight and the absence of risk increase pro tanto the desirability of the 
action to which they refer, but we cannot measure the amount of the increase (p. 
313) 
 
People interpret situations based on their understanding and consequently all decisions 
are based on a degree of uncertainty, however, because people do not understand what 
they do not know, particular rationales may be viewed as being more certain than they 
may actually be.  Completely accurate rationales may never be known with complete 
certainty, however, through continued exposure to a particular phenomenon, the majority 
of the cause and effect relationships that constitute the phenomenon may be observed and 
may eventually be generally understood.  Those cause and effect relationships that are 
more consistent, observed more often, will be better understood and rationales based on 
these observances will involve less risk than rationales based on less understood 
phenomena.  Courses of action based on rationales that are not well understood pose a 
risk that the result sought may not occur.  In these situations, the expectation of return is 
lower than the potential return and consequently uncertain rationales are less likely to be 
used to develop courses of action than those rationales that are relatively certain.  In 
short, people will tend to do what they know. 
 
Because the likelihood of an outcome is dependent upon how a person understands the 
nature the cause and effect relationships in a problem, a person will interpret even simple 
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games in terms of a much broader realm of understanding and motivation.  The 
differences in how a simple game or a lottery is perceived, understood and differences in 
motivation will create variability in what people generally choose because these variables 
are not temporally consistent, and not consistent between different people.  Differences in 
experience and consequently understanding and differences in momentary desires and 
needs will focus a person’s actions towards goals that appear subjective.  Choice, 
however, derives from the objective qualities of the many factors that manifest into 
action.  Choice and action are consequently objective, albeit this objectivity involves an 
understanding of the causal processes that effect them.  Even if different people 
understand probability theory and the probabilities in different lotteries, how people 
choose to use these lotteries and which lottery they will choose depends not just upon the 
information contained in the lottery, but on how the person perceive the outcomes of 
these lotteries leading to their best interest and the maximization of their wellbeing. 
 
IV. Explaining Prospect Theory with Opportunity Cost 
It was demonstrated that even in simple lottery examples, as discussed in Kahneman 
and Tversky’s, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk (1979), that people 
will not base decisions solely on the outcome of different lotteries.  Rather, people will 
underweight outcomes that are probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained 
with certainty.  According to Prospect Theory, $5 should generally be preferred to a 50% 
likelihood of winning $10, which contradicts the expected utility approach that a chooser 
should be generally be indifferent between two outcomes with the same expected return.  
In Prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky, demonstrate through a series of surveys that 
people consistently overweight certain outcomes relative to those that are probable, a 
phenomenon that they refer to as the Certainty Effect.  Experimental evidence published 
in Thaler et al.’s, The Effects of Myopia in Risk Aversion, confirms the certainty effect 
and proposes that people will generally prefer a gamble to a certain return only if the 
expected return from a gamble is twice that of a certain return.  While the results of many 
direct tests demonstrate inconsistency between experimental evidence and the expected 
utility hypothesis, many of these tests are limited to a narrow range of comparisons where 
the expected difference between a certain return and a gamble is relatively small. 
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Paul Samuelson once offered a colleague the following bet: flip a coin and if the coin 
lands on heads you win $200.00 and if it lands on tails you lose $100.  Samuelson 
reported that his colleague turned the bet down but said that he would be happy to take 
100 such bets.  Samuelson then proved a theorem that demonstrated that the pair of 
choices are inconsistent, that is, someone should not be willing to play a bet many times 
if they are not willing to play just once.   Expected utility theory as utilized by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern in their 1944 Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, set 
the rational foundation for decision-making under risk.  In expected utility theory, the 
utilities of outcomes are weighted by their probabilities and choices are based on 
competing lotteries rather than outcomes. 
 
As with the Monty Hall puzzle, the difficulty in understanding why the colleague 
would make such a statement is the result of not understanding the true nature of the 
offer.  An answer to the Allais paradox and to Paul Samuelson’s dilemma is that the 
opportunity cost of playing a lottery is sometimes higher than the expected return of a 
lottery.  What does this mean exactly?  As with the Monty Hall example, most of the in-
between steps serve only to confuse the chooser.  What is Samuelson’s colleague really 
risking if he chooses to play Samuelson’s gamble?  If he gambles and the coin lands on 
tails he loses $100.00 and if it lands on heads he wins $200.00.  Alternatively, if he does 
not play at all, he does not win $200.00, nor does he lose $100.00.  The true cost stopping 
him from gambling is the potential loss of U($100.00), and therefore the gamble must be 
expected to provide an expected return at least as great as the potential loss, otherwise 
there is no reason to gamble.  Because the gamble is played only once, the expected 
return from the gamble is U($50.00) = .50U($200.00) - .50U($100.00), which is less than 
the opportunity cost of making the gamble.  Consequently, if the lottery is played out 100 
times, as the colleague suggests, the opportunity cost or potential loss will be 
U($5000.00), and the expected return would be U($5000.00) = 100·.50U($200.00) - 
100·.50U($100.00).  Given that the opportunity cost of the gamble is equal to the 
expected return of the gamble after 100 plays, the colleague might save himself the time 
and effort and choose not to accept the gamble anyway.  People that are asked these types 
of questions unconsciously understand the intuition behind them.  However, consciously 
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the difficulty in understanding the nature of these problems is in identifying that the 
expected return from playing a lottery once is different from the expected return in 
playing the same lottery a repeated number of times. 
 
Expanding this discussion further, the Allais Paradox can be explained by comparing 
the classic expected utility approach to the opportunity cost and expected utility 
approach.  The following pair of choice problems discussed in Kahneman and Tversky’s, 
“Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,” are a variation of the problems 
Allais uses to describe his paradox; and differ from the original choice problems in that 
they refer to moderate rather than to extremely large gains.  The number of respondents 
who answered each problem is denoted by N, and the percentage that chose each option 
is given in brackets. 
 
Allais Paradox Example:  (Tversky and Kahneman, 1979, p. 265) 
Problem 1: Choose between  
A: 2,500 with probability 0.33, B: 2,400 with certainty. 
2,400 with probability .066, 
0 with probability 0.01; 
N = 72 [18] [82]* 
 
Classic Model7
.33·U($2,500) + .66·U($2,400) + .01·U(0) = U($2409)gamble A > U($2,400)certain B  
 
Opportunity Cost Model 
.33·U($2,500) + .66·U($2,400) + .01·U(-$2,400) = U($2385)gamble A < U($2,400)certain B  
 
Problem 2 (Tversky and Kahneman, 1979, p. 266): Choose between  
C: 2,500 with probability .33, D: 2,400 with probability .34, 
   0 with probability .67;  0 with probability .66. 
N = 72             [83]*     [17]    
 
Classic Model 
.33·U($2,500) + .67·U(0) = U($825)gamble C > U($816)certain D = .34·U($2,400) + .66·U(0) 
 
Opportunity Cost Model 
.33·U($2,500) + .67·U(.34·U(-$2,400)) = U($278.28)gamble C > U($272.16)certain D 
.34·U($2,400) + .66·U(.33·U($2,500)) 
                                                 
7 In this example, for the purpose of simplicity it is assumed that each dollar, no matter how many are 
added together, leads to the same utility as any other dollar.  The result is that a .50 likelihood will decrease 
the expected utility in half.   
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Which do you prefer?  Many experimenters find that a substantial fraction of subjects 
prefer A to B and D to C.  While these preference choices do not seem counter intuitive, 
they turn out to violate expected utility theory.  If we accept that people prefer the certain 
choice in problem 1, then by logically manipulating the expected utility equation, we 
determine that the same people in problem 2 should prefer gamble D over gamble C.  The 
problem with expected utility theory is that, in reality, people generally prefer gamble C 
to gamble D, which leads to the conclusion that the expected utility hypothesis is an 
incorrect hypothesis because it does not accurately predict human behavior.  The 
expectation of the Allais paradox is that people should prefer gambles A and C, or 
gambles B and D.  The results of the Allais paradox have led to serious concerns whether 
or not expected utility theory is broadly applicable to human decision making. 
 
Classic Model 
If (B > A), then: 
 U($2,400)certain B > .33·U($2,500) + .66·U($2,400) + .01·U(0) 
This implies,  
⇒ U($2,400)certain B - .66·U($2,400) > .33·U($2,500) + .01·U(0) 
⇒ .34·U($2,400) > .33·U($2,500) + .01·U(0) 
Which in turn implies: 
⇒ .34·U($2,400) + .66·U(0) = Gamble D > Gamble C = .33·U($2,500) + .67·U(0) 
⇒ U($816) < U($825) 
 
Then logically, gamble D should be preferred to gamble C (D > C). 
 
Opportunity Cost Model 
If B > A, then: 
U($2,400) > .33·U($2,500) + .66·U($2,400) + .01·U(-$2,400) 
This implies,  
⇒ U($2,400) - .66·U($2,400) > .33·U($2,500) + .01·U(-$2,400) 
⇒ .34·U($2,400) > .33·U($2,500) + .01·U(-$2,400) 
⇒ U($816) > U($801) 
 
While the Allais paradox suggests that expected utility theory is flawed, the paradox 
possesses several flaws which may invalidate it as evidence.  For example, the Allais 
paradox is a purely mathematical or logical manipulation of the equations that represent 
the comparison between two lotteries.  What is assumed in the Allais paradox is that the 
utility per dollar is additive and that the utility derived from $1,000,000 is equal to the 
product of the utility derived from $100 multiplied by 10,000, or any similar re-
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arrangement.  Assumed, is that the utility from winning nothing in a gamble is equal to 
the mathematical equivalent of zero.  Experimental evidence suggests that both these 
propositions are false.  Daniel Bernoulli’s 1738 solution to the St. Petersburg paradox 
introduced the idea of diminishing marginal utility, where he proposed that the utility 
from wealth, U(w), is not linearly related to wealth (w), but rather increases at a 
decreasing rate.  Significant evidence exists to support the prevalence of phenomena 
similar to diminishing marginal utility, and several studies where reported general 
happiness is compared with salary support this phenomenon.  Additionally, while it is 
generally said to be true that there is no positive utility gained from losing, it is possible 
that a person is negatively affected by not winning.  Psychologically, missing the chance 
to win $1000.00, especially when there was only a 1% chance of losing is generally 
going to lead to unhappiness.  As discussed in Schlomo Benartzi and Richard Thaler’s, 
“Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle,” and in Thaler et al.’s, 
“Probabilistic Insurance,” people tend to have a greater sensitivity to losses than gains.  
This loss aversion was shown to effect decisions merely in how particular opportunities 
are described.  In Tversky and Kahneman’s, “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative 
Representation of Uncertainty,”, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler’s, “Experimental Tests 
of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem,” describe how losses are generally 
found to be weighted about twice as strongly as gains, where the disutility of losing $100 
is roughly twice the utility of gaining $100.  In the Allais paradox, .01·U(0) = 0, which, 
out of the context of the gamble may be true.  In the context of a gamble, this 
mathematical statement represents losing the gamble, which suggests that .01·U(0) = 0 
psychologically can not be removed from the equation merely because it equates 
mathematically to zero. 
 
Original versions of the Allais paradox use extremely large gains, for example, in the 
first problem a person can choose between a certain $1,000,000 and a gamble where they 
have a 10% probability of winning $5,000,000, a 89% probability of winning $1,000,000 
and a 1% probability of winning nothing.  In the second problem, a person can choose 
between a 10% probability of winning $5,000,000 and an 11% probability of winning 
$1,000,000.  By incorporating opportunity cost in the Kahneman and Tversky moderate 
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gain example, an accurate prediction can be made in how people will choose between 
gambles.  With extremely large gains however, the model is unable to pick what choice 
people will generally make.  Expected utility theory is not a comparison of outcomes, it is 
a comparison of psychological associations in relation to outcomes.  This was the original 
intent of the theory, as Bernoulli sought to use the concept of diminishing marginal utility 
to solve the St. Petersburg paradox. 
 
As discussed previously in this discourse, satisfaction derives from the satisfaction of 
desire, and consequently, the total amount of satisfaction obtainable is equivalent to the 
extent of a person’s desires.  While an increased ability to procure useful things may lead 
to a higher level of wellbeing, eventually, all goods that are useful in satisfying a person’s 
desires will be acquired and the remaining purchasing power becomes ineffective in 
providing further satisfaction during these moments.  Just how much purchasing power is 
required to practically satisfy a person’s desires likely depends on many subjective 
factors.  As a person becomes accustomed to a higher standard of living they can become 
aware of particular luxuries that they previously would not have understood existed and 
consequently would have desired.  The utility, or more appropriately, the satisfaction that 
is expected to derive from spending larger amounts of money is subjective, and 
consequently a general average utility or expected satisfaction equated to a particular 
amount of money does not seem to accurately reflect the underlying phenomena the 
notion is used to model. 
 
By incorporating the psychological effect that different aspects of a gamble have on a 
chooser, expectation theory can be used to explain the Allais paradox and other 
experimental findings; for example, anomalies that are inconsistent with the post-
neoclassical or mathematical expectations models.  The failures of expected utility are 
not logical or mathematical ones, rather, they are symptoms of the failure to identify, 
quantify and include the psychological aspects of human behavior into the theory.  For 
example, given diminishing marginal returns and a general psychological aversion to 
losses, expectations theory can be used to demonstrate that there is not a paradox, only a 
failure to include relevant considerations. 
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In the following hypothetical example, by decreasing the amount of utility or 
satisfaction that is derived from larger winnings and incorporating the psychological 
opportunity cost of potentially losing a certainly obtainable amount of money, a 
consumer may be modeled to prefer a choice that is contrary to the preferred choice 
predicted by expected utility theory.  The main problem of the expected utility approach 
is not in its conceptualization and applicability, but rather in the exclusion of the 
psychological interpretation of the value of possible outcomes and the value of money.  
While the numbers picked in this example are arbitrary, this diminution in satisfaction 
from larger sums of money and the inclusion of a much greater disutility from the 
possibility of losing a million dollars more accurately addresses the actual factors 
affecting the choice people make when faced with this problem. 
 
Original Allais Paradox 
Situation A. 
Gamble or Certainty: Choose Between 
A:  $5,000,000 with probability .10, B: $1,000,000 with certainty. 
  $1,000,000 with probability .89, 
  $0 with probability  .01; 
 
Expected Utility Model with Psychological Integration 
.10·U($5,000,000) + .89·U($1,000,000) + .01·U(-$1,000,000)  ?  U($1,000,000) 
10·1200 utile + .89·1000 utile + .01·(-2000) utile  ?  1000 utile 
990 utile < 1000 utile8     (B is preferred to A) 
 
Depending on how people frame their decision and understand their options, it is 
possible to rationally develop a different preferred option based on the same lottery.  In 
the end, a person will prefer to choose that option which they perceive will lead to their 
best interest.  By utilizing the opportunity cost approach and the psychological 
understanding developed so far, the expected utility approach can be demonstrated to 
accurately predict which gamble people will generally prefer in each of the 14 problems 
discussed in Kahneman and Tversky’s, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk”.  The previous failure of prediction can be explained by not taking into 
account the psychological impact that each of the elements in a gamble presents.  
                                                 
8 Utilities are chosen according to the psychological properties of choice previously discussed.  
Diminishing marginal utility reduces much of the value of the extra $4,000,000 that could be won, and 
peoples’ aversion to loss increases the disutility of losing $1,000,000 with certainty.  A utile is a 
hypothetical generic unit of comparable monetary utility. 
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Incorporating the causal effect between the medium of exchange and satisfaction and the 
potential opportunity cost of winning nothing into expectations model increases the 
accuracy of the model to predict currently anomalous behaviors, and replaces the need for 
decision weights and a weighting function.  The following example further illustrates 
how the opportunity cost approach can be used to accurately predict which gamble a 
person will choose. 
 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1979, p. 267) 
Problem 7: 
A:      (6,000, .45)         B: (3,000, .90) 
N=66      [14]                       [86] * 
 
Classical Model 
A: U($6,000·.45) + U(0·.55) 
B: U($3,000·.90) + U(0·.10) 
U($2700.00) gamble A  =  U($2700.00) gamble B     (Gamble A and B are equal) 
 
Opportunity Cost Model 
A: U($6,000·.45) + U(U(-$3,000·.90)·.55) = U($2700.00) - U($1485) = U($1215) gamble A 
B: U($3,000·.90) + U(U(-$6,000·.45)·.10) = U($2700.00) - U($270) = U($2430) gamble B 
U($1215)gamble A  <  U($2430)gamble B     (Gamble B is clearly preferred to gamble A) 
 
Kahneman and Tversky’s critique of expected utility theory suggests that when people 
face uncertain or risky prospects, they consistently take actions that are inconsistent with 
the tenets of utility theory.  They found that people tend to underweight outcomes that are 
merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty.  This 
tendency called the “certainty effect” contributes to risk aversion in choices involving 
sure gains and to risk seeking in choices involving sure losses.  In addition, they suggest 
that people generally reduce and simplify more complex problems by subtracting 
common probabilities and outcomes under consideration.  This tendency is called the 
“isolation effect,” which is suggested to lead to inconsistent preferences when the same 
choice is presented in different forms.  These psychological effects and many others that 
are being discovered today will play a large role in how the psychological aspects of 
decision processes can be used to modify a formal model like expected utility theory.  
The expectation theory seems to characterize the fundamental process of choice 
involving uncertainty, however, the exclusion of the psychology or heuristics people use 
 106 
 
to deal with uncertainty and frame decisions must be ultimately incorporated into 
expectation theories to improve the accuracy of economic predictions of choice and 
consumer behavior. 
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Chapter 7.  Synopsis  
 
A scientific theory is usually felt to be better than its predecessors not only in the 
sense that it is a better instrument for discovering and solving puzzles but also 
because it is somehow a better representation of what nature is really like. One 
often hears that successive theories grow ever closer to, or approximate more and 
more closely to, the truth. Apparently generalizations like that refer not to the 
puzzle-solutions and the concrete predictions derived from a theory but rather to 
its ontology, to the match, that is, between the entities with which the theory 
populates nature and what is “really there.” 
 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn
 
I. The History of Human Behavior in Economics 
Neoclassical Economics and the Marginalist Revolution 
Prior to the study of economics was the study of political economy.  During the 
Marginalist Revolution, in the late nineteenth century, scientific inquiry began to focus 
on explaining human behavior as the primary determinant of political economizing.  
Deriving from Greek words ‘oikos’ and ‘nomos’, Economics literally means, ‘laws or 
norms of man’.  Economics was intended to be the study of the practical activities of 
economizing men in the same way that chemists study the properties of chemicals.  The 
classical economists were already leaning towards the idea that value derived from the 
labor embodied in particular things, and the marginalists extended this idea to explain 
how value derived from the relative supply and demand of the product of labor in 
exchange markets.  
 
While it is practically impossible to briefly describe the enormous amount of work that 
constitutes the history of economic thought, there exist particular undercurrents over the 
past two centuries that have guided and impeded the development of a realistic paradigm 
of human behavior in economic science.  Perhaps the most significant development 
during this period of time was the discovery of neoclassical economics.  Developing out 
of the Marginalist Revolution, which derived from the simultaneous publication of 
William Stanley Jevons’, The Theory of Political Economy, and Carl Menger’s, 
Principles of Economics, in 1871, the Marginalist Revolution led to an ideological 
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transformation where the dominant ‘classical’ labor theory of value described by Adam 
Smith, David Ricardo and Karl Marx was replaced by a new classical approach, where 
value is based on exchange rather than production and distribution.  While both Jevons 
and Menger’s revolutionary treatises were published simultaneously and addressed 
similar improvements, it was only William Stanley Jevons’ arguments, later popularized 
by Alfred Marshall, which served to develop what is now generally regarded as 
neoclassical economics.   In this neoclassical theory, rather than labor being the primary 
determinant of value, the ‘natural value’ of a good is determined according to its 
subjective scarcity, or the degree to which peoples’ desire for that good exceeds its 
availability. 
 
Within two decades, from eighteen eighty to nineteen hundred, economic theory 
significantly changed.  From Jevons’, Theory of Political Economy, to Enrico Barone’s 
1896 publication, Studi Sulla Distribuzione, the theoretical foundation of neoclassical 
economics was consolidated.  Developing upon William Stanley Jevons arguments, 
Alfred Marshall significantly improved both the scope and applicability of the 
marginalist doctrine.  In his, Principles of Economics, published in 1890, he develops and 
defines much of the terminology and many of the economic processes that are still used 
in economics today.  In this treatise he discusses demand and consumption and defines 
the law of satiable wants or diminishing utility, marginal utility, demand price, marginal 
demand price, the law of demand, elasticity of wants or demand elasticity and establishes 
the demand schedule and the process of demand that generally characterizes the process 
of demand used today.  Jevons’ treatment of utility as the defining property of value 
became the basis of Marshall’s new utilitarian system, which became the dominant 
economic approach and was used to direct economic and domestic policy in many of the 
world’s most powerful countries for almost half a century.  The marginal utility approach 
supplanted the classic labor theory of value, and utility, notably measurable or cardinal 
utility, became the key instrument to incorporate human behavior into economic 
discussion. 
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Other less economic social trends emerged and grew stronger during this period of 
history.  An epistemological revolution inspired by Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer 
led to an evolutionary movement in economics that was popularized in Social 
Darwinism.  Karl Marx had immediately picked up upon this idea and in his 
correspondence with Friedrich Engels he considers Social Darwinism as the “natural-
scientific basis for the class struggle in history”. (p. 123)  Spenser’s “survival of the 
fittest” mantra led to a socio-cultural movement towards free market system capitalism, 
where government intervention was discouraged so that the weak and unfit would be 
weeded out of the economy.  This evolutionist mode of thinking influenced the work of 
many economists at the time; namely, Pareto, Mises and Veblen.  Advancing quickly, 
science and the power of new ideas swept across the world. 
 
The end of the nineteenth century also marked the beginning of scientific psychology.  
In 1879 Wilhelm Wundt founded the first laboratory dedicated to psychological research 
at the University of Leipzig. In 1890, William James published his book, The Principles 
of Psychology, which laid many of the foundations for the sorts of questions that 
psychologists would focus on for years to come.  By not using metaphysical or religious 
explanations of human thought and behavior, Wundt and James established the 
foundation of the modern science of psychology and freed investigations focused on 
determining the nature of human behavior from the realms of philosophy and theology.  
During this time, the Jewish physician Sigmund Freud developed his techniques of 
psychoanalysis which postulated the existence of various unconscious and instinctive 
‘drives,’ and the existence of a, ‘self,’ which was presumed to exist as an internal 
perpetual struggle between the desires and demands of the id, ego and superego.  The 
scientific classification of human behavior was developed by many other important 
scientists during this period of time; including Hermann Ebbinghaus and his pioneering 
studies on memory and Ivan Pavlov’s discovery of classical conditioning. 
 
Partly as a reaction to the difficulty in quantifying the subjective and introspective 
hypotheses developed in these early psychological studies, psychologists, and with them 
many economists, began to reject studies of the mind in the early twentieth century, 
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arguing that the sciences should only study what is observable; namely behavior.  While 
many of the psychological ideas developed during this time were rejected as unscientific, 
the new behavioral and experimental approach to studying human behavior established a 
guiding epistemology that has led to the development of modern psychology and the 
behavioral and experimental approaches now being used in economics to demonstrate 
behavioral inconsistencies or anomalies in the post-neoclassical rational theory of 
consumer behavior.   
 
Led by B. F. Skinner, and later John B. Watson, Behaviorism was developed, which 
advocated restricting psychological studies to the manifestation of human action.  Skinner 
and Watson rejected the idea of internal mental states such as beliefs, desires and goals, 
believing that all behavior and learning is a reaction to the environment.  In Watson’s 
1913 paper, “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It”, he argues that Psychology “is a 
purely objective experimental branch of natural science,” and that, “introspection forms 
no essential part of its method”. (p. 158)  Because scientific knowledge of the ‘mind’ was 
considered too metaphysical and impossible to achieve, many of the subjective theories 
advanced near the end of the nineteenth century were latter abandoned.  It was not until 
late in the twentieth century with the development of cognitive science, which uses tools 
of evolutionary psychology, linguistics, computer science, philosophy and neurobiology, 
that the ‘mind’ was again considered to be a subject for serious scientific investigation. 
 
In the late nineteenth century, appeals to hedonic measures of behavior that formed the 
foundation of human behavior in economics succumbed to the same subjective 
epistemological turmoil.  With the rejection of the labor theory of value, the neoclassical 
theory became heavily dependent upon the existence of utility to explain the law of 
demand.  Married to utilitarianism, economic theory became an instrument of Bentham 
and Mills theory of ethics, which prescribed the quantitative maximization of good 
consequences for a population.  Difficulties in ascertaining the nature and measure of 
utility quickly led many economists to undertake an examination of demand theory 
without addressing measurable utility.  As early as 1906, Vilfred Pareto published his, 
Manual of Political Economy, which focused on formulating equilibrium in terms of 
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“objectives and constraints”, rather than behavioral psychology.  Focusing on preferences 
and substituting ophelimity, or economic satisfaction, for utility, Pareto relied on 
indifference curves developed by Edgeworth in, Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the 
Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences, to develop a theory of the consumer 
and producer that did not require a cardinal measure of utility.  Developing a counter 
model to the utilitarian equilibrium, Pareto introduced the notion of Pareto-optimality; the 
idea that a society enjoys maximum ophelimity when no single person can be made better 
off without making someone else worse off. 
 
During the first half of the twentieth century, the scientific treatment of human behavior 
was significantly affected by the epistemological debate over what constitutes proper 
scientific evidence, what variables should be used to explain behavior, and how these 
variables should be defined and measured.  While both William Stanley Jevons and Carl 
Menger are credited with the discovery of marginal utility, only Jevons used the term in 
his analysis.  Menger specifically objected to the concept of utility and developed an 
empirical subjective theory of value based on satisfaction maximization.  The key 
difference between the two approaches revolves around the nature of the variables used 
to describe the process of choice.  Jevons determined that utility, or usefulness, is 
variable while desire is a constant that is dependent upon usefulness.  Menger, 
alternatively, determined that the usefulness of a thing is constant and that desire is what 
is variable.  While Jevons’ theory became popularized in the English speaking world and 
ultimately formed the foundation of the now dominant neoclassical approach, Menger’s 
empirical approach was effectively relegated from international consideration by the 
inaccessibility to his research, by early attacks from the dominant German Historical 
School led by Gustov Schmoller and by many other geo-political factors.9
 
While Jevons and Menger are both generally credited with the transformation of 
economic theory from the classical labor theory to the neoclassical exchange theory of 
                                                 
9 Gustov Schmoller, one of the principal advocates of the German Historicist movement, led an intellectual 
attack on the epistemology used by the Austrian Economists, which was later referred to as the 
‘methodenstreit.’  The methodenstreit divided Austria and Germany intellectually and resulted in the 
development of the two distinct economic schools of thought; the German Historical School and the 
Austrian School of Economics.    
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value, both theories are not identical, and in fact, Menger specifically disputes 
approaches similar to Jevons’ that are dependent upon the notion of utility.  While the 
history and development of the utility based neoclassical approach is relatively well 
known, Menger’s marginal approach was never widely explored or generally accepted.  
Given the difficulty with defining, measuring or incorporating utility into a unified 
economic theory, further examination of Menger’s research should be useful; as he 
identified the failure of the utility approach over a century ago and fifty years before Sir 
John Hicks.  While Menger’s Principles of Economics is generally regarded to have 
helped issue in the marginalist revolution, knowledge and familiarity with this work did 
not develop outside of Austria and Germany until German and Austrian economists 
began relocating to the Western Countries at the beginning of the 1930s.  It was not until 
almost a century later that Menger’s, Principles of Economics, was translated into 
English and published in an English speaking country.  The first English publication was 
printed in 1950, with a forward by Frank Knight, and then later in 1976, with a forward 
by F.A. Hayek.  It was effectively not until after Jevons and Marshall’s neoclassical 
economics was effectively discredited that Menger’s contribution became accessible to 
English speaking scholars and was generally determined to have paralleled Jevons’ The 
Theory of Political Economy.     
 
International Conflict and the Rejection of Neoclassical Economics  
While the neoclassical approach was once thought to be the paradigm that could unify 
economic theory, over a century later, the neoclassical theory and economic theory in 
general is still incapable of fully addressing a broad range of human economic behavior.  
The empirical and marginal approach developed by Carl Menger constitutes a 
methodology and body of research that is significantly different than the currently 
accepted post-neoclassical approach that offers a scientific foundation to the approach 
and research currently being conducted by behavioral economists.  Menger had 
developed a new type of economics in Austria and had begun teaching and proliferating 
what was later to be referred to as Austrian Economics.  He taught two generations of 
Austrian economists, two of which were Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and Friedrich von 
Wieser, who continued Menger’s work and who helped train the next generation of 
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Austrian economists.  The most famous of these later economists were von Hayek, von 
Mises and Schumpeter, whose ideas have been adopted into mainstream Anglo-Saxon 
economics; as exampled by Lord Robbins and Frank Knight’s use of von Mises views on 
rationality and human action to dispute Marshallian economics, Wicksell and Fisher 
adoption of the Austrian theory of capital, and Wicksteed, Robbins and Knight’s adoption 
of the alternative cost doctrine. 
 
Within the English-speaking world, Marshallian or neoclassical economics became the 
dominant form of economics from the eighteen-nineties to the nineteen-thirties.  Much of 
the other economic research developed during this time was incapable of escaping the 
regions in which it was discovered.  Research conducted by the Lausanne School, 
primarily made up of French and Italian economists following the mathematical 
economics of Walras and Pareto, research conducted by the German Historical School of 
Schmoller, and research conducted by the Austrian School of Wieser and von Böhm-
Bawerk slowly diffused across their respective borders, however, very few of these ideas 
eventually reached a global audience or a universal acclaim during the lifespan of their 
creators.  While each school took a different theoretical stance or focus, the lack of 
translation and the obscure access to many of the different schools publications posed 
perhaps the greatest obstacle to the expansion of their ideas. The Marshallian approach, 
however, possessed advocates in many different countries.  In Italy and the United States, 
for example, the Marshallian principles were elucidated by Maffeo Pantaleoni, and by 
Frank Taussig, an influential economist in the Harvard School.  International conflict and 
social upheaval during this progressive time also contributed to the fragmentation of 
cooperation and the international exchange of economic ideas. 
 
Almost at the same time the Marginalist Revolution began, the Franco-Prussian war 
erupted; marking the culmination of tension between France and the Prussia dominated 
loosely federated quasi-independent territories in Germany.  Otto von Bismarck quickly 
defeated the French and broke France’s supremacy over continental Europe.  Bismark 
carefully built the external security of the new German state over the next twenty years 
and worked to isolated France internationally.  Growing instability in the Ottoman and 
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Russian empires and an escalating imperialistic race to colonialize Africa led to growing 
tensions and conflict between the world powers which ultimately culminated in The 
Great War.  At the same time, Britian had grown in power and at this time controlled 
over a third of the worlds land mass and a quarter of the world’s population.  As a result, 
renowned English economists possessed a world wide audience and an undisputed sway 
over world economic policy.  Alfred Marshall’s neoclassical economics consequently 
became widely regarded as the international standard while other economic ideas 
developed in less stable and politically isolated regions were effectively contained by 
geo-political tension, social upheaval and war.    
 
Starting in August 1914 and ending with the signing of Armistice on November 11th, 
1918, an estimated 8.5 million people were killed and an estimated 21 million people 
were wounded during the First World War.  After the war, David Lloyd George, the 
leader of Great Britian, argued that they should, “Hang the Kaiser,” and that they should, 
“Make Germany Pay,” while Georges Clemenceau, the leader of France, argued, “that 
Germany should be brought to its knees so that she could never start a war again”.  
Coupled with the punitive measures placed on Germany as stipulated in the Treatise of 
Versailles, signed on June 28th, 1919, a divisive and isolationist attitude engulfed world 
politics which ultimately contributed to the international environment that led to the 
Second World War.10  In, On European Civilization and the European Mind, Paul Valéry 
describes the effect of the First World War: 
 
One can say that all the fundamentals of the world have been affected by the war, 
or more exactly, by the circumstances of the war; something deeper has been 
worn away than the renewable parts of the machine. You know how greatly the 
general economic situation has been disturbed, and the polity of states, and the 
very life of the individual; you are familiar with the universal discomfort, 
hesitation, apprehension.  But among all these injured things is the Mind.  The 
Mind has indeed been cruelly wounded; its complaint is heard in the hearts of 
intellectual man; it passes a mournful judgment on itself. It doubts itself 
profoundly. (1922) 
 
In an article in the Hearst Newspaper (20 July 1932) titled, “On Modern Uncertainty”, 
Bertrand Russell describes a new era of uncertainty where: 
                                                 
10 It is estimated that over 62 million people lost their lives as a result of the Second World War.   
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Men of science like Eddington are doubtful whether science really knows 
anything.  Economists perceive that the accepted methods of doing the world's 
business are making everybody poor.  Statesmen cannot find any way of securing 
international co-operation or preventing war.  Philosophers have no guidance to 
offer mankind. The only people left with positive opinions are those who are too 
stupid to know when their opinions are absurd. (p. iv) 
 
Two main political changes rocked the world after the war: a greater number of 
countries began to adopt more liberal forms of government, and an angered Germany 
tried to cope with the punitions doled out to them by the Allied Nations.  Many citizens 
were angered that peacemakers had not expressed their ideals fervently enough, and 
people began to wonder why war was fought at all.  A feeling of disillusionment had 
spread across the world and people began to view their governments as being unable to 
serve the best interests of the people.  The turbulent period after the First World War 
called for a major readjustment of politics and economic policy; especially in the German 
state. 
 
In October 1929 the stock market crash in New York heralded the Great Depression.  
The ensuing U.S. economic collapse caused a ripple effect across the world.  World trade 
contracted, prices fell and governments faced financial crises as the supply of American 
credit dried up.  Many countries responded by erecting trade barriers and tariffs, which 
only worsened the crisis by further hindering global trade.  Internationally, 
unemployment surged and a growing public frustration with current economic and 
political policies led to a reevaluation of the current systems of government and 
economics.  In economic science in the nineteen-thirties, growing social discontent with 
the effect of economic policies and an academic inability to operationalize Marshall’s 
marginal theory, specifically proceeding from an inability to derive an objective measure 
of utility, led to a general revolt against the Marshallian empire. 
 
Geo-political turmoil also led to the eradication of the Austrian School of Economics.  
In Austria, after the collapse of the largest bank in 1926, the dissolution of the Austrian 
parliament in 1930, and with the possibility of civil war and annexation by Germany, 
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many of the members of the Austrian School of Economics either moved or where 
eventually exiled to Great Britain and the United States.  In nineteen thirty one, both von 
Mises and Schumpeter left Austria and eventually found their way to the United States, 
while von Hayek fled to England in 1932 later being appointed by Lord Robbins to head 
up the London School of Economics.  After the international fragmentation of the 
Austrian economists, Menger’s empirical approach and many of the ideas of his 
followers were patchworked into the prevailing academic movement away from the early 
marginalists and were synthesized into a new or post-neoclassical approach. 
 
Primarily as a result of the mounting pressure to develop new economic policies to lead 
the great powers out of the Great Depression, economic theory took a significant turn 
away from the marginalists attempts to scientifically account for human behavior in 
economics.  A trend away from the often lofty and unsupportable hypothetical 
propositions concerning the nature of mind resonated in all of the social sciences as 
discontent emerged from the failure of the utilitarian and neoclassicist based economic 
policies which were unable to prevent and which were ultimately used to antagonize 
global recession.  Economists as well as psychologists began to limit and restrict the 
study in their disciplines to strictly observable behavior and evidence, and many of the 
theoretical propositions of the early marginalists were discarded or outright discredited. 
 
The general removal of psychological interpretations of human behavior in favor of a 
New-Walrasian mathematical approach, later marked by Debreu’s 1956 paper, “Market 
Equilibrium,” led to a divisive academic environment where arguments based on the 
subtle differences between the disintegrating neoclassical approach and Menger’s 
empirical approach were not welcome.  What was desired was a purely quantitative 
science that relied on fundamentally sound assumptions that were definite and not easily 
misinterpreted or refuted.  While many of the ideas of the Austrians were incorporated 
into the new post-neoclassical economics, the empirical foundation of the Austrian 
approach was effectively discarded in favor of a highly formal mathematical approach 
that abandoned explanations of the causal connection between goods and peoples needs 
or desires.  In the early nineteen-thirties to the late nineteen-forties, it was in this 
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transforming academic environment that the Austrian economists were integrated into 
western culture.  With the disintegration of the Austrian School of Economics and the 
diffusion of its academic descendents, the empirical approach eventually dissolved and 
has since been mostly forgotten; if it was known to begin with. 
 
Post-Neoclassical Economics 
The last century of economic thought can be broadly described as the struggle to 
operationalize, then circumvent, and finally ignore the measurable marginal utility theory 
and more generally the underlying foundations of the neoclassical approach developed in 
the late nineteenth century.  For most economists, a theory of value is important because 
value is generally conceived as the cause which determines price levels.  Jevons 
conceived of price as a ratio of exchange, where price is the phenomenal manifestation of 
the value of a good.  Jevons had rejected the classical view that only the costs of 
production, namely labor, determine value, and argued that value is a magnitude which is 
determined by the interaction of two objective qualities, namely the cost of production 
and the degree of utility in the satisfaction of a person’s needs.  Alfred Marshal refers to 
this duality in his Principles as: 
 
Utility determines the amount that has to be supplied, 
The amount that has to be supplied determines cost of production, 
Cost of production determines value (p. 674) 
 
Early neoclassical theory proposed that because the two determinants of value were 
objective (utility and cost in production), then a logical and mathematical analysis of 
these objective qualities could be used to develop a realistic model of an economy.  
While an analysis of the connections between income, price and quantity have still 
remained, a cardinal or objective measure of utility has never been discovered. 
 
In early works, like Pareto’s integration of ophelimity in, Manual of Political Economy, 
and Sraffa’s 1926 critique of the Marshallian theory of the firm, in, “The Laws of 
Returns under Competitive Conditions,” the foundation of the neoclassical approach 
began to fracture.  It was not until the nineteen thirties, however, that overwhelming 
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pressure was brought on by a public need for new tools to re-evaluate economics that the 
Marshallian approach was ultimately rejected and widely discredited.  A former 
Marshallian, John Maynard Keynes, led the Cambridge economists and most of the rest 
of the world against the old Marshallian establishment.  In his now famous book, The 
General Theory of Employment Interest and Money, Keyes writes: 
 
Our criticism of the accepted classical theory of economics has consisted not so 
much in finding logical flaws in its analysis as in pointing out that its tacit 
assumptions are seldom or never satisfied, with the result that it cannot solve the 
economic problems of the actual world. (p. 378) 
 
Aided by many economists, including Lord Robbins, Frank Knight, Sir Hicks, and many 
of the fleeing Austrian economists, the neoclassical economics that developed out of the 
marginalist revolution came to an end.   
 
The difficulty in ascertaining the nature of and measuring utility led Sir John Hicks to 
publish his 1934 papers, written with R.G. D. Allen, “A Reconsideration of the Theory of 
Value” (Part I and Part II), and later, his 1939 book, Value and Capital: An Inquiry Into 
Some Fundamental Principles of Economic Theory; in which he develops an alternate 
theory of choice that uses an ordinal measure of utility that replaces marginal utility with 
a marginal rate of substitution.  Building on Pareto’s general equilibrium, Sir Hicks 
demonstrated how a theory of demand could be conceived without using anything but an 
ordinal utility function.  A measure of utility, in ‘utils,’ consequently became unnecessary 
and was replaced by a rank ordering of preference. 
 
While the Cambridge Marshallians led by Arthur C. Pigou still defended the utilitarian 
tradition in economics, many others like Lionel Robbins in his 1932 book, An Essay on 
the Nature & Significance of Economic Science, led an assault against cardinal utility 
arguing the Pigovian defense of “equal capacities for satisfaction”.  Robbins argued that 
social welfare should not be a subject of economic study at all, because if utility is not 
comparable across individuals, then the choice of social optimum is necessarily a 
normative concern or a value judgment, which is not within the scope of economic 
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science.  According to Robbins, while economics “is incapable of deciding as between 
the desirability of different ends.  It is fundamentally distinct from Ethics.” (p. 152) 
 
Similar to the abolition of subjectivism in psychology by the Behaviorists, Robbins’ 
rejection of utility and psychological hedonism as unscientific led him to redefine the 
scope of economics to similarly include only what could be observed and quantified.  
Seeking to reduce the prestige of the Marshallians, he advocated that utility and a 
subjective or psychological theory of value could not play a role in an economic science 
because it was untenable to scientific interpretation and inquiry: 
 
In recent years, however partly as a result of the influence of Behaviorism, partly 
as a result of a desire to secure the maximum possible austerity in analytical 
exposition, there have arisen voices urging that this framework of subjectivity 
should be discarded.  Scientific method is urged, and demands that we should 
leave out of account anything which is incapable of direct observation.  We may 
take account of demand as it shows itself in observable behaviour in the market.  
But beyond this we may not go.  Valuation is a subjective process.  We cannot 
observe valuation.  It is therefore out of place in a scientific explanation.  Our 
theoretical constructions must assume observable data (p. 87) 
 
In, The Nature and Significance of Economic Science, Lord Robbins redefines the scope 
of economics to be “the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between 
scarce means which have alternative uses”. (p. 16)  Similar to John Hicks argument for 
replacing marginal utility with a marginal rate of substitution, Robbins writes that in 
economic science: 
 
all that is assumed in the scales of valuation is that different goods have different 
uses and that these different uses have different significances for action, such that 
in a given situation one use will be preferred before another and one good before 
another.  Why the human animal attaches particular values in this sense to 
particular things, is a question which we do not discuss.  That is quite properly a 
question for psychologists or perhaps even physiologists.  All that we need to 
assume as economists is the obvious fact that different possibilities offer different 
incentives, and that these incentives can be arranged in order of their intensity. (p. 
85) 
 
Robbins’ rejection of the inclusion of subjective and normative arguments troubled 
some of his contemporaries.  Roy Harrod posed the question in his 1938 essay, “Scope 
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and Method of Economics,” as to whether Robbins' argument would allow any policy 
recommendations at all.   As long as somebody suffers from a policy measure, Harrod 
argued, the Pareto-improvement criteria (everyone better off, nobody made worse off) 
does not apply and thus, by Robbins's argument, economists are not in a position to judge 
such a measure.   There are very few, if any instances, where a policy proposal is clearly 
Pareto-improving.   Harrod proposed an interesting exercise to Robbins: how would one 
defend policy measures long advocated by economists, such as the repeal of the Corn 
Laws or free trade: “If the incomparability of utility to different individuals is strictly 
pressed, not only are the prescriptions of the welfare school ruled out, but all 
prescriptions whatever.  The economist as an advisor is completely stultified” (p. 396).  
Later in, “Economics and Political Economy,” Lord Robbins replies: 
 
I should not attempt to justify (the repeal of the Corn Laws) in terms of the gain in 
utility at the expense of the producers.  I should not know how to do this without 
comparisons which, to put it mildly, would be highly conjectural.  I should base 
my vindication on the general utility of the extension of markets and the resulting 
enlargement of liberty of choice. (p. 196) 
 
Many Paretians were dissatisfied with Robbins conclusions and launched the "New 
Welfare Economics" movement in the nineteen-thirties.  New Welfare Economics 
accepted the argument that utility is not comparable across people, but nonetheless 
thought that welfare judgments could be made with appropriate modifications to the 
concept of Pareto-optimality.  While many economists agreed with Lord Robbins that 
social optimality is a normative issue and that individual utilities are not comparable, 
many economists representing the new approach disagreed that normative social issues 
lied outside the purview of economics.  Other Economists like Nicholas Kaldor in, 
“Welfare Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility”, John 
Hicks in, Value and Capital, and Tibor Scitovsky in, “A Note on Welfare Propositions in 
Economics”, also did not regard social choice as a normative issue. 
 
Relabeled the “Distributists,” proponents of a modern utilitarianism like Ian Little in, 
“The Foundations of Welfare Economics”, and, A Critique of Welfare Economics, led the 
charge against New Welfare Economics. In, A Critique of Welfare Economics, Little 
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argued that individual utilities are comparable in a scientific manner, and as a result, the 
choice of a social optimum is a positive issue which economists must analyze.  As he 
writes: “interpersonal comparisons of satisfaction are empirical judgments about the real 
world, and are not, in any normal context, value judgments” (p. 66).  Little's basic 
argument is reiterated by Dennis Robertson in, “A Revolutionist's Handbook”, and in, 
“Utility and All That”.  According to Robertson: 
 
We need not worry so much about “utility and all that” but concentrate instead on 
things we can empirically see, such as peoples’ reactions to income.  We can 
safely say that a dollar to a poor man means more than a dollar to rich man.  This 
does not rely on “interpersonal comparisons of utility” in a formal sense, but it is 
plain common sense, i.e. an empirically-validated hypothesis. (p. 39) 
 
Since the Marginalist Revolution and the rejection of the labor theory of value, the 
progression of economic thought has proceeded to reduce and eliminate, step by step, the 
relevance and need for utility as both a measure and a conceptual requirement to explain 
consumer behavior, demand and market equilibrium.  No more is this apparent than in the 
work of the Neo-Walrasian economists, who have sought to recast the Paretian consumer, 
production and welfare theories into a formal axiomatic model of general equilibrium.  
Led by Tjalling Koopmans in, “Efficient Allocation of Resources,” and in, Three Essays 
on the State of Economic Science, Kenneth Arrow in, Social Choice and Individual 
Values, and Gérard Debreu in, “The Coefficient of Resource Utililization,”, and, 
“Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy,” mathematical economics 
developed and emerged into a model of human behavior in economics that relies on only 
a few simple humanistic axioms that are combined with several mathematical 
assumptions.  For example, the separation hyper-plane and fixed point theorems, which 
are used to establish the first and second welfare theorems, which set the conditions for 
equilibrium and the conditions under which a utility function can represent the preference 
ordering of a consumer.  Over the past century, most of the original neoclassical analysis 
and research, exemplified by, “On Wants and Their Satisfaction,” Book III of Alfred 
Marshall’s, Principles of Economics, has slowly been purged from economic theory.  A 
richer interpretation of human behavior was replaced by a narrower subset of behavior 
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that is characterized by the selective exclusion of controversial and supposedly subjective 
propositions. 
 
Because of the increasingly restricted view of consumer behavior, the limited inclusion 
of empirical evidence, the inability to synthesize new empirical observations, and the 
development of techniques that permit a scientific study of cognitive psychology, many 
economists have begun to question the efficacy of the rational theory of consumer choice.  
Herbert Simon and other critics of the neoclassical model argue that information is 
expensive, incomplete, and unreliable, and consequently that human rationality is limited.  
He argues that a consumer attempting to optimize their utility can’t possibly consider all 
possible alternatives (likewise comparisons) and choose the best.  To counter this view he 
has proposed a form of conduct called satisficing.  Rather than optimizing behavior, 
satisficers change their rules of conduct only if circumstances change so that the current 
rules no longer produce satisfactory results.  Even then, people do not try to optimize, but 
search for better rules by trial and error.  Because satisficing has received a great deal of 
attention, there exists a solid mathematical foundation for it and other theories of 
bounded rationality that can be found summarized in Roy Radner’s 1975 article, 
“Satisficing.” 
 
The view that utility is not amendable to measurement has recently been disputed.  In 
Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin’s, “Back to Bentham?  Explorations of Experienced 
Utility,” they argue that experienced utility is both measurable and empirically distinct 
from decision utility.  Tversky and Kahneman, have been able to show in, “Judgement 
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,”, and in, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decision Under Risk,” certain inconsistencies in the formal axiomatic model of consumer 
choice, and have demonstrated how people utilizing heuristics and framing techniques 
“rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks … to 
simpler judgmental operations”. (p. 1124) The technique of framing, specifically 
cognitive framing, mental accounting, reference utility, and anchoring were developed to 
explain other inconsistent behaviors.  
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While the “subjective” approach requires considerably more empirical research and is 
much broader in scope than the mathematical models of human behavior currently 
utilized, it possesses the potential to establish a scientific foundation of human behavior 
in economics that will enable the empirical treatment and explanation of economic 
metrics which could be used to expand the scope of economic theory, synthesize the 
current morass of economic literature into a cogent discipline, develop a realistic theory 
of the process of choice, resolve the deductive paradox with econometrics, and 
realistically explain the phenomena that affect people in their ordinary business of life.  
The story of the empirical approach was one of adversity and tragedy, however, it seems 
apparent that there is a great potential in its epistemology that may lead to the 
development of a clearer and more accurate consumer theory that could be used to 
identify the inconsistencies in the current neoclassical approach, and which could be used 
to better guide econometric studies and develop a unified theory; or at least a broader 
more inclusive economic science  
 
 
II. A Summary of Human Behavior in Economics 
Human Behavior in Economics 
The thesis of this discussion is directed towards investigating the existence of a 
foundation upon which to develop a realistic treatment and explanation of human 
behavior in economics.  Throughout this discussion, a large number of anomalous 
behaviors have been identified which cannot be explained using the current post-
neoclassical theory and models.  Many of these anomalous behaviors have been 
discovered using empirical techniques and studies that develop conclusions based on 
actual observed behavior, rather than the technique of arguing the internal logical 
consistency of particular assumptions within a formal hypothetical framework.  Despite 
the elegance and reasonableness of the hypothetical mathematical approach, the true test 
of a scientific model’s efficacy must be based upon its relevance to the phenomena it 
describes, and through the accurate comparison of its foundations and predictions with 
the true catalytics, processes and phenomena observed in reality.   
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 As described in the preceding discourse, the highly stylized models of the post-
neoclassical theory are based on inaccurate assumptions and from their inception, these 
models admittedly are incapable of accurately addressing human behavior; given that the 
these models rely extensively upon the ceteris paribus assumption, meaning that relevant 
variables are initially systematically excluded or variables that may either contradict or 
affect the model in some unknown fashion are ignored.  One of the main focuses of this 
discussion was to address these issues without arguing the internal logic of the modern 
neoclassical approach, as this approach has failed to resolve many of the core issues 
regarding motivation, discrimination and the general process of choice that seemingly 
must be understood to advance and unify the disparate subjects currently studied in 
economic science.  Because behavioral economists, those economists utilizing 
demonstrable experimental evidence, have been able to demonstrate many 
inconsistencies in modern economic theory, it was hoped that by researching and using a 
similar methodology, and by incorporating more information and more observations to 
broaden the scope of discussion, that it would be possible to realistically address human 
behavior in economics and that this approach would reveal a way forward in the science.       
 
Since the nineteen-thirties, psychological aspects of human behavior have been 
systematically rejected in economic discussion.  Because human behavior transcends into 
all economic activity, a realistic or cogent theory of human behavior is needed to develop 
the science, and consequently a realistic theory of human behavior requires an analysis of 
all relevant aspects of this behavior to include physiological and psychological 
explanations of the root causes of motivation, discrimination and the process of choice.  
In Chapter Two, the historical reason why human behavior is not more extensively 
addressed in economics is explained.  While there have been many contributing factors 
that have led to the exclusion of using human behavior to explain economic principles, 
this mode of analysis was principally eliminated from scholarly study in the nineteen-
thirties as a result of an inability to accurately develop a coherent model of human 
behavior.  In effect, economists, tired of centuries of fruitless debate, began to search for 
other means and methods to address economic behavior.  As a result, many of the early 
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psychological assumptions were removed in favor of specific theories and models that 
relate the logical consistency faced by a consumer in particular situations and under 
different conditions.   
 
Using the rational theory of consumer choice, the logical consistency within certainly 
defined scenarios can be explored, and questions in regards to how much a person will 
choose if they have higher or lower income or if they face higher or lower prices are 
addressed.  The principal failure of this approach has derived from a failure to explain the 
causal connection between goods and the reason why any particular good is chosen.  
Generally, the rational theory of consumer choice is incapable of explaining a broad 
range of economic behavior; specifically, because it excludes discussion of human 
behavior.  The restricted incorporation and explanation of human behavior in terms of a 
few behavioral axioms, establishes the foundation of a hypothetical syllogistic model that 
neither needs experimental evidence to prove its logical consistency nor requires or is 
capable of integrating experimental evidence without modifying the model.  The only 
way to judge the effectiveness of this type of model is through the models capability to 
accurately explain and predict reality, and admittedly, models based on the rational 
theory of consumer choice are incapable of accurately addressing a broad range of human 
economic behavior.  Regardless of the elegance of these highly stylized models, and their 
often clear but allegorical assertions, the work that is required to accurately understand 
and explain economic behavior can only be discovered by integrating more observations 
of behavior; not less.  Only through an inductive empirical approach, where behavior is 
analyzed and tested experimentally, will economists be able to develop a detailed and 
demonstrable understanding of the causal forces in human behavior that manifest choice.  
There already exists a considerable amount of scientific research, both in and outside of 
economics, which can be used to develop a scientific foundation of human behavior in 
economics.        
 
The two main arguments for rejecting the discussion of human behavior in economics, 
popularized in the nineteen-thirties, involved firstly identifying human behavior as a non-
economic concern, supposing that human behavior should only be studied in sociology 
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and psychology, and secondly, that the inherent nature of human behavior precludes 
generalization.  In regards to the first reason, the unavoidable fact that economics at its 
most basic level discusses the nature of and the interaction between consumers and 
producers, requires that the censorship or suppression of the subject of human behavior in 
economics will retard the development of the science.  Generally, psychological 
assumptions are made in economic theory; however, these assumptions are rarely stated 
and are generally only tacitly assumed.  The un-scientific treatment of these subconscious 
psychological assumptions that guide economic research and economic interpretation, 
invariably escape calculated examination and potentially lead to the misapplication and 
misunderstanding of the relevance and applicability of the numerous parameter based 
hypothetical propositions and models in economics.  
 
While in the nineteen-thirties much of the early behavioral research was suppressed, 
and the definition of economics was re-defined by Lord Robbins to include only the study 
of how scarce resources are or should be allocated, a detailed understanding of value, 
motivation, preference, demand, choice and exchange are all behavioral characteristics 
that must be understood in order to develop a science that attempts to realistically address 
economic phenomena.  While the argument to exclude behavioral data and analysis from 
economics is largely based upon the assumption that value judgments and other 
subjective concerns should not be the focus of economic inquiry, the primary motivation 
for abandoning the study of behavior in economics derives primarily from the geo-
political and social concerns that developed at the beginning of the twentieth century.  
This trend away from Utilitarianism resulted from the rejection of the conditional 
economic policies that led to the First World War, the Marshallian based policies that 
exasperated the Great Depression, the increased development and intellectual support for 
socialist or communist economic policies, and more generally from a failure to develop a 
realistic theory and model of human economic behavior based on utility and utility 
maximization.  These factors played a significant role in the support for and motivation to 
develop a post-neoclassical economic theory.    
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Similarly, the second objection that human behavior is subjective and not amendable to 
generalization can now generally be regarded as incorrect.  Since the marginalist 
revolution, the new science of economics was devised to concentrate on developing the 
theoretical foundations of a science of human behavior.  In the late nineteenth century, 
economists sought to explain the general qualities of human behavior, and sought to 
explain how these qualities form the foundation of a unified economic understanding.  
Jevons, Menger, Walras, Pareto, and later Marshall, all developed a theory of human 
behavior upon which they developed their economic theories and models.  The notion 
that human behavior is not amendable to generalization derived mainly from a failure to 
discover a measure of utility, and it is generally this rejection of utility that took place in 
the nineteen-thirties that marks the transformation away from the economics of the early 
marginalists.  Rather than studying the nature of the economic phenomena, a general 
theory of economic behavior and consequently a scientific foundation of economics was 
abandoned.  Today, the argument that it is not possible to develop accurate and useful 
generalizations of human behavior is demonstrably false.   
 
With the development of cognitive psychology and advancements in general 
psychology, medical research, physiology, and a detailed understanding of the 
relationship between particular physiological systems and motivation, preference, choice 
and personality, many of the questions that could not be adequately addressed 
approximately a century ago can now be scientifically demonstrated and incorporated 
into economic science to realistically model the process of choice and to develop a 
realistic theory and model human economic behavior.  It is now possible to objectively 
quantify behavioral phenomena and incorporate this understanding into economic theory.  
While human behavior is complex and choices and preferences are not necessarily 
identical between individuals, the physiological and environmental systems and forces 
that work together to manifest preference and choice can now be identified and studied.  
As I. M. D. Little argues in, A Critique of Welfare Economics, “interpersonal 
comparisons of satisfaction are empirical judgments about the real world, and are not, in 
any normal context, value judgments”. (p. 66)   
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Emphasizing consistency rather than an improved analysis of the core variables of 
human behavior, many of the arguments and terminology used by the neoclassicists was 
redefined in terms of a logical and mathematical framework.  Perhaps the most 
unfortunate transformation was the adjustment of rationality to mean only logical 
consistency.  Rather than relating the purposeful and reasoned nature of behavior in the 
rational theory of consumer choice, rational behavior refers only to the transitivity in 
peoples’ decisions.  In, “Rational Expectations and Macroeconomics in 1984,” Robert 
Barro comments on the clever interpretation of rationality used in post-neoclassical 
economics:   
 
One of the cleverest features of the rational expectations revolution was the 
application of the term ‘rational’. Thereby, the opponents of this approach were 
forced into the defensive position of either being irrational or of modeling others 
as irrational, neither of which are comfortable positions for an economist (p. 179) 
 
The argument that people can be either irrational or rational has contributed to the 
inability to develop a realistic theory.  As discussed in Chapter Three, the suggestion that 
people act rationally involves more than an argument involving the consistency between 
choices.  In post-neoclassical economics, behavior that is inconsistent with particular 
economic hypotheses is often considered irrational, when in fact, it is not that the 
behavior is inconsistent; it is rather that these models fail to adequately explain and 
predict the outcome of particular behavioral phenomena.  As von Mises has suggested in, 
Epistemological Problems in Economics, it is not that peoples’ choices are rational or 
irrational, consistent or inconsistent, it is rather that peoples’ behavior and actions are 
always purposeful; there being always a rationale directing action.  The failure to 
distinguish the difference between these two concepts of rationality has led to many 
inaccuracies and to a science based on syllogistic models that reject and judge particular 
behaviors rather than a science that rejects those hypotheses that are incapable of 
accurately explaining or predicting human behavior.   
 
Because of the reliance on syllogistic reasoning rather than scientific inquiry, in 
Chapter Four, an attempt has been made to empirically re-address the basic 
characteristics and basic properties generally known today concerning the mechanical 
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nature of human behavior.  While many people may reject the mechanical or empirical 
nature of this discussion, the volumes of medical and psychological research conducted 
on the nature of human behavior demonstrates that human beings are biological machines 
that are constituted by a multitude of internal causal systems that are affected by a 
multiplicity of causal external forces.  Given this causal environment, all existing 
phenomena must be interconnected and it is in this chapter that the physiological 
foundation of understanding, motivation and the basis for discrimination are 
hypothesized.  Neither the neoclassical, nor the post-neoclassical theory of consumer 
behavior attempt to address the derivation of motivation and discrimination here 
hypothesized to derive causally from differing desires and differing physiological needs 
that are guided by the body’s ideas and genetic programming.    
 
While there are many important human characteristics that are not addressed in modern 
economics, there also exist a number of important human characteristics that are miss-
specified or inaccurately depicted in modern economics.  In Chapter Five, Jevons’ theory 
of value based on scarcity and ‘utility’ is demonstrated to both improperly explain how 
people value and choose goods and inadequately resolve Adam Smith’s water and 
diamond paradox.   According to the neoclassical theory derived from Jevons’, The 
Theory of Political Economy, Smith’s supposed value-paradox is resolved by taking into 
account the relative scarcity of a good in relation to its demand.  According to Jevons, 
value in use is equivalent to the total utility derived from a good, which is equal to the 
sum of the final utility derived from each successive unit of a similar goods consumed.  
Exchange value, or price, is equivalent to the final degree of utility, which is represented 
as the ratio of the quantities in which different goods are exchanged.  Water has no price 
because all desire for water is satisfied and consequently the final degree of utility for 
water is zero.  Because diamonds are scarce, a limited number of diamonds cannot be 
used to satisfy the total demand for diamonds and consequently the final degree of utility 
from consuming a diamond is much higher.  Based on this logic, increased scarcity, 
relative to demand, leads to a higher price or exchange value, while an increased ability 
to use a good, whether cheaply obtainable through relative abundance, leads to a higher 
use value or total utility.     
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 In Jevons’ approach to resolving Smith’s paradox, he redefines the nature of value in 
terms of the quantity of a good consumed relative to its demand.  The total value of a 
mass of a good is consequently equivalent to its exchange price multiplied by its quantity.  
Alternatively, Smith’s original discussion of use and exchange value revolves around his 
attempt to explain his labor theory of value and the real and nominal price of things: 
 
The real price of every thing, what every thing really costs to the man who wants 
to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it.  What every thing is really 
worth to the man who has acquired it, and who wants to dispose of it or exchange 
it for something else, is the toil and trouble which it can save to himself, and 
which it can impose upon other people. (p. 33)   
 
According to Smith, “Labor, therefore, it appears evidently, is the only universal, as well 
as the only accurate measure of value, or the only standard by which we can compare the 
values of different commodities at all times and at all places.” (p. 41)   
 
The difficulty in Jevons’ approach derives from his reliance on utility, whereby he 
means the desire or demand for more of a good.  Where Smith attributes the toil and 
trouble of labor as the psychological root of value, Jevons attributes utility, or the desire 
for more, as the psychological root of value.  Jevons, however, never explains the 
characteristics of how this desire manifests, other than to suggest disjointedly that 
consuming more leads to a greater total utility, if only marginally.  What is completely 
ignored in both theories (the labor theory of value and the marginal utility theory) is the 
causal connection between the intrinsic usefulness of the physical properties of a good 
and how these properties are understood and can be commanded to satisfy ‘desire’. 
 
Neither theory argues with the idea that people demand goods because they satisfy a 
person’s needs or desires, however, neither theory explains how this desire relates to the 
pursuit and interests of people and why they choose to acquire a particular thing.  
According to Adam Smith, people value goods based on the cost of production, and 
Jevons argues that people value goods based on the relative supply in relation to demand.  
Why people desire things is not dependent upon their cost in production, nor their relative 
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availability.  Why people desire things is dependent upon a person’s understanding of 
how a particular thing can be used to improve a person’s wellbeing.  Because people 
desire things that they understand improve their wellbeing, they will value more those 
things that can better be used to improve their wellbeing.  If there was no cost in 
production and all goods were freely abundant, how would a person discriminate in their 
choice, and what goods would a person value over others?  As constraints to obtaining 
this value are imposed, whether through the cost of production, or through relative 
scarcity, the capability to obtain the true value of a good is limited, and a person must 
negotiate between these constraints to best obtain this true value; the properties of things 
that can be used to improve wellbeing. 
 
Both the labor theory of value and the marginal utility theory inaccurately or 
incompletely address the motivation to acquire and the subsequent process whereby 
useful things are valued.  The value of any good, as Carl Menger has argued in, 
Principles of Economics, is dependent on the causal connection between the physical 
properties of a thing and how a useful thing is understood and can be commanded to lead 
to a person’s wellbeing.  The value in use is consequently the degree to which a good can 
be used to lead to an improvement in wellbeing, and consequently is dependent upon the 
corresponding momentary degree of desire for a particular thing.  Exchange value, on the 
other hand, is not so much a measure of value, but a measure of the relative cost to 
produce and acquire particular things.  The perverse, or inverse, idea that a cost should 
relate to value derives primarily from the perspective of the producer or the seller, as they 
compare what ‘value’ (the physical properties of things that can be used to improve 
welfare) can be exchanged for with their produce.  Exchange consequently revolves 
around the interaction between an understanding of and demand for value and the 
constraints in acquiring value.  In an exchange market, only those useful things that best 
deliver value relative to their cost will be exchanged.  The opportunity cost of acquiring 
relatively less useful things at a higher relative cost will eliminate the marketability of 
potentially useful things.                
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In Chapter Six and Chapter Seven, the basic assumptions and parameters that define 
consumer choice under relative certainty and uncertainty are examined.  In many cases, 
by simply defining empirically the most basic economic properties and by introducing the 
physiological and psychological lessons learned in the previous chapters, the causal 
connections between many economic assumptions and arguments can be identified and 
can be used to demonstrate how most of the basic economic assumptions currently used 
in modern neoclassical and post-neoclassical economics inaccurately model human 
economic behavior.  Many of the initial assumptions used in the rational theory of 
consumer choice can be demonstrated to be flawed, including the axiom of transitivity, 
the axiom of non-satiation, and rationality.  While the rational theory of choice and 
welfare economics establish a logical structure upon which to model economic behavior, 
these theories and models are: incapable of integrating new observations, unable to fully 
explain why people consume, unable to explain why people discriminate, unable to 
explain utility, unable to explain how desires regenerate, unable to explain anomalous 
behavior, and generally are unable to interpret, integrate, or explain any behavioral 
characteristics that are not specifically modeled into the syllogistic paradigm. 
 
Choice and action as discussed in this thesis are primarily dependent upon the quality 
of a person’s understanding of reality.  As this understanding evolves, people are able to 
identify usefulness in things that previously were not perceived to have value.  Solow and 
Romer’s growth theories based on the development of human capital and technological 
expansion parallel how people, societies and nations increase their wellbeing by 
developing an improved understanding and capability to more efficiently satisfy their 
desires and improve their general wellbeing.  Similar also to the development of an 
economic science, what is required is a greater understanding of the actual phenomena 
that are involved to improve understanding, rather than protecting inquiry by forming an 
insulated syllogistic paradigm.  Growth in economics like growth in an economy requires 
a mastery of nature, which develops from a greater understanding of reality. 
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Human Behavior 
Why I do something, why I choose this over that, why I choose anything at all, what 
motivates me, how does it affect me, why does it affect me, how much does it affects me, 
how much do I want it, why do I want it, how do I use it, how do I understand it, how do 
I understand, why do I understand, how do we interpret and understand these things and 
what are they and what do they mean to me?  There are many questions that must be 
resolved in order to develop a realistic model of human behavior in economics.  In 
Herbert Simon’s Richard T. Ely Lecture, “Rationality as Process and as Product of 
Thought,” he makes three suggestions that address a proper starting point to develop a 
realistic theory of consumer behavior.  First, he suggests that “all human behavior has a 
large rational component, but only in terms of the broader everyday sense of rationality, 
not the economists’ more specialized sense of maximization.”  Second, he recommends 
that using a stronger, not a weaker, definition of rationality would improve upon 
economic theory and analysis.  Lastly, he advocates the study of choice processes rather 
than static scenarios: 
 
economics has largely been preoccupied with the results of rational choice rather 
than the process of choice.  Yet as economic analysis acquires a broader concern 
with the dynamics of choice under uncertainty, it will become more and more 
essential to consider choice processes.  (p. 2) 
 
Each of these suggestions has in common a methodological transition from a syllogistic 
to an empirical epistemology.  Herbert Simon does not just advocate the redefinition of 
rationality, he, and many others, advocate an epistemological transformation in the how 
economics phenomena should be studied.  The causes and connections between the 
phenomena that effectuate choice must be understood and the best way to do this, as has 
been discovered hundreds of years ago, is to concentrate on expanding the scope of 
observed experience and to continually experimentally develop and test the science’s 
most basic assumptions.  In this discourse, many of the most basic assumptions in 
modern economics have been discussed and many of them have been shown to 
inaccurately model reality.  While it is quite likely that many of the ideas presented in 
this discourse may not be completely accurate, the ideas in this discourse are based on 
observations that can be demonstrated to be accurate or be rejected by experimental 
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testing, whereas, many of the assumptions and arguments in the neoclassical and post-
neoclassical models are syllogistic hypotheses that can only be tested in relation to the 
accuracy of the models predictions.  If the predictions are wrong, the only course of 
action to fix these models is through modifying their initial assumptions or by expanding 
the internal logical consistency in their arguments.  The empirical approach, alternatively, 
establishes a scientific foundation upon which to develop an inquiry based on observable 
evidence derived from actual investigations of human economic behavior that can be 
tested at any level; this is because each assertion in the empirical model is derived from 
observable phenomena.    
 
In modern economics, human beings are generally considered to be rational, however, 
this rationality means only that a person is consistent in their decision making, rather than 
relating the purposeful or reasoned nature of human choice and action.  In chapter three, 
rationality is determined to be momentary and causal, referring to the use of and 
awareness of rationales.  A person’s understanding is hypothesized to be constituted from 
a large number of rationales that derive from the cause and effect relationships a person 
observes or experiences in reality.  This remembered understanding forms the basic 
collection or repository of ideas that a person draws from to guide decisions directed 
towards their interests.  Because action is purposeful and based upon the same logical 
consistency in reality that all people generally observe, there exists a significant degree of 
commonality in how different people will generally respond to similar desires.  
Combined with autonomous physiological responses, and the physiological manifestation 
of need or desire in terms of feelings and emotions, value is derived as a consequence of 
the identification that particular things are useful in satisfying these human feelings, and 
consequently through the combination of a person’s understanding and their feelings, a 
person chooses and acts purposefully to improve their wellbeing by satisfying their 
internal desires or physiological needs.   
 
A person’s senses or specifically a person’s ability to detect the bodies chemistry 
and external phenomena are translated through a person’s understanding.  This 
understanding manifests into preferences for particular things and courses of action.  
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Based on a preference for the state of being identified to result from utilizing 
particular means or taking or not taking a particular action, a person is motivated to 
acquire or act in such a way that their preferred state of being can be realized.  This 
preference for one thing, or one action, over another, forms the basis for 
discrimination in choice.  Choice, as a cognitive function, is consequently motivated 
by an attempt to effect the conditions that lead to previously experienced states of 
being.  Choosing to eat food, for example, is motivated causally by a desire to move 
from the state of hunger to a state of fullness; which is a preferred state of being.  
How a person understands the conditions that must be met to achieve particular states 
of being, and how they understand the tools, actions and general means of achieving 
them will ultimately determine what a person will value, and consequently will 
determine what choices they will make.     
 
All behavior, other than autonomous or involuntary response, is rational, in that it is the 
product of a choice that is conceived from a rationale, or an understanding of 
consequence.  What a person understands effects how they plan to effect particular 
courses of action and determines why a person acts in a particular way.   Laziness or 
altruism, are often thought to be irrational behaviors.  These behaviors are rational in that 
they reflect a person’s perceived best interest in their pursuit of maximizing their 
wellbeing.  Obviously, those who do not understand how reduced effort or giving 
unconditionally to others leads to a positive outcome will not engage in these courses of 
action.  Gary Becker has expressed in his Nobel Lecture, “The Economic Way of 
Looking at Behavior,” that there has been a concerted effort to, “pry economists away 
from narrow assumptions about self-interest.” (p. 384)  According to Becker, behavior is 
driven by a much richer set of values and preferences where, “individuals maximize 
welfare as they conceive it, whether they be selfish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or 
masochistic.” (p. 385) 
 
Because people are purposeful in their conduct, their choices and actions are limited 
temporally to what can be interpreted and considered in momentary situations.  Whether 
many moments are used to formulate one or many possible courses of action, decisions 
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are ultimately momentary and consequently affected by momentary considerations and 
momentary desires.  A person’s current state of being, capabilities, environment, 
understanding and opportunity will affect what a person will choose and define the 
limitations of choice.  In the modern consumer theory, consumers are thought to be able 
to make all crosswise binary comparisons between all goods and determine what goods 
they prefer.  This assumption is apparently false, as a person can be demonstrated to be 
guided by their momentary desires and limited in their choice of action by their current 
understanding and ability to command the cause and effect conditions that lead to the 
satisfaction of their desires.   
 
The motivation for choice is hypothesized to derive individually from the relative 
magnitude of a person’s many mutually exclusive desires, and the discrimination between 
particular choices is hypothesized to derive from the perceived differences in the degree 
and duration of dissatisfaction that will be satisfied.  The preferred choice is the one with 
the lowest opportunity cost that leads to the most dissatisfaction being reduced.  Desire is 
consequently the motivator of choice and economic usefulness in satisfaction of current 
desire is the measure of discrimination.  Because a person possesses many mutually 
exclusive desires that fluctuate, growing stronger as time passes, or becoming satiated 
through action, a person requires many different useful things to satisfy their many 
desires.  Just because a thing possesses particular properties that may be used to satisfy 
particular needs or desires, does not guarantee that the thing will be valued or chosen.  A 
person must have a desire that can be satisfied by a thing or action before they are 
motivated or interested in acting.  Additionally, those things that are more economical 
(more effective at a lower cost), will reduce the marketability of useful things that are, 
per unit of cost, relatively less effective.   
 
Rather than maximizing utility, people attempt to maximize their wellbeing, which is 
equivalent to minimizing their dissatisfaction over time.  Interestingly, because people 
maximize wellbeing over time, the longer the period in consideration, the greater will be 
the expected dissatisfaction that will result from not satisfying particular desires.  The 
total dissatisfaction felt in any one moment is equivalent to the sum of all current 
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unsatisfied desires, and each of these mutually exclusive desires are chosen to be satisfied 
in priority relative to the expected total dissatisfaction expected to occur over a period of 
time if the desire is not currently satisfied.  In this way, of the two desires that in a 
moment dissatisfy a person equally, the desire that will be satisfied first will be the desire 
that grows more quickly in dissatisfaction over time.  Choice and action consequently 
revolve around the temporal satisfaction of as many desires as possible, as the benefit 
over time of satisfying desires sooner than later leads to increased wellbeing as the same 
dissatisfaction, or unsatisfied desire, is not felt in each consecutive moment.  Because 
choices are based on temporal considerations, there is a greater benefit in completely 
satisfying a particular desire than attempting to satisfy many different desires 
incompletely where the marginal ‘utility’, or more accurately, the marginal satisfaction, 
from the consumption of each unit of a good is equal.  Because of the additional cost in 
effort and time from switching between different means to satisfy different desires, 
desires should tend to be completely satisfied, and this tendency should become more 
prevalent as the cost of transition, or opportunity cost, is higher.    
 
Choice and action derive from the pursuit of a person’s perceived best interest in the 
moment, as people seek to maximize their wellbeing temporally.  Things that are 
understood to be useful and can be commanded in the satisfaction of desire have value 
and are considered goods.  A thing that is not useful in directly or indirectly satisfying a 
desire does not possess value and is not considered a good.  This can result from a lack of 
understanding how to use a thing, can result once a desire is satisfied, can develop from 
an inability to command a good, or can result from a change in technology.  A person 
consequently may not know how to operate a computer, may no longer desire food once 
full, may no longer be able to ride a motorcycle losing their legs in war, or higher order 
goods that are used in one form of production may become obsolete as the method of 
production changes.  Goods like desires are relatively mutually exclusive.  Unlike 
desires, a good may be useful in satisfying different desires.  For example, a knife may be 
used as a weapon, as an eating utensil, as a crampon, used to tell time and direction and 
may be useful in satisfying many desires.  Some things, however, may be perceived to 
possess value, but may not lead to satisfaction.  Value while based on reality is subject to 
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a person’s understanding of usefulness.  An inaccurate or incomplete understanding of 
reality may lead to a failure to identify value and may lead to the consumption of bogus 
goods, which are later discovered to not satisfy desire.     
 
In order for a person to form an expectation, they must understand to a degree the 
causal relationships between particular phenomena.  In simple games, they must 
understand the possibilities and possess an understanding of likelihood.  True uncertainty 
in a person’s understanding refers to phenomena not experienced or understood.  People 
are not able to take into consideration what they do not know, and are unable to intuit 
probabilities as there is no understanding upon which to expect or interpret particular 
outcomes or what outcomes are possible.  Rationales contain an understanding of cause 
and effect, but when particular connections are less understood or are more abstract, the 
understood probabilities of occurrence are determined by the a person’s experience of 
outcome.  Because reality must be experienced to be understood, an understanding of the 
causal connection between things derives from the consistency in occurrence observed 
and consequently all expectations contain a degree of risk. 
 
People will tend to favor less risky choices, because these choices are expected to lead 
to a higher degree of satisfaction because the potential outcome is not diminished by the 
probability that the course of action will not lead to satisfaction.  Between a risky choice 
and a relatively certain choice with the same potential outcome, the certain choice will 
always be preferred.  Because understanding plays such an important role in what a 
person chooses, how a person understands a particular situation will determine what 
choice a person will make.  In experiments with simple games, the respondent is 
generally assumed to make a decision based only on the probabilities in the game.  They 
are usually not asked what they think the probabilities are in a simple game.  When 
people choose differently than how they are hypothesized to act, they are assumed to 
have acted irrationally or acted mistakenly.  As discussed in chapter six, sometimes 
interpreting what the true probabilities are, even in simple games is not always simple or 
easy. 
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Because people base their decisions on how particular phenomena and particular 
courses of action affect their wellbeing, a simple game and the logic inherent in the game 
are interpreted in relation to the interests of the respondent.  A person’s momentary 
understanding and desires will determine how they respond.  A person interested in other 
activities other than thinking about the game may quickly and arbitrarily answer which of 
several lotteries they would prefer, so as to reduce the amount of time they would 
otherwise waste considering the choice.  Other respondents may empathically choose a 
particular outcome, but may interpret more into the simple game and may rely on guiding 
rules that they have experienced work well to derive a positive outcome from uncertain 
situations.  In these simple games, how a person understands the choices in relation to 
their interests determines how they will frame their decision and what choice they will 
make.  While a game provides a basic probability scheme, how this scheme is interpreted 
determines the basis for choice.  For example, Paul Samuelson’s bet against his friend, 
where if a coin lands on heads his friend wins $200 and if it lands on tails he looses $100.  
Samuelson’s friend rejects the bet, which violates the expectations hypothesis; however, 
his friend is interpreting more information into the game than is simply represented by 
the probabilities.  In the short term, Samuelson’s friend faces the possibility of being 
worse off than they currently are which is not articulated in the expectation equation.  
Repeatedly playing the game would reduce this potential problem.  By incorporating the 
opportunity cost of both possible outcomes into the expectation, it can be shown that in 
the short run the simple game is expected to not be in the interest of a person who makes 
only one gamble, but over time, the expected return will be equal to zero.   
 
Many economic experiments suffer from a similar problem of not taking into account 
patterns that affects what a person chooses.  People draw from their understanding and 
integrate their desires with the probabilities in simple games when they decide which 
choice they will make.   People reveal what they prefer when they choose, however, this 
does not mean that people are transitive in their decision-making.  Rather, this only 
means that people relate means to ends and choose courses of action or useful things 
because they are perceived to best lead to the maximization of a person’s wellbeing.  
People reveal their preferences when they choose, however, because there is not a 
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realistic framework or model to explain the process of choice, peoples’ choice are often 
confused by economists and some behaviors are categorized inaccurately.  The empirical 
approach discussed in this discourse can alleviate many of these problems.   
 
Whether through explaining rationality, understanding, motivation, discrimination, 
value, the mutually exclusive nature of desires and goods, how choices are momentary 
considerations of temporal considerations, how desires can be satisfied, how numerous 
economic assumptions are inaccurate, the nature of certain and uncertain decisions, or 
explaining how improved understanding leads to economic growth, the empirical 
approach, while only briefly examined in this discourse, can be utilized to effectively 
guide future economic research and experimentally test future hypotheses of human 
behavior in economics.  It seems relatively certain that there will be a great benefit from 
developing a more experimental and empirical study of economic behavior, rather than 
concentrating on the development of syllogistic models.  A reliance on mathematical 
manipulation has done little to expand and develop a realistic unifying theory, primarily 
because it is not focused on identifying observable evidence and integrating this evidence 
into a coherent theory.  While economics is largely considered to be the study of how 
scarce resources are or should be allocated, economics is exceedingly more vibrant and 
psychological than is currently accepted.  Given the importance of human behavior and 
the psychological and physiological underpinnings of the foundations of consumer 
theory, it seems practical to reintroduce Alfred Marshall’s definition of economics:  
 
Economics is a study of mankind in the ordinary business of life; it examines that 
part of individual and social action which is most closely connected with the 
attainment and with the use of the material requisites of wellbeing. (p. 1) 
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